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Political Science Quarterly

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Readers of *PSQ* will note in the masthead a change in the name of the Managing Editor. Mary Ann Epstein, who has been with *PSQ* since 1973, resigned to relocate abroad with her husband. Her successor, Lesley A. Rimmel, comes to *PSQ* after having served as Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of International Affairs.*

Mary Ann Epstein will always have my special thanks and affection for managing the affairs of the journal with consummate efficiency, thus permitting me to perform the duties of Editor while also remaining a full-time professor.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

JERRY A. WEBMAN uses statistical and case-study methods to analyze Urban Development Action Grants made between April 1978 and January 1980. He finds that the grants supported private investment that was largely in line with prevailing urbanization patterns and that grant money went disproportionately to the most economically distressed cities eligible for the programs.

GARY L. GUERTNER examines the multinational structure of the Soviet state and its resulting vulnerability in the context of the Soviet-American mutual deterrence relationship. He argues that geopolitical and ethnographic variables are as important as weapons characteristics in maintaining the stability of the strategic balance.

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN argues that Canada's 114-year-old constitutional system is undergoing a profound change under the leadership of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and that the result could be either a strengthening of the federal authority or a further decentralization, even fragmentation, of the country.

AARON S. KLIEMAN takes issue with the general tendency to dismiss the 1975–1977 emergency period in India as a brief departure from democratic government. Emphasizing the structural and behavioral weaknesses exposed by crisis rule, Klieman uses India to illustrate the likelihood of a residue of undemocratic practices enduring even after the successful termination of an emergency.

WILLIAM W. LAMMERS examines data on the frequency and regularity of press conferences for all presidents since Franklin Roosevelt. Lammers concludes that the tendency toward press conference avoidance during crisis situations is a serious limitation on their effectiveness as an avenue for public scrutiny of presidential action.

JOSEPH COOPER and WILLIAM WEST analyze the growth in voluntary retirement among congressmen during the past decade. They attribute the trend to increased job dissatisfaction and they analyze the significance of voluntary retirement with respect to patterns of tenure and institutional change.

LOUIS FISHER and RONALD C. MOE review the federal government experience with the executive reorganization plan process. They conclude that the drawbacks of the process are so serious that the executive and legislative branches would both benefit by not renewing the authority, which expired in April 1981.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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UDAG: Targeting Urban Economic Development

JERRY A. WEBMAN

The Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program, the principal urban policy innovation of the Carter administration, was intended to stimulate economic recovery in America's most distressed urban areas. Enacted in October 1977 as section 119 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, it provided $400 million in each of its first two years of operation, fiscal 1978 and 1979. Congress increased funding to $675 million for fiscal 1980. Popular among the nation's mayors, UDAG survived the Reagan fiscal 1982 budget cuts despite initial inclusion among doomed programs.

In authorizing the program, Congress provided specific instructions concerning who was to receive action grants, but said little about what recipients could do with the money. The law states that UDAG funds should go "to severely distressed cities and urban counties to help alleviate physical and economic deterioration through reclamation of neighborhoods having excessive housing abandonment or deterioration, and through community revitalization in areas with population outmigration or a stagnating or declining tax base."[1] Relative levels of "severe distress" and "excessive" deterioration were to be measured by "factors such as age and condition of housing stock, including residential abandonment; average income; population outmigration; and a stagnating or declining tax base."[2] Congress clearly intended that eligibility be narrowly restricted and that eligibility criteria emphasize physical aspects of urban deterioration.

[1] Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, sec. 119 (a), 91 Stat. 1125 (1977).
[2] Ibid., sec. 119 (b).

JERRY A. WEBMAN is assistant professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University and director of the cross-national research project on the politics and implementation of urban economic development policy. He is the author of a forthcoming book on urban redevelopment in two Western European cities.

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By contrast, the law is remarkably vague and permissive in describing how action grants are to help alleviate distress. Applications are to "describe a concentrated urban development action program setting forth a comprehensive action plan and strategy to alleviate physical and economic distress through systematic change." In its strongest hint about what such programs should include, Congress required that they "be developed as to take advantage of unique opportunities to attract private investment, stimulate investment in restoration of deteriorated or abandoned housing stock, or solve critical problems resulting from population outmigration or a stagnating or declining tax base."[3] Congress intended, in short, that UDAG be a highly targeted program. But it did not specify that the program should focus primarily on private investments as its way of stimulating economic development.

This focus is nonetheless the distinctive feature of the UDAG program. This approach flows not from the authorizing legislation but from Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rules and regulations. Using the law's "unique opportunity" provision, HUD officials wrote regulations stating that "no project will be funded . . . unless there is a firm commitment of private resources to the proposed project."[4] With this provision, HUD shaped the action grant program as an instrument for achieving public goals by securing the cooperation and active participation of private business. HUD's first annual report on UDAG explains the strategy behind the requirement for private commitments.

> This is a fundamental principle distinguishing the Action Grant program from previous urban revitalization efforts. This requirement is based on the recognition that public funds, alone, are not sufficient to revitalize distressed cities. The private sector is essential, working in partnership with local government, to carry out economic development and neighborhood revitalization projects.[5]

These regulations mean that action grants cannot fund just any activity that would "help alleviate deterioration," but can only support projects that stimulate new private economic activity in distressed urban areas. Applications must contain legally binding commitments for private investment: no UDAG money can be spent until private funds begin to flow.

In sum, the law specifies who can receive UDAG grants; the regulations specify what can be done with them. Together, these legislative and administrative requirements define the two principle goals of the UDAG program: to stimulate private economic activity, and to do so in the nation's most distressed urban areas. This article assesses how well the program met these goals in the first two years of its operation. It uses two sources of information: data provided by HUD on the 520 grants that were awarded between April 1978 and January

[3] Ibid., sec. 119 (c) (2).

[4] *Federal Register*, vol. 43, no. 6 (19 January 1977), p. 1608.

[5] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Evaluation, *Urban Development Action Grant Program: First Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 4.

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1980; and case studies of eight UDAG projects in five New Jersey cities—four projects in Newark and one each in Paterson, Morristown, New Brunswick, and Salem.

The Mechanics of Action Grants

To obtain an Urban Development Action Grant, an eligible city or urban county must put together a financial package. This package is the central component of a UDAG application, and understanding the process of putting together the package is the key to understanding how the UDAG program works.

In brief, an application must show first that government officials and prospective private investors have worked out a project that would be viable if a specific problem were solved, and second that an action grant to the municipality can reasonably be expected to solve that problem. The application must also estimate how many jobs the project will create, predict how the project will affect the municipality's fiscal position, show how much experience the local government has had with similar undertakings, and provide information on how distressed the municipality is. In choosing which projects to fund from among those submitted in each calendar quarter, HUD looks at all the supporting information. But first HUD officials review the plans for the specific project and the information provided on a specific problem to be solved by an action grant.

Action grants can be used to solve a wide range of problems connected with new private investment projects. Like traditional public works and community development grant programs, action grants can be used to provide infrastructure, access, or public facilities for a proposed project. Like urban renewal, funds from UDAG may be used to assemble and discount developable tracts of land. Other uses for action grants have more in common with Economic Development Administration and Small Business Administration programs. In these cases, a grant can enable a municipality to extend direct financial assistance to a potential investor.

This last form of assistance requires some elaboration. In a pattern HUD has encouraged, cities have lent or occasionally given UDAG funds directly to project developers.[6] Often private investors have found land and adequate public facilities in declining cities, but have claimed that they could not raise adequate capital cheaply enough to make the project feasible and attractive. In such cases, cities, often acting through quasi-independent development corporations, can provide UDAG money in the form of loans to private developers. Such loans usually take the form of a subordinated second mortgage on land and buildings. The most common form of subsidization is to charge interest below the market rate. Such "soft" loans, as illustrated by the New Jersey case studies, can amount to a substantial subsidy.

[6] David Cordish, "Overview of UDAG," in *The Urban Development Action Grant Program: Papers and Proceedings on Its First Two Years of Operation*, eds. Richard P. Nathan and Jerry A. Webman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Urban Regional Research Center, 1981), p. 16.

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The variability in uses for UDAG money is an important attribute of the program. Cities, their development corporations and consultants, and potential investors have considerable flexibility in developing financial packages for proposed projects.

The advantages of this flexibility for an economic development program can be seen by contrasts with the urban renewal program, a predecessor of UDAG.[7] Urban renewal also attempted to help revitalize declining cities by subsidizing private investment in blighted areas. Before it ended in 1974, the urban renewal program had attracted $9.15 billion in private investment in various renewal projects; federal grants and public investment in the same areas amounted to $9.03 billion.[8] Despite this accomplishment, the program was a rather blunt instrument for economic development. The urban renewal program could provide money to local redevelopment authorities that allowed them to buy land and sell it at greatly reduced prices to developers. It could also provide some indirect aid for infrastructure and public facilities. But it could not give direct aid to a business in return for an investment in a renewal area. One of the strengths of the UDAG program is the ability to adapt to a specific firm's investment needs.

This flexibility is particularly significant when considered together with another major way in which UDAG differs from previous urban development programs, namely the HUD requirement that UDAG projects be "wired"—that is, that both the local government and the private investor be committed in advance—before grants are approved. Under the urban renewal program, local renewal authorities were required to dispose of redevelopment land through competitive bidding. Projects could not be tailored to fit a specific developer's needs. The urban renewal program had a mixed record in attracting developers. Some redevelopment agencies offered land that was so attractive that developers did compete for its use; in other cases the agency had to quietly make arrangements with a developer before the project proceeded. In many cities, however, redevelopment agencies assembled and cleared land but could find no private developer to buy and use it. Some of these sites were eventually used for public facilities, but many sat empty.[9]

In fact, many of the UDAG projects that were funded in the first two years of the program were built on land that had been acquired under the urban renewal program but had been vacant for several years. As the UDAG program con-

[7] For comparisons see, M. Carter McFarland, *Federal Government and Urban Problems: HUD: Success, Failures, and the Fate of Our Cities* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), p. 94.

[8] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, *The Central City Problem and Urban Renewal Policy*, Committee Print, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 65.

[9] A legion of urban renewal case studies could be cited. Those dealing in particular with implementation problems include Roger Montgomery, "Improving the Design Process in Urban Renewal," in *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy*, ed. James Q. Wilson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 454-87; Harold Kaplan, *Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance in Newark* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); and Jean L. Stinchcombe, *Reform and Reaction: City Politics in Toledo* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1968).

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tinues, some municipalities may eventually run out of such publicly owned land. If this happens, local governments may find in some cases that to make a deal with a private business they must offer the business a tract of land, and that before they can make such an offer they must acquire the land. As the urban renewal program showed, land acquisition can take years and create tremendous controversy. In this way, the UDAG program's requirement that packages be agreed upon in advance may in some places slow the program's implementation; analysts cannot know whether this problem will actually arise, however, until more UDAG projects are built.

HUD's requirement of an advance commitment has had another effect that is already clear. This effect is related to the process of developing projects. By requiring that deals be "wired," the UDAG program brings private investors directly and publicly into the political process. Business people willing to invest in eligible cities thus become major participants in the design of development projects. The result is a development package that brings together the local government's concern for economic development and a private developer's evaluation of the potentials and requirements for a specific investment at a specific location.

The local government and the developer are not the only participants in the UDAG development process. The UDAG office in HUD's Washington headquarters reviews each proposal for an action grant, evaluating what is being proposed and how the proposed project will be carried out. HUD thus has extensive influence over the details of a project. This approach is the opposite of the funding method used in other recent urban aid programs, such as the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program and activities funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Those programs leave local governments more flexibility in deciding what projects to fund with federal money.

Approved UDAG projects, in sum, reflect an amalgam of the requirements and interests of local government, HUD officials, and private investors. Thus, the balancing and negotiation needed to prepare a successful package must affect the content of approved projects.

Does UDAG Attract New Private Investment in Declining Urban Areas?

As noted earlier, one of the UDAG program's two principal goals is to stimulate new economic activity. HUD's regulations state that a grant should be made only where it will pin down an investment that otherwise would not have been undertaken in that particular jurisdiction. Some critics of the UDAG approach have argued that a significant portion of the private investments that applicants claim were stimulated by action grants would actually have been made without a grant to sweeten the deal.[10] In response, HUD officials have required local govern-

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Improvements Needed in Selecting and Processing Urban Development Action Grants* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1979).

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ment officials and developers to sign in their applications what amounts to an oath that the proposed project would not go forward "but for" the UDAG grant. As a result, the issue is often referred to as the "but-for" issue.[11]

In most previous discussions, the "but-for" question has been considered in terms of particular grants for particular projects at particular sites. It is also necessary to discuss the more general issue: Do action grants support a pattern of investment that is different from current trends? Is UDAG altering, however marginally, the locational patterns that have led to urban economic decline?

In discussing these questions, we are stepping back from the "but-for" question. Unfortunately, there are not yet enough reliable data to allow a comprehensive assessment of the record of UDAG in affecting investors' decisions on whether to locate a business in one place or another. This article suggests an approach that could eventually be used in making such assessments. For now, it is instructive to review information on the kinds of places that businesses have been favoring in recent years and to determine whether private investments tied to UDAG projects are going to the same or different kinds of places.

Action Grants and General Investment Trends

Trends in the location of private investment can be briefly summarized: Older central cities are losing economic activity; less built-up areas—suburbs, rural areas, growing cities—are gaining such activity. The process is not simply the movement of existing enterprises; it also involves a bias in the choice of location of new activities. Various explanations for this shift have been offered; the economic factors are most important for assessing the UDAG program.

In brief, the transportation, infrastructure, density, and other advantages of the older cities no longer outweigh the advantages of other more dispersed places—the suburbs, rural areas, and newer cities in the South and West. No longer do manufacturers need to be near the railroads and waterways that brought them their raw materials and carried their goods to customers. No longer do most manufacturing firms find it economical to use multistory factories to save on land costs. Now these firms bring in their raw materials and send out their finished products by truck or air, using factories built on one level on open, cheaper land, in keeping with the most modern production techniques.

This dispersion of business began with manufacturing firms but has extended to business services and retail and personal services as well. As manufacturing has declined, many older large cities have lost population, jobs, and large parts of their tax base. Because the law authorizing UDAG uses several of these factors in measuring distress, many of the cities eligible for UDAG aid are those that have experienced this pattern of decline.

Yet other locational forces are at work as well. The same large cities that have lost manufacturing still offer advantages to other types of businesses. Many service activities still require center-city locations that facilitate "face-to-face" con-

[11] Cordish, "Overview of UDAG," p. 10.

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TABLE 1

Average Percentage Change in Value Added, Sales and Receipts, 53 U.S. Cities, 1967-1977

Activity	Percentage Change, 1967-1977
Value added by manufacturing	+80.8
Wholesale sales	+98.0
Retail sales	+93.3
Selected Service receipts	+190.0

Source: James W. Fossett and Richard P. Nathan, "The Prospects for Urban Renewal," in *Urban Government Finance in the 1980s*, ed. Roy Bahl (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 77.

tacts. These activities include finance, advertising, publishing, information services, law, specialized medicine, and government.[12] Several older cities have experienced growth in their central business areas, even though other areas have declined—a pattern of "islands of prosperity" surrounded by decline.[13]

The same locational forces have affected smaller cities of the Northeast and Midwest, some of which had prospered in the past because they were close to raw materials or power sources. These cities have declined as old industries have either moved away or grown smaller; but some have other advantages, such as good transportation and skilled workers, that could attract new industries.

Impressions of these trends are more readily available than are hard measures of their magnitude.[14] Table 1, which shows data for fifty-three of the fifty-seven largest U.S. cities, provides evidence of a shift in all central cities from manufacturing to service activity. Similarly, Varaiya and Wiseman conclude from a study of thirty metropolitan areas that "in old and intermediate aged cities such [high-wage] services constitute the only source of significant employment growth other than local government. For cities in all classes, the share of employment in this category has doubled between 1958 and 1972."[15] In central

[12] This process has been well documented and discussed at length. For a recent example see James W. Fossett and Richard P. Nathan, "The Prospects for Urban Renewal," in *Urban Government Finance in the 1980s*, ed. Roy Bahl (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981). For a classic overview, see Raymond Vernon, *The Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), esp. pp. 20-22 and 46-51. Others would add an explicitly political explanation for these patterns. For example, see David Gordon, "Capitalist Development and the History of American Cities," in *Marxism and the Metropolis: New Perspectives in Urban Political Economy*, eds. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 25-63.

[13] Anthony Downs, "Urban Policy," in *Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget*, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 168.

[14] For example see John Herbers, "Urban Center's Population Drift Creating a Countryside Harvest," *New York Times*, 23 March 1980, and idem, "Commuter Travel Stretches with Metropolitan Areas' Spread to Countryside," *New York Times*, 24 March 1980.

[15] Pravin Varaiya and Michael Wiseman, "The Age of Cities, the Employment Effects of Business Cycles, and Public Service Employment," in *Studies in Public Service Employment: Project Report*, ed. Michael Wiseman (Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1978), p. 36.

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TABLE 2

Change in Manufacturing Employment by Area, 1967–1973

Area	Number of Manufacturing Jobs (thousands)		Change, 1967–1973 (thousands)	
	1967	1973	Number	Percentage
United States	18,569.3	18,710.0	+145.7	+0.8
Metropolitan	13,482.0	13,054.5	−427.5	−3.2
Nonmetropolitan	5,082.0	5,655.0	+573.0	+11.3

Source: M. F. Petrulis, "Regional Manufacturing Growth Patterns," U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Development Research Reports, no. 13 (June 1979).

cities, rich and poor, service activities and service employment constitute the major point of growth.

Manufacturing activity, in contrast, has become more dispersed. Furthermore, between 1967 and 1973 manufacturing employment increased very little in the United States as a whole (see Table 2). What increases did occur were concentrated *outside* metropolitan areas. During this period central cities and suburbs alike were largely unable to attract enough new manufacturing activity to offset the loss of jobs caused by disinvestment and more capital-intensive production techniques. Although comparable employment data are not yet available for subsequent years, nonmetropolitan areas have continued to outstrip cities and suburbs in population growth (see Table 3). Because population and jobs have generally shifted from metropolitan to nonmetropolitan areas at similar rates, it can be assumed that the population figures mean that jobs are still shifting.

Does UDAG support investments that counteract these trends? Figures 1 and 2 indicate that it does not. These charts use figures for the program's first two years and compare two things: the proportions of *all* grants and *all* private investments that went to central cities, suburbs, and nonmetropolitan areas; and

TABLE 3

Changes in Population of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) and Nonmetropolitan Counties, 1970–1977

Type of Area*	Population (thousands)		Population Change, 1970–1977 (thousands)	
	1970	1977	Number	Percentage
Metropolitan	137,058	143,107	6,049	4.4
Nonmetropolitan	62,761	69,459	6,698	10.7

* Data use the Census Bureau's definitions of SMSAs as of 1970.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Social and Economic Characteristics of Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan Population: 1977 and 1970," Current Population Reports, Special Studies P-23, No. 75 (November 1978).

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FIGURE 1

Proportions of All UDAG Funds, 1978–1979



Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Evaluation, *Urban Development Action Grant Program: First Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979); HUD news releases; and HUD Action Grant Information Service.

the proportions of each of four different *types* of UDAG grants and private investments that went to each of the three types of jurisdictions. The four investment types are commercial, industrial, residential, and mixed use. In effect, the figures compare the whole with its parts—that is, the locational pattern for all

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FIGURE 2

Proportions of All Private Investment Committed to UDAG Projects, 1978–1979



Source: Same as Figure 1.

UDAG grants and all private investments is compared with the pattern for each separate type of grant and investment.

By concentrating on the two categories most directly related to economic development, it can be seen from the charts that, compared with their share of overall grants (74 percent) and investments (72 percent), central cities attracted a disproportionately large amount of commercial activity (85 percent of grants,

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87 percent of investments) and a disproportionately small amount of industrial activity (50 percent of grants, 48 percent of investments). Commercial activity includes offices, hotels, and retail stores. For the same types of projects, nonmetropolitan cities reversed the pattern: Relative to these cities' overall shares of grants (14 percent) and investments (17 percent), industrial projects proved disproportionately important (32 percent of grants and 37 percent of investments) and commercial projects disproportionately unimportant (8 percent of grants, 7 percent of investments). Distressed suburban cities showed a slightly greater tendency to attract industrial grants (18 percent) and residential investments (20 percent) than overall patterns would predict, but otherwise remained close to their overall share for each type of project (11 percent).

These findings suggest that action grants support the general *kinds* of locational choices investors have been making in the program's absence. UDAG tends to follow rather than to counter current urbanization patterns. Thus, one should not dismiss UDAG's impact on distressed cities, but rather stress that its impact does not constitute a reversal of the current and dominant patterns in American urbanization. The location of the projects that action grants support reflects the existing locational advantages of the distressed cities—a point that can be illustrated with examples from the New Jersey case studies, which demonstrate the advantages of central business districts for commercial development and the attraction of peripheral areas for expanded industry.[16]

Newark is New Jersey's business, legal, and financial center, although that city's dominance in these activities has certainly diminished in the past fifteen years. The city's Washington Park UDAG project provides a $10 million second mortgage to help finance a $35 million office building in Newark's central business district. This will be only the second speculative office building constructed in Newark in more than a decade. The completed project is to provide retail space, parking, and facilities for a corporate headquarters and for legal and financial offices—that is, the sort of activities that are still drawn to the downtowns of central cities, but that increasingly find suburban and nonmetropolitan "campus" sites a suitable alternative. Modern downtown office space can help maintain the relative attractiveness of central-city locations.

Twenty miles west of Newark, Morristown is using a $5 million action grant to build a foundation and provide subsidized parking for a $60 million office, retail, and hotel project. Because it is on the edge of the northern New Jersey metropolitan area, Morristown and its environs have been attractive locations for "exurban" corporate headquarters and business services—some of which were previously situated in Newark. The problem that the UDAG project deals with is the growing attractiveness of the environs at the expense of the aging center of Morristown itself. By subsidizing construction costs, the action grant allows the project's developers to benefit from Morristown's existing commer-

[16] These eight case studies were conducted between June and November 1979. For details of history, financial package, and implementation prospects, see Jerry A. Webman, "UDAG Case Studies," in *The Urban Development Action Grant Program,* Nathan and Webman, pp. 25-39.

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cial and business locational advantages and still charge rents competitive with outlying sites.

New Brunswick varies the theme slightly. The action grant will help finance a hotel-conference center project, which abuts the new Johnson and Johnson Corporation headquarters, Rutgers University, the county offices, and a medical center. This combination of research, business, government, and medical services is not typical of the traditional downtown area. It is an example of the kind of central-city concentration that is becoming more common. UDAG helps provide an additional facility appropriate to the kind of urban development New Brunswick is experiencing, but once again the project builds on inherent strengths rather than attempting to reorient the city's economy.

These three cases illustrate growth in nonmanufacturing activity in cities. There is, however, one case under study that is out of keeping with prevailing trends: a $5.8 million project to restore a traditional, central-city, multistory industrial building. The restoration will accommodate a number of small manufacturers and distributors in the buildings of a bankrupt brewery in Newark. Manufacturing may indeed be "no longer an urban-seeking sector of our economy,"[17] but the demand for inner-city industrial space has not entirely disappeared—as some 15 percent of UDAG investment indicates.

Still, the most attractive sites for industrial expansion remain those with open land and easy access to transportation, especially by road. Accordingly, other industrial UDAG projects in Newark and in Paterson use sites that are more characteristic of suburbs and nonmetropolitan areas than of central cities. In both instances, developers will locate industry on undeveloped or underdeveloped sites on the edge of the cities near major interstate highways. Sites like these are hard to find in central cities, but they do show the kind of locational advantages industry will likely seek.

This point is made more clearly by a $730,000 industrial project in Salem, a city of 7,000 in the southern part of New Jersey, outside the state's metropolitan areas. Located near tomato fields, factories in Salem once made both catsup and the bottles to put it in. As New Jersey agriculture declined, Salem's factories closed and the city's unemployment rate rose to 18 percent. The UDAG project helped finance the rehabilitation of an abandoned linoleum factory near a state highway on the edge of town. The new owner is using it to make military electronics components. With an experienced labor force and good road transportation in Salem, this factory can take advantage of the availability of land and the ease of access found in an essentially rural location. Available studies reveal less about development patterns in nonmetropolitan areas. It is known, however, that well over one-third of investment in industrial UDAG projects has been directed to such locations.

[17]Academy for Contemporary Problems, *Revitalizing the Northeastern Economy: A Survey for Action: General Summary and Recommendations* (Columbus, Ohio: The Academy for Contemporary Problems, 1977), p. 43.

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Action Grants and Particular Investment Decisions

To summarize, the kinds of places where commercial and industrial UDAG projects are locating are very similar to the kinds of places where commercial and industrial firms are making unsubsidized investments. But this does not mean that businesses benefiting from UDAG aid are getting windfalls for doing what they would have done anyway: Action grants may *influence* the location of investments, but only within the bounds of dominant nationwide patterns of economic development.

These general patterns help to clarify what effect UDAG has on particular investors' decisions to locate particular facilities in particular places. From the viewpoint of local governments—and of public-policy analysts—this is an important issue. The owner of a small electronics manufacturing firm may look at several sites and find that two or three of them are equally attractive, but it makes a big difference whether the firm moves to an economically distressed town like Salem or to a nearby "green field" site or a less distressed city. Similarly, a developer interested in putting up a speculative office project may find that a traditional urban center like Newark or Morristown offers the advantage of easy face-to-face contacts while a campus-like site near an expressway has the advantages of easier access and more space. For both the electronics firm and the office developer, a subsidy package made possible by UDAG can tip the scales in favor of the fiscally distressed city.

Whether or not an investor locates in a distressed city is important to that city for two reasons. First, the investment can bring jobs closer to relatively immobile disadvantaged people. Of course, a firm that locates in a jurisdiction with large numbers of disadvantaged people may or may not actually hire those people. But if the firm were to locate in a more prosperous location, the exclusionary residential policies in force in many such communities may well assure that disadvantaged people from other jurisdictions would *not* benefit.[18] Second, new economic activity may have a positive effect on municipal finance, although local tax abatements may limit the impact. An improved tax base provides municipal government with some relief from the widespread problems of fiscal stress.

These benefits can be attributed to UDAG only if the enterprise in question, or another one with similar fiscal and employment characteristics, would not have selected the given location without an action grant. It is difficult to determine that nothing as good or better would have occurred without the UDAG grant. The aggregate data on general patterns of investment do not help here; the case studies of individual projects enable analysts to make preliminary judgments about those projects, but these judgments cannot be generalized to other projects.

In short, one cannot now assess whether, in specific cases, the UDAG pro-

[18] Michael N. Danielson, *The Politics of Exclusion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976)

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gram makes a difference in investors' decisions about where to locate new or expanded enterprises. But this is an important issue in evaluating UDAG. What is needed is a more continuous and larger research effort than has so far occurred. Such a project would consider the history, financial package, and local economic environment of a representative sample of UDAG projects and would gather information over a period of several years. This information would then provide the basis for uniformly structured and well-informed judgments about the stimulative effects of the action grants. If such studies were carried out in enough cases for a long enough time, according to sufficiently uniform research and analysis procedures, then conclusions could be drawn about the locational impact of the program.

Are Action Grants Awarded to the Most Distressed Cities?

The basic purpose of the UDAG program implies that grants should be targeted to the most distressed urban areas. The law setting up the program mandates that UDAG money is to be "targeted"—that is, directed toward the most distressed cities—in two ways. First, eligibility standards allow only the most distressed urban areas to compete for action grants. Under HUD regulations, 2,067 towns and cities are eligible to apply.[19] Second, in choosing among applications HUD is supposed to give preference to the most distressed eligible cities that apply. The law states that the selection criteria must include "as the primary criterion, the comparative degree of physical and economic distress among applicants as measured (in the case of a metropolitan city or urban county) by the differences in the extent of growth lag, the extent of poverty, and the adjusted age of housing in the metropolitan city or urban county."[20] In principle, UDAG is a "worst first" program.

How has HUD put this principle into practice? To help choose among eligible metropolitan cities, HUD has devised an "impaction index." This approach takes into account the percentage of housing built before 1940 (weighted 0.5), the percentage of the local population with incomes below the poverty line (weighted 0.3), and the percentage rate of population growth (or decline) between 1960 and 1975 (weighted 0.2). Using this index, HUD has ranked eligible metropolitan cities from 1 (most distressed) through 322 (least distressed).[21]

Do heavily distressed eligible cities benefit more from UDAG than relatively better-off cities? The answer is yes with a qualification, considering the relative amounts of private investment. Table 4 indicates that the most distressed cities did receive a disproportionate share of grants. The most distressed quartile, in fact, received nearly four times as many grants as the least distressed quartile.

[19] As data extend through the last round of UDAG awards made before the 1980 revision of the program, this discussion of targeting ignores the "pockets of poverty" provision added to the program in 1980.

[20] Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, sec. 119 (e).

[21] HUD has excluded from this ranking cities eligible for the small cities (less than 50,000 population) set-aside.

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TABLE 4

Distribution of Approved UDAG Projects by Impaction Ranking of Cities

Impaction Ranking of Cities	*Number of Approved Projects*	*Percentage of Total Projects*
Most distressed quartile (n = 80)	122	44.8
Next most distressed quartile (n = 80)	84	30.9
Next most distressed quartile (n = 80)	32	11.8
Least distressed quartile (n = 78)	34	12.5
Total projects	272	100.0

Source: HUD eligibility rankings; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Evaluation, *Urban Development Action Grant Program: First Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979); and HUD news releases.

These findings, however, do not take into account the likely effects of a city's size on success in winning action grants. Larger cities are likely to have more economic activity, a larger administrative staff, and more experience with federal grant programs than smaller cities and thus win more action grants whatever their levels of distress may be. A multivariable analysis allows analysts not only to hold population constant but also to estimate the effects for particular cities of relative levels of distress.

Equation I in Table 5 displays the results of such an analysis for the number of grants cities received. Clearly, population is an important determinant of how many grants a city received. But even with population held constant, the impaction index is still strongly related to this measure of program benefits. (Recall that the impaction index runs from the most distressed to the least distressed city, so that a negative regression coefficient indicates that HUD favors more distressed cities.) Thus with population held constant, a city with the median score on the impaction index received an additional .8 of a grant and the most distressed city an additional 1.6 grants over the least distressed city.

The results suggest that more distressed cities did measurably better in the UDAG contest than did their relatively less distressed competitors. But how much was this success worth? HUD administrators may have some measure of control over who gets an award ahead of whom; they may have less control over how much each award is worth.

Because action grants are tied closely to the amount of private investment they supposedly leverage, the size of grants will vary to some extent with the amount of money private investors are willing to risk in a city.[22] The most distressed cities are in difficulty in part because they are not desirable places in which to invest. As a result, the most distressed cities might end up applying for and receiving more but smaller action grants. Thus, better-off cities might

[22] Levels of private investment are based on applicants' estimates and are probably somewhat inflated for purposes of strengthening applications. In the remainder of this analysis, I have assumed that this bias is constant across all cities. Less distressed cities are as optimistic as more distressed ones.

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TABLE 5

Regression Equations: Effects of Population and Impaction Ranking of UDAG Recipients on Number of Grants Recipient Received, Total UDAG Funds Recipient Received, and Private Investment Received, 1978–1979, Metropolitan Cities (in dollars)

Equation		Regression Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance
I. Number of grants city received, 1978–1979 =				
1. City's population plus (thousands)	×	.0017	.00015	.00001
2. City's ranking on impaction index plus	×	−0.005	.00123	.00001
3. Intercept		2.01		
R^2 = .50				
N = 149				
II. Total UDAG funds city was awarded, 1978–1979 =				
1. City's population plus	×	$4.144	0.5702	.00001
2. City's ranking on impaction index plus	×	$-9,111.00	4,713.5	.05
3. Intercept		$5,202,302		
R^2 = .28				
N = 149				
III. Total private investment committed to city's UDAG projects, 1978–1979 =				
1. City's population plus	×	$5.87	3.0	.01
2. City's ranking on impaction index plus	×	$61,973.29	21,171.20	.005
3. City's total of awarded UDAG funds plus	×	$6.33	0.37	.00001
4. Intercept		$-13,022,760		
R^2 = .76				
N = .49				

Source: HUD UDAG eligibility rankings; HUD, *UDAG: First Annual Report;* HUD news releases.

receive more in total dollars from the program even though more distressed cities might receive more grants.

The findings reported in equation II of Table 5 indicate that this problem is less severe than might be expected. Total UDAG funds are strongly related to the impaction index when population is held constant. According to these estimates for a "typical" city of 500,000, the difference between being the most

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and the least distressed eligible city amounted to about $2.9 million over the course of two program years.

Clearly UDAG grants are awarded in a way that provides disproportionate benefits to heavily distressed cities. But what about the private investments that these grants "leverage"? The evidence in equation III suggests that the pattern is reversed for private grants: with both population and action grant money held constant, less distressed cities attracted more private investment than more distressed cities. For a city of 500,000 with the predicted relative success rate for winning UDAG funds, being the *least* distressed rather than the most distressed was worth an additional $1.4 million over two years in private investment within UDAG projects.

Equation III also indicates that although grant money is targeted to more distressed cities, private investment in UDAG projects is less targeted. This equation uses data from HUD, which are based on cities' own estimates of how much private money will be invested in a project. Although these estimates are likely to be inflated, there is no reason to believe that estimates from cities at one end of the impaction ranking will be any more or less inflated than estimates from cities at the other end of the ranking. As a result, the figures are probably reliable for making comparisons. Thus, despite relative success rates in winning UDAG funds, better-off cities will still attract more private investment than worse-off cities. The program, as noted earlier, may counter but will not alone reverse prevailing urban development trends.

One caution implicit in this discussion of targeting is that these estimates of the effect of relative distress on UDAG funding assume that all factors besides population and distress ranking are equal among recipient cities. Obviously they are not. Calculated percentages of variance explained in numbers of grants and funding levels (the R^2 statistics) indicate that the other factors are important determinants of relative levels of UDAG funding. Among these factors are likely to be relative political influence, differences in experience with federal grant programs, and HUD administrative procedures. These and similar explanations may be important and are candidates for further research. Even so, the importance of other factors, whether proven or assumed, does not diminish the impact of distress as it has been estimated here. That impact is considerable.

Conclusion

During its first two years, was the UDAG program implemented in a way that was consistent with the targeting and economic development goals set by Congress and HUD? With some caution, one can conclude from available evidence that it was. Action grants did subsidize private investment in America's most distressed urban places. They subsidized this investment more heavily where distress was more severe, although not heavily enough to compensate for greater private investment in better-off cities.

The question, however, does imply that this private investment was somehow

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"new"—that is, different from what would otherwise have occurred. Here the evidence is much weaker. General trends suggest that UDAG projects build on existing locational advantages rather than attempt to create new ones.

Still, these advantages may have gone unexploited in the absence of the grant. A grant, for example, probably was required before Paterson's well-located but underutilized industrial space would attract new investment. Land assembly and capital costs might have remained too high for the small firms involved. In contrast, Morristown's city-center tract would probably have been developed without UDAG. The alternative may have been smaller and thus less competitive with suburban facilities, but some development would probably have occurred. Judgments of this sort will have to be made more systematically for a larger number of cases over several years before the program's overall effectiveness can be assessed. Nevertheless, UDAG does offer an innovative approach to urban policy and has important political and economic implications.

UDAG introduces two major innovations to federal urban policy. First, the program takes an explicitly economic approach to issues of urban decline. HUD has limited action grants to projects that seem likely to create or maintain economic activity in cities whose economic base has been eroded. The second innovation follows from the first. The program's economic objectives are to be realized not solely through governmental action, but through a public-private partnership. A city government agrees to apply for grants (and probably to provide other services and facilities) and the federal government agrees to award a grant because a private business commits itself to invest in industry, commerce, or housing in that city. This partnership for economic development in distressed urban areas defines both the potentials and the limitations of the UDAG program.

UDAG's potential may lie less in its influence on the location of specific investments than in the incentives it provides for cities and private firms to work together. A financial package to which HUD, a municipal government, and a private developer will all agree must provide a balance among public—that is, local and federal—and private interests. Negotiating this financial package can bring the city's economic development problems squarely before policymakers. These findings on the program's first two years suggest that UDAG will especially encourage this process in the most distressed cities.

Furthermore, UDAG will be most effective where existing conditions and other subsidies attract the private investor. As shown earlier, the general locational pattern of UDAG investments matches the locational pattern of unsubsidized growth. The UDAG program will not restore large numbers of manufacturing jobs to most declining metropolitan areas. Only in rare instances can action grants be expected to provide investors with a locational incentive big enough to overcome the forces that have led to shifts in economic activity from the North and Midwest to the West and South, and from large central cities to suburban areas.[23]

[23] For a summary of these trends, see George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes, "New

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UDAG must be considered as one of a number of available types of aid to distressed cities and to the people who live in them. By encouraging shifts in investment among areas, UDAG can speed the transition of distressed areas to new—if reduced—economic functions. If UDAG indeed shifts investment to distressed areas where it would not otherwise occur, and if UDAG continues its "worst first" strategy in awarding grants, then the program can play an important role in this adjustment process.

Further assessment of the UDAG program as an element in federal urban policy must take account of three aspects of the program: UDAG as *subsidy,* as *symbol*, and as *process.*

This article has concentrated on UDAG as a subsidy and has raised several public-policy questions about the way funds are dispersed. We could ask other questions. For example, what exactly is the federal government buying with action grants: economic transformation, support of lame-duck industries, or help for low-income households? Answers to these questions must await a longer record of implemented projects. Once again a longitudinal study of a large sample of action grant projects would be needed to provide data for analysis of these issues.

UDAG and the action grant office in HUD symbolize the federal commitment to distressed urban areas. The extent, durability, and appropriateness of that commitment may be questioned. The program, nevertheless, does help to maintain the visibility of this commitment.

The UDAG program must also be appraised for its effect on the process of urban policymaking. The program not only subsidizes private firms, but also brings them into a bargaining process with public officials. The bargains that are struck in this process are the basis for the program. Further study of the UDAG program must consider the political results of the program and the effects of these public-private partnerships in the realization of public objectives for distressed cities.*

Metropolitan and Regional Realities in America," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 43 (July 1977): 227–41.

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Strategic Vulnerability of a Multinational State: Deterring the Soviet Union

GARY L. GUERTNER

The efforts to ratify both SALT treaties will be remembered above all else as a competition for shaping public and congressional perceptions of the strategic balance. Nearly all critics have argued that the nuclear balance is delicate and that weapons symmetry is a requirement of strategic stability. Isolated variables (megatonnage and throwweight, for example) have been cast in scenarios illustrating U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) vulnerability and Soviet first-strike incentives. Many of these arguments were incorporated in the Jackson amendment to SALT I, which mandated equal numerical ceilings in SALT II. Each administration since 1972 has been bound by the Jackson amendment, but has rejected efforts to define precise qualitative balances between strategic forces or to rival every Soviet weapons system. Instead, the concept of essential equivalence has been substituted. Thus, weapons advantages enjoyed by the Soviets need not be matched so long as they are offset by other U.S. advantages. Stability under this rubric requires equivalent, but not equal, capabilities across the technical spectrum.[1]

Like its critics, who advocated acquiring a first-strike capability, the Carter administration's concept of essential equivalence was limited to weapons characteristics. Both positions illustrate how the SALT process has been dominated by a wide range of technical "imperatives" pushing U.S. strategic doctrine fur-

[1] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1980* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 76.

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ther in the development of limited nuclear war-fighting options. The stability of nuclear deterrence must be viewed across a wider spectrum of variables, however, if these trends are to be reversed and the arms competition they foster checked. Technical capabilities must be linked more precisely with the full range of threats faced by each country. These include the geopolitical, economic, ethnographic, and even the historical factors that surely influence the calculus of Soviet strategic planning. This article examines these variables, emphasizing the geopolitical/ethnographic vulnerabilities unique to the Soviet state. Its central thesis is that Soviet sensitivity to these problems, particularly to the loyalty in a crisis situation of their nationalities in the union republics, introduces an element of doubt in Soviet strategy sufficient to strengthen the credibility of U.S. strategic forces at levels considerably below the current SALT II ceilings, and without further development of counterforce or limited nuclear options in the U.S. policies concerning strategic planning and force procurement.

Soviet Geopolitical Vulnerabilities

Any assessment of the nuclear balance is partly subjective. Numbers alone may be misleading in the clues they offer about both intentions and capabilities. Experts' knowledge of all variables remains theoretical and incomplete, since neither testing nor experience has confirmed the validity of rival strategic doctrines. These gaps in knowledge are a two-edged sword. On the one hand, they are highly desirable: certainly no sane person would want to confirm or disprove strategic theories through experience (that is, through nuclear war). By the same token, the very uncertainties of such warfare contribute to the effectiveness and stability of deterrence. On the other hand, these ambiguities also have their negative side—especially for the prospects of arms control—for they promote force planning based on worst-case assessments of enemy capabilities.[2]

The difficulty with worst-case assessments is that they focus almost entirely on weapons symmetries or asymmetries. Yet, other considerations may well be equally important, if not more so. One of the least examined variables in the nuclear equation, for instance, involves geopolitical vulnerabilities to societal disruption and political fragmentation. The literature concerning U.S. strategic doctrine treats the Soviet Union as a unitary state, powerful in its military and political potential to threaten the United States and its allies. Little has been done in unclassified sources to examine the multinational character of the Soviet state and its potential effect on the Soviet-American mutual deterrence relationship.[3]

Some experts predict that ethnic Russians soon will constitute only a minority

[2] A recent and detailed analysis of this is Stanley Sienkiewicz's "Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis," *World Politics* 32 (October 1979): 90–110.

[3] See Bruce Russett, "Assured Destruction of What?" *Public Policy* 22 (Spring 1974): 121–38; Colin Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory," *International Security* 4 (Summer 1979): 54–87; and Bernard Albert, "Constructive Counterpower," *Orbis* 20 (Summer 1976): 343–66.

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of the Soviet population.[4] They are concentrated in the central areas of the USSR and are buffered from neighboring countries by union republics populated predominantly by non-Russian ethnic groups. Most important, many of these ethnic minorities have long histories of political independence. How Soviet leaders have managed pressures for autonomy or independence by these groups during periods of crisis or national stress reveals a great deal about Soviet perceptions and sensitivity toward these points of vulnerability.

World War I and the Bolshevik revolution, for example, led to temporary independence for some ethnic groups, which later had to be forcibly reintegrated by the Red Army. Similarly, during World War II Stalin relocated entire ethnic populations to the interior of the country for fear that they might collaborate with the Germans. This fear was warranted. Many groups did defect in large numbers, taking up arms on the German side. As the German armies moved through the Ukraine, the Baltic regions, and Byelorussia, they conquered regions that had been most cruelly hit by forced collectivization of 1930–1933, famine, and Stalin's russification policies. Had the Germans been capable of humane and moderate treatment of the Soviet nationalities in these areas, their occupation could have become a danger to the Soviet system even after the German retreat. One can only speculate about what additional problems the Soviets would have encountered had Hitler in 1941 proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic states. According to Adam Ulam, the continuous demands for a second front in Europe, even when the Germans could no longer win in the east, were prompted by the urgent necessity of reconquering Soviet territories as soon as possible and before any form of anti-Soviet organization could take root.[5] As it was, pockets of anti-Soviet partisans in these areas resisted the Soviet Army for several years following the German surrender in 1945.[6]

The precise relationship between contemporary Soviet domestic and foreign policies cannot be stated without firsthand knowledge of Soviet decision making. Whatever the nature of this linkage, there is little doubt that Soviet domestic vulnerabilities are taken into account during times of crisis and play a role in Soviet assessments of both their conventional and strategic force requirements. The nationalities issue is especially significant in assessing Soviet vulnerability to nuclear war. Nuclear retaliation (or the threat of retaliation) concentrated in ethnic Russian areas would significantly increase Soviet vulnerabilities, while allowing the United States greater economy of nuclear force. To take a crucial example: most Soviet ICBMs have been concentrated along major west-east rail lines and several northern spurs, from an area north of Moscow to the east of Lake Baykal (see Maps 1 and 2). The outer perimeter of Soviet ICBM deploy-

[4] Some experts had predicted that the 1980 census would show ethnic Russians to be a minority. A Soviet publication, *Population of the U.S.S.R.*, claims that ethnic Russians constitute 52.4 percent of the population (cited by Dan Fisher, *Los Angeles Times*, 23 February 1980).

[5] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–73*, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 326–27.

[6] Reported in the *New York Times*, 19 April 1946, 15 May 1949, 26 July 1949, and 1 May 1950.

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MAP 1

ICBM SITES ARE ALONG MAIN WEST-EAST RAIL LINES AND SEVERAL NORTHERN SPURS OUTER PERIMETER ENCLOSES LARGEST POPULATION CONCENTRATIONS.



ments enclose an area with the highest population density and the largest concentrations of Great Russian population in the USSR.[7] Twenty of twenty-six Soviet ICBM fields cut through the heart of these concentrations. The majority of strategic bomber bases and over 60 percent of Soviet industrial production are also located within the perimeter of this belt.[8]

There are also important climatological conditions affecting Soviet vulnerability to nuclear attack. Prevailing ground winds would carry local fallout over the most densely populated areas of the country. From November to March, winds generally blow from the southern and western perimeter of the ICBM belt toward the major population centers (see Map 2). From April to October, they blow from the northern and western perimeter toward the same centers (see Map 1). These patterns increase the probability of high radiation exposure since large directional changes in the wind serve to concentrate fallout more locally.

[7] Gary L. Guertner, "Carter's SALT: MAD or SAFE?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 35 (October 1979): 28–33. The most detailed description of Soviet missile deployments in an open source is Desmond Ball, "Soviet ICBM Deployment," *Survival* 22 (July–August 1980): 167–70.

[8] Kevin N. Lewis, "The Prompt and Delayed Effects of Nuclear War," *Scientific American* 241 (July 1979): 35–47.

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MAP 2



ICBM FIELDS CUT THROUGH LARGEST CONCENTRATIONS OF ETHNIC RUSSIAN POPULATION

Source: 1. Harold Fullard, Soviet Union in Maps
2. Desmond Ball, SURVIVAL, August 1980

In short, prevailing wind patterns throughout the year ensure that early fallout (the most lethal) would cover areas with the highest population density and with the highest concentration of ethnic Russians.

The implications are clear: in the event of nuclear attack, Soviet minorities will have a far better chance of survival than ethnic Russians, since there are fewer strategic and economic targets in their homelands. Even a limited nuclear attack on centers of Russian power could signal the political disintegration of the USSR. If the Soviet regime were not politically incapacitated and could deal effectively with nationalist or ethnic challenges to central authority, what problems might it face from the Chinese or from its "allies" in Eastern Europe? These critical political questions are largely ignored by most American strategic analysts (and especially by critics of SALT II), who have been preoccupied by technical issues and the allegedly delicate nuclear balance of power. At best, nuclear weapons are an imperfect means of compensating for the geopolitical liabilities unique to the Soviet state. These liabilities place serious constraints on the use of Soviet strategic power as a tool either that can be employed in preplanned ways to coerce concessions from an adversary or that might tempt Soviet leaders to adopt reckless and inflexible positions during crises.

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Soviet Strategic Doctrine and Domestic Stability

Strategic doctrine in the United States has emphasized technical capabilities of weapons systems and their combined impact on the conduct of war if deterrence fails. Soviet observers regard limited nuclear options, control of escalation, and nuclear "dueling" as U.S. attempts to rationalize the use of nuclear weapons or to engage in political intimidation, especially during times of crisis.[9] The Soviets share with many European observers a sense that recent American strategic doctrine has evolved from a purely technical milieu.[10] Its models contain only one of the three broadly defined elements—operational activity, political motivation, and stability of the social and political structure—that Clausewitz defined as being intrinsic to war. Operational activity dominates U.S. war-fighting scenarios, while references to political motivation and the stability of the social structure—American as well as Soviet—are often absent.

In contrast, Soviet strategic analysts have been far more attentive to the full continuum of possibilities ranging from politics to war. There is, admittedly, extensive and unsettling interest in the actual conduct of nuclear war. Preemption, combined arms, and counterforce emphasis, for example, are sinister and threatening aspects of Soviet doctrine singled out by many American analysts.[11] To conclude, however, that an emphasis on war fighting constitutes a rejection of deterrence is to engage in a very selective reading of Soviet doctrine. Soviet writings since the Malenkov-Khrushchev era are filled with references to the unprecedented devastation nuclear war would bring to both capitalist and socialist states. To argue, as Richard Pipes has done, that the Soviets believe they might be able to fight and "win" nuclear wars is to misread fundamentally the Soviet frame of reference.[12] Both their ideology and history reinforce the sobering Russian experiences of repeated invasions, of attempts at diplomatic isolation, and of encirclement by hostile forces. The question, then, is whether the Soviets see nuclear war-fighting capabilities as credible instruments of policy (political motivation in Clausewitz's terms) that might facilitate the achievement of specific and well-defined global objectives, or whether their emphasis on war fighting is a reaction to anticipated future aggression against the USSR. Clearly, in the Soviet strategic mind-set, the latter is the case. Soviet doctrine repeatedly

[9] See, for example, Georgi Arbatov, "The Dangers of a New Cold War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 33 (March 1977): 38; Radomir Bogdanov and Lev Semeiki, "Soviet Military Might: A Soviet View," *Fortune*, 26 February 1979, pp. 46–52; and Robert Legvold, "Strategic 'Doctrine' and SALT: Soviet and American Views," *Survival* 21 (January–February 1979): 8–13.

[10] See, for example, Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Summer 1979): 975–86; and Lawrence Freedman, review of *Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s* by Roger Speed, *Survival* 22 (January–February 1980): 45.

[11] For example, Joseph Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979); Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy* 25 (Winter 1976–77): 195–210; or William Van Cleave and Roger Barnett, "Strategic Adaptability," *Orbis* 18 (Fall 1974): 655–76.

[12] Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* 64 (July 1977): 21–34.

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emphasizes that if nuclear war comes, it will be forced on them, perhaps by a capitalist system caught in the death throes of its "final crisis," desperately seeking to reverse the inevitable course of history.

This "anticipatory" view of future dangers, combined with their own acute sense of vulnerability, has fostered strategic policies in the Soviet Union that are quite different from their U.S. counterparts.[13] In the Soviet view, deterrence based on punishment through retaliatory second strikes—the basis of the U.S. doctrine of assured destruction—may not be sufficient during the final and potentially aggressive period of capitalism. Thus, potential adversaries must be convinced that there is no hope of achieving their goals through military means. Military forces therefore must be in a position to deny victory if deterrence fails. This theme—the denial of victory in nuclear war—has remained a major and constant refrain in Soviet doctrine since Khrushchev's historic speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 in which he reversed the classic Leninist dictum of the inevitability of war between capitalist and socialist states: "But war is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces *possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war.*"[14]

The ability to deny victory to the enemy further strengthens deterrence, but does not preempt its importance in Soviet doctrine. Soviet rejection of limited nuclear war and controlled escalation, and the absence of references even in abstract terms about how a nuclear war would be terminated are evidence of a commitment to deterrence and delineate major differences between Soviet and American thinking about counterforce strategies.[15]

To argue that the Soviet strategic buildup and the emphasis on war fighting portends an era of Soviet assertiveness in the form of nuclear "Trotskyism" is to ignore the importance of social and political stability during periods of threat, crisis, or war that is emphasized in Soviet commentaries. Social and political cohesion may be as essential an element in Soviet calculations as survivable, second-strike capabilities are in U.S. doctrine. The Soviets view war, including nuclear war, as being potentially protracted in duration as compared with the short, spasmodic exchanges popularized in so much of the Western literature. This has political significance because the short, spasmodic exchanges are fought and generally decided by existing forces, using resources that are immediately available. Although existing forces are also viewed as important in a long war, mobilization and support of the civilian sectors of the economy and political systems are as critical and are so emphasized in Soviet writings. Soviet military doctrine thus allows for the possibility of a long war, waged by large

[13] Dennis Ross, *Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy: Inputs and Implications,* University of California at Los Angeles Center for Arms Control and International Security Working Paper no. 5 (Los Angeles, Calif., June 1977), esp. pp. 5–13.

[14] Quoted in Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies* II (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1957), pp. 29–63 (emphasis added).

[15] Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Views on the Interrelation of Diplomacy and Military Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Fall 1979): 404.

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armies and conducted by combined force operations—strategic, tactical, and conventional—in which victory is described in terms of the destruction of enemy military potential, seizure of strategic areas, occupation of territory, installation of friendly governments, and perhaps, carrying out of ideological conversion.

It is important to remember that in the Soviet view all of this is seen as a response to aggression, not as a policy choice in pursuit of preplanned Soviet objectives. Because of the unprecedented destructiveness of nuclear war, Soviet doctrine emphasizes both the importance of its prevention and the necessity of preparing for the possibility of its being waged. A major gap between theory and capabilities is the Soviet inability to occupy the United States. This, in turn, must certainly create doubts about whether any first-strike capability could "eliminate" U.S. military and economic capabilities, while Soviet combined forces were engaging the remnants of the "imperialist coalition" in Western Europe, holding off certain "jackals" (China), controlling Eastern Europe, subduing unrest among their own nationalities, and perhaps dealing with aroused and militant Third World elements on their borders during the "recovery period."[16]

Surely any responsible leadership would harbor the gravest doubts as to the adequacy of Soviet strategic and conventional forces to underwrite the enormous wartime demands placed on them by Soviet doctrine. As Benjamin Lambeth has eloquently pointed out, "Because . . . obligations place open-ended demands on Soviet force availability, performance, and durability, the Soviet leaders can never feel so complacent about the adequacy of their preparedness efforts as to permit any prolonged resting on their strategic oars."[17] Lambeth's observations are in sharp contrast with the often repeated belief that Soviet military preparedness goes far beyond legitimate defense requirements. If correct, Soviet notions of sufficiency are inevitably going to be considerably more ambitious than their American counterparts. Combined threats to Soviet security—especially geopolitical and ethnic—may do more to enhance the credibility of U.S. deterrence than any variant of military hardware or technical capability popularized by the SALT debate. To argue that the Soviet Union is planning to use its growing strategic power as an instrument of imperial expansion is to take enormous and speculative leaps beyond anything contained in Soviet published materials, as well as to ignore the geopolitical restraints described above.[18]

U.S. Strategic Doctrine and Arms Control

There is little doubt that the Soviet strategic buildup—or more accurately, catch-up—has contributed to major changes in U.S. strategic doctrine. These

[16] The Soviets fear that Western strategy includes efforts to break up the socialist community and to separate individual countries from its ranks. See ibid., p. 398.

[17] Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," *International Security* 4 (Fall 1979): 37.

[18] This is the thesis of a recent book on Soviet strategic doctrine. See Douglass and Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy*, p. ix.

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changes can be seen in former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's *Annual Defense Reports* from 1979 to 1981, in which he delineated the requirements for stable deterrence on which the Carter administration based U.S. strategic programs and SALT II. These can be summarized as SAFE: *S*urvivability; *A*ssured destruction; *F*lexibility; and *E*ssential equivalence.

SAFE incorporates the components of survivability and assured destruction from the Kennedy-Johnson and early Nixon years and refers to the required capability of the U.S. retaliatory force to inflict an "unacceptable" level of damage to urban-industrial (and some military), and more recently, "political power structure" targets in the Soviet Union, even after absorbing a full-scale Soviet attack.[19]

Flexibility, or limited nuclear options, was given wide publicity by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1974. This latest variant of counterforce strategy refers to the growing capability of U.S. strategic forces to respond to a Soviet attack on a lower scale than all-out retaliation against Soviet cities and incorporates "limited" attacks against Soviet military targets, including missile silos and command and control centers. Secretary Brown also described this as a "countervailing strategy" in the sense that retaliation is selective and commensurate with the level of provocation.[20] Thus, countervailing or limited nuclear options are initial responses, while the capacity to carry out assured destruction against Soviet cities and industrial complexes is held in reserve.[21] This limited, but potentially protracted, nuclear war-fighting doctrine was reaffirmed and made more specific in Presidential Directive 59 signed by Carter during the summer of 1980.[22]

SAFE, then, is a hybrid in the evolutionary process from a predominantly countervalue-based set of declaratory policies to a greater emphasis on counterforce targeting. This process has dominated the strategic debate, dividing advocates of limited nuclear options and "strategic stabilizers" over the desirability of hard-target, counterforce options.[23] The "war fighters" advocate strategies and force levels that reflect the traditional belief that strategic weapons and doctrine must be prepared to fight wars, not just deter them. Maintaining a war-fighting capability is the other side of the deterrence coin. Deterrence, according to this view, cannot be credibly maintained in the absence of declared operational plans and capabilities. Credible deterrence can, it is argued herein, be maintained, as it has in the past, independent of limited war-fighting options.

[19] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 66. McNamara first defined unacceptable damage as destruction of 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of its industry. Secretary Brown initially defined unacceptable damage as destruction of a minimum of 200 major cities, but avoided specifying numerical requirements in his reports for fiscal years 1980 or 1981.

[20] Ibid., p. 65.

[21] Ibid., p. 66.

[22] See *New York Times*, 6 August 1980.

[23] For the major points dividing "war fighters" and "stable balancers," see Leon Sigal, "Rethinking the Unthinkable," *Foreign Policy* 34 (Spring 1979): 35–51.

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This can be accomplished by insuring survivable, second-strike forces assigned limited missions (for example, retaliation in response to a direct attack on the United States or its NATO and Japanese allies) while maintaining credible conventional force levels to meet crises below the nuclear threshold.

The most important measure of a nation's strategic deterrent is its ability to survive an initial attack and perform its assigned missions.[24] The size and characteristics of that deterrent should be determined not by the need for matching the enemy's counterparts, but by the requirements of destroying specific enemy targets. What those missions or targets should be are at the heart of the strategic debate. One reasonable objective of U.S. strategic deterrent presumably agreed on by all participants in that debate is the erosion or elimination of Soviet confidence in military solutions to crisis. As Colin Gray has recently put it, "One of the essential tasks of the American defense community is to help ensure that in moments of acute crisis the Soviet general staff cannot brief the Politburo with a plausible theory of victory."[25]

This article has attempted to demonstrate that a Soviet decision to go to war requires much more than military confidence of the general staff. The Soviet calculus requires confidence in political, social, and economic components as well. This presents U.S. planners with a broad deterrence spectrum in targeting those interrelated values that will most credibly prevent Gray's "victory" briefing from becoming plausible. Alternative strategies could be based on the Soviet Union's unique geopolitical vulnerabilities and on the requirements of denying Soviet forces what they, themselves, delineate as the prerequisites for victory.

According to Soviet doctrine, victory includes combined conventional and strategic force coordination in wars of potentially long durations, during which the economic, political, and social viability of Soviet and allied states are vital. Under such circumstances, what kinds of threat would have the most deterring effect on the Soviet leadership? It is the thesis of this article that the broad outlines of such a deterrent would include an ethnic-based countercombatant, counterindustrial targeting doctrine. Within this framework, declaratory policies and force-procurement decisions would avoid both hard-target, counterforce capability and countervalue "city-killing" strategies. In short, there are credible alternatives to both assured destruction and the current destabilizing counterforce options.

Ethnic-Based Targeting Doctrine

To a large extent, U.S. targeting doctrine is ethnically based by default, since the majority of strategic and industrial targets are located in the central Great Russian republic (RSFSR). Amplifying the prospects for assured and concentrated retaliation by even a limited force against military and industrial targets

[24] A missions approach is discussed by General Maxwell Taylor in "What if SALT II Fails?" *AEI Defense Review* 2 (August 1978): 22.

[25] Gray, "Nuclear Strategy," p. 56.

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in the ethnic Russian areas could strengthen the credibility of U.S. deterrence. Ethnic targeting does not mean singling out Russians for destruction. Rather, it is an effort to minimize collateral damage in the adjacent and predominantly non-Russian union republics. Even in the RSFSR, population centers would not be directly targeted. The objective should be to maximize the prospects of societal disruption, the destruction of the industrial base, and the degradation of conventional war-fighting capabilities, thereby radically altering both the domestic and international balance of power confronting the Soviet leadership.

Countercombatant and Counterindustrial Targets

The term "countercombatant" was first introduced to the strategic debate by Bruce Russett.[26] In essence, Russett argued that the rational Russian leader would be deterred by prospects of severe damage to the conventional and strategic forces of the Soviet Union—forces that are heavily relied upon in Soviet doctrine and that maintain internal security and bloc cohesion. Their loss or degradation would surely be as unacceptable as the loss of cities. The concept is defined more narrowly here than by Russett, whose definition included all nuclear striking forces. In this article a more limited target-acquisition process is advocated, with emphasis on concentrations of conventional forces, the logistical support bases of these forces, transport and storage areas, air bases, and naval port facilities. Land-based missile silos would be specifically excluded. The object, if first-strike incentives are to be avoided, is not to *deny* the Soviets a credible nuclear retaliatory force. Rather, the intent is to reduce, but not eliminate, the Soviet Union's capacity for inflicting damage on the United States, and more importantly, to reduce to unacceptable levels the USSR's capacity to defend itself tactically at home, in Europe, and on the Chinese border. Soviet ICBMs have limited use in these latter conflicts where Soviet doctrine prescribes occupation by ground troops. Moreover, their employment against American cities could invite counterstrikes on Russian cities.

Soviet troop configurations lend themselves to such a strategy since first-line combat formations are predominantly ethnic Russian. Many are garrisoned at points distant from (or, at worst, adjacent to) population centers in both the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Where they can be identified, non-Russian troop concentrations might be deliberately avoided. The object would not be the total destruction of the Soviet army, but the prospect of such substantial and assured degradation that combined threats to the Soviet state could not be met. Concentrations of internal security forces, including the State Security Committee (KGB), might also be targeted.

Targeting the industrial potential of the Soviet Union has always been an integral part of U.S. strategy. The ability to destroy one-half to two-thirds of the Soviet industrial base was a major objective under the assured destruction doc-

[26] Russett, "Assured Destruction of What?" pp. 124–25.

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trine of the 1960s and formed a major part of U.S. doctrine as delineated in Secretary Brown's FY 1981 *Annual Defense Report*. There was a brief period during the Nixon years when the emphasis shifted to economic "recovery time." But early in the Carter administration, Secretary Brown moved away from this strategy on the grounds that antirecovery concepts were too vague and could be used to justify increases in strategic forces.[27] (The same argument, of course, could also apply to the counterforce, limited nuclear options endorsed by Brown.) Indeed, this seemed to be very much the case since former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld claimed that 8,500 warheads were required for adequate coverage of all targets, including those necessary for implementing the antirecovery doctrine.[28] In any case, such figures are suspect given the economic concentrations that characterize the centrally planned Soviet economy.

For a variety of reasons—historic, economic, and political—the Soviet Union, despite its geographic expansiveness, has concentrated its industry and population in less than one-quarter of its total area. Key industrial complexes, clustered around major cities, are more concentrated than in the United States, and a limited number of facilities constitute the bulk of the productive capacity in many major industries.[29] A good example would be the controversial Kama River truck and auto facility, a giant complex the size of Manhattan, where one-fifth of all Soviet vehicles are produced.[30] Similarly, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment has shown that an attack on petroleum refineries in the USSR could, with ten missiles (seven Poseidon and three Minutemen IIIs), destroy 73 percent of the entire refining capacity.[31] Electrical power, transportation, food processing, chemical plants, and steel are equally vulnerable. Clearly, Soviet planners have chosen industrial efficiency and typically Russian "massive" complexes over considerations of civil defense. The centrally planned economy has many such vulnerable choke-points that, if destroyed, would curtail production in many other industries. Existing civil-defense programs cannot confidently ensure a modern nation against the vulnerability of industrial interdependence. The degree of damage the United States could inflict on unprotectable economic resources with only a fraction of its total forces would be so great that the Soviet Union could be effectively eliminated as a major industrial power.

For the Soviets, recovery would be complicated by political problems they would confront in the presumably less damaged, non-Russian republics. Could the economically linked, but physically less damaged, zones be counted on for

[27] See U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1978 and 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978 and 1979).

[28] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1978*, pp. 21 and 78.

[29] Fred Kaplan, "The Soviet Civil Defense Myth," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 34 (April 1978): 41–51. See also Geoffrey Kemp, *Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers*, Adelphi Paper No. 196 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974).

[30] U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 54.

[31] Ibid., p. 76.

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recovery assistance as in the case of other localized disaster recovery efforts? Or would scarcity and chaos further stimulate the centripetal forces of nationalism and separatism?[32] The lessons of World War II so often cited by American analysts alarmed by Soviet civil-defense programs are not applicable in nuclear-war scenarios.[33] Many of the outlying union republics served their buffer functions well in World War II, absorbing the initial damage and destruction of the German Army. In a nuclear war, the reverse would be true. The central Great Russian zones would receive immediate and highly concentrated levels of damage. Recent studies conducted by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office conclude that the force requirements for a counterindustrial strategy would be closer to the 300 to 400 warhead range of earlier McNamara estimates. Soviet vulnerability to limited nuclear attack, even after efforts to fortify industrial complexes (construction of special canopies, foundations, and sandbagging), is extensive. Eleven Poseidon submarines, for instance, could expect to achieve 50 percent destruction of a fortified Soviet industrial base (85 percent with no fortification). The Trident I missiles currently being deployed (224 by the end of FY 1981) increase to 60 percent the estimated destruction to a fortified Soviet industrial base (assuming a total force of 240 missiles).[34]

Strategic bombers are even less affected by Soviet civil-defense efforts. Of the 380 bombers in the U.S. force, at least 100 could be expected to survive a first strike, assuming normal peacetime alert. These bombers could be expected to destroy 70 percent of the Soviet industrial base, if unfortified, or 65 percent if fortified. Twice as many weapons would be available if the bomber force was on a generated alert; under such circumstances, 80 percent of a Soviet fortified industrial base would be destroyed. Even more threatening, when cruise missiles are deployed, a surviving force of only 60 B-52s is expected to destroy nearly 85 percent of the unprotected Soviet industrial base.[35]

Even these grim statistics may exaggerate force requirements, since credible deterrence may not demand the total destruction of Soviet industry. The destruction of essential choke-points in a highly interdependent economic system would effectively shut down industrial production, even if many plants and industrial centers survived. Soviet sensitivity to threats aimed at the industrial infrastructure that supports its super power status and its strategic perceptions of long wars requiring a stable political and economic base suggest that a counter-economic, second-strike emphasis may be an effective (but, thus far, insuffi-

[32] For a historical examination of the problem, see Jack Hirschleifer, *Disaster and Recovery: A Historical Survey*, RM-3079-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, April 1963).

[33] For example, Leon Goure, *War Survival in Soviet Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1976), and T.K. Jones, *Industrial Survival and Recovery after Nuclear Attack: A Report to the Joint Committee on Defense Production, U.S. Congress* (Seattle, Wash.: Boeing Aerospace Co., November, 1976).

[34] U.S., Congress, Congressional Budget Office, *Retaliatory Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 25-27.

[35] Ibid., p. 28.

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ciently explored) means for achieving both stable and credible deterrence and strategic arms reductions.

A Strategy for Deterrence or "Victory"?

The positions outlined here hold no illusions that nuclear war can be closely and surgically controlled or that such a war could avoid killing millions of civilians by both the immediate and delayed effects of a nuclear exchange (regardless of what targets are included or excluded from strategic doctrines). Above all, the arguments here are aimed at strengthening the credibility of prewar deterrence. That, in turn, rests on the ability of both sides to maintain survivable second-strike forces against targets sufficiently valued by their adversary that threats against these targets will effectively deter a first strike. The Soviet military and economic targets discussed earlier meet these requirements, since they are identified in Soviet military writings as vital prerequisites for victory. The fundamental question dividing strategic analysts in the United States—and perhaps in the Soviet Union as well—is precisely what these targets should be, and what forces and technical capabilities should be arrayed against them.

One side advocates hard-target, counterforce capabilities, which would be gained only at the cost of increased crisis instability, including an enhanced possibility of preemptive attack. Soviet counterforce superiority would not be militarily feasible so long as the United States retained survivable second-strike forces. Survivability can and must be independent of Soviet force characteristics. It does not require the time-urgent, hard-target kill capabilities of the MX missile ("Missile Experimental") and its more accurate MK 12A warhead (also being deployed on 300 Minuteman missiles), or the counterforce accuracy that has been proposed for Trident II. Seeking survivability by preempting threatening systems does not create deterrence; rather, it leads to a runaway process since, under crisis conditions, options may become mandates for survival. Stability and survivability can coexist within the framework of a weapons acquisition strategy that emphasizes survivability rather than counterforce capabilities.

Rejecting hard-target, counterforce options in U.S. force-procurement decisions and declaratory policies would be a major step requiring strong and determined leadership. Soviet vulnerabilities described here could effectively be used in the domestic debate that would be necessary to allay fears in Congress, the press, and among the attentive public. The difficulties in developing a convincing strategic dialogue would be compounded by the dangers of a potential Soviet backlash. Soviet policymakers listen to what Americans are saying about their nuclear policy. What is said in *Foreign Affairs*, in a State of the Union address, in a speech at West Point, or in Senate debate provides the bulk of what the Soviets hear. Not infrequently, American policymakers and academics fail to take into consideration the potential effect. If the domestic debate involved widespread discussion of Soviet vulnerabilities, especially references to the nationalities, with no accompanying restraints in the deployment of counterforce

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systems, the Soviets' heightened perception of U.S. hostility could easily prompt countermeasures against what could appear to be the nuclear variant of the "captive nations" theme. The net result would be major escalation of the arms race. An emphasis on Soviet vulnerabilities in official declaratory policies could be effectively used only in defense of major qualitative restraints or quantitative reductions in U.S. strategic forces.

The feasibility and extent of strategic-arms reductions under the targeting strategies proposed here would be bitterly contested. Ceilings proposed by analysts without access to classified targeting data may be arbitrary and imprecise. What is openly known about Soviet vulnerabilities, however, suggests that a credible deterrent could be maintained at force levels considerably below the 8,500 warheads advocated by Rumsfeld, and certainly well below (perhaps as much as 50 percent) current U.S. force levels of 9,200.

Where is the balance between "prudence and paranoia"? It appears unlikely that there will ever be agreement. It would also seem that strategic-arms competition, with or without SALT, is moving further in the direction of paranoia.*

* I would like to thank Dan Caldwell, Robert Kennedy, Fred Neal, William Potter, Gregory Treverton, Enders Wimbush, and especially Don Schulz for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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The Demise of Canada's Confederation

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's decision in October 1980 requesting Great Britain to "patriate" (send to Canada) the Canadian Constitution marked the beginning of an ominous political and constitutional struggle within Canada whose outcome will profoundly affect the way that country is governed in the future. The sizable majority of seats held by Trudeau's Liberal party in the House of Commons insures that his plan will receive Canadian parliamentary approval;[1] but seven of the ten provinces expressed disapproval of Trudeau's constitutional proposals because of his insistence on including a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and an amending procedure that is unacceptable to most provincial governments.[2] Trudeau's decision to bypass the provinces in this crucial matter and to rely for support on his parliamentary majority in Ottawa threatened to bring on a confrontation with both Quebec and the western provinces, one which could well shatter the 114-year-old Canadian Confederation.

The British North America Act of 1867, Canada's basic law, contains no

[1] Following the elections of 18 February 1980, the Liberal party held 146 seats out of 282 in the House of Commons; the Progressive-Conservative party captured 103 and the New Democratic party had 32. One seat was unfilled. In percentages, the Liberals got 43.9 percent, the Conservatives 33 percent, and the New Democrats 19.8 percent of the votes.

[2] The seven that objected to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms during the constitutional conference in September 1980 were: British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. On the question of Trudeau's taking unilateral action to patriate the constitution from Britain, these seven were joined by Newfoundland in protesting Trudeau's move.

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amending provision. Attempts to add such a provision during the early part of this century failed because of conflicting views held by the provinces. The unanimity rule usually applied, therefore, whenever Ottawa petitioned the Imperial Parliament to admit a new province, or when a change was proposed that affected the powers granted in the 1867 law to provinces. When Canada gained full independence in 1931 under terms of the Statute of Westminster, the failure to reach agreement within Canada on an amending formula to the 1867 act was recognized: "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or to any order, rule or regulation made thereunder."[3] Subsequent efforts to make the constitution uniquely Canadian have all foundered because of the inability of provincial leaders and federal leaders to reach unanimous agreement on an acceptable amending formula to the basic law. The most recent failure occurred in September 1980 when Quebec was joined by most of the provinces in rejecting the federal government's proposals.[4]

Trudeau took his case to the nation in a televised newscast on 2 October 1980: "We assumed that it was possible in a system of diverse governments for all to agree in all respects on everything. . . . In accepting that the only agreement could be unanimous agreement, we took that ideal of unanimity and made it a tyrant." The unanimity rule, he argued, gave each provincial premier a veto, and this was increasingly used to seek the advantage of a particular region or province: "So we achieved the good of none, least of all did we achieve the good of all, the common good."[5]

Constitutional reform became a political necessity for Trudeau's government in 1980 for reasons that had not before prevailed in Canada. During the public debate on the May 1980 referendum in Quebec, which was called to determine whether Quebecers wished to secede from Canada, Trudeau made large promises designed to increase the no vote. He assured Quebec's voters that if they defeated the "sovereignty-association" formula proposed by the separatist government of Quebec, he would take immediate steps to revise the constitution in order to insure Quebec a full partnership in a "renewed federation." Following the defeat of this referendum, by 59 to 41 percent, *Parti Quebecois* leader Rene Levesque asserted that "it is up to those who solemnly promise renewal of federalism and, above all, Mr. Trudeau himself, to begin immediately and

[3] Quoted in Donald V. Smiley, *Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972), p. 8. For a discussion of Canada's constitutional system, see Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington, *The Canadian Political System* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), chaps. 5–8.

[4] The constitutional conference took up twelve specific proposals for inclusion in a new constitution and reached consensus on many of them. Consensus could not be reached, however, on the rights of linguistic minorities for education in English or French, an amending formula to the constitution, and a policy granting control over natural resources. Quebec, Ontario, Newfoundland, and British Columbia played key roles in the debates and in the failure to find agreement.

[5] "Statement by Prime Minister Trudeau on Constitutional Change," Ottawa, 2 October 1980, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., (CR-1), p. 3.

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frankly to add some content to their promises."[6] Trudeau's subsequent failure to persuade Canada's provincial leaders to amend the constitution in a way that would satisfy both Quebec and the energy-rich western provinces left him with three alternatives: admit to Quebec that he could not deliver on his earlier promises; agree to accord all provinces greater autonomy in a new decentralized constitutional arrangement; or use his majority in the federal Parliament to patriate the constitution with an amending formula that abolishes the unanimity rule. Trudeau chose the latter course because it stood the best chance of strengthening the federal government, while granting Quebec enough concessions to enhance the likelihood it would not secede from the Confederation.

The Quebec Issue

The key figure in Canada's constitutional crisis is Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who entered politics in 1965 and rose to the leadership of the national Liberal party and to prime minister of Canada in 1968. Trudeau had been a Quebec nationalist before entering Canadian politics, but he parted company in the 1960s with other nationalist leaders, such as Rene Levesque and Claude Ryan, over a fundamental issue: should French-speaking Canadians be treated as equals of English-speaking citizens *everywhere* in Canada, or should French-speaking Quebec be accorded a special status within Canada because of its unique history, language, and culture? For Trudeau, no province should have a special status within Canada. Rather, he argues, all of Canada should be officially bilingual and all French Canadians, regardless of where they reside, should have the right to use French as an official language and to find cultural fulfillment within a larger Canadian nation-state committed to the concept of full equality between Canada's two founding ethnic groups. Trudeau set forth this view of a more unified Canada in a White Paper published by the Canadian government in 1978: "This watershed in Canadian history gives us a unique opportunity to reshape our national destiny and to reshape it as we see fit. To this destiny, our whole country, all our regions and all our people must be committed. . . . For in the final analysis, it is the collective will of all Canadians which will ensure this country's survival." In Trudeau's view, Canadians will not achieve true nationhood until they "become fully aware of their identity and understand what it means to be part of Canada."[7]

Claude Ryan, leader of Quebec's Liberal party, and Rene Levesque, head of the *Parti Quebecois*, disagree with Trudeau's vision of Canada. They believe that Quebec is essentially different from the other provinces, that its language, religion, culture, and law are distinctive, and that this difference was recognized by Great Britain soon after it ousted the French from North America in 1763. The British Quebec Act of 1774 gave the French-speaking population the right

[6] Quoted in *Maclean's* Magazine, 2 June 1980, p. 32.

[7] *A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federation* (Ottawa: Canadian Minister of Supply and Services, 1978), p. 3.

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to practice the Roman Catholic religion and to use French civil law. Both Ryan and Levesque assert that this duality of peoples and cultures was reaffirmed in the British North America Act of 1867 and has been accepted by nearly all Canadians until recent times. These Quebec leaders disagree, however, on the recommended method for insuring that Quebec will be treated as an equal in the future: Levesque is convinced that English Canada is incapable of granting a special status to Quebec within a new constitutional framework and that Quebecers will continue to be treated as second-class citizens within this increasingly English-speaking country. Therefore, he concludes, the only way Quebecers can run their own affairs in the future and win the respect of other Canadians is by declaring their political independence and then negotiating for close economic ties to Canada. Ryan, on the other hand, is confident that Quebec can achieve its nationalist aims *within* a new constitutional framework, one granting Quebec and the other provinces a large degree of autonomy to run their own affairs. Ryan disagrees with Trudeau over the amount of powers the federal government should have: Trudeau has long advocated a strong central government; Ryan favors considerable decentralization of government authority. Both believe that Canada must survive, however.

The *Parti Quebecois*'s view of the constitutional issue between Canada and Quebec was contained in a manifesto issued by the party in October 1979. It set forth the party's reasons for recommending a yes vote in the May 1980 referendum, asserting that "Quebec's approach to the issue of autonomy is not merely an administrative quarrel between Quebec and Ottawa, nor is it an expression of purely regional preoccupations in which some people would like to reduce Quebec's aspirations." Sovereignty-association, it argued, "is the manifestation of the firm conviction of Quebecers that they constitute a distinct community and people."[8]

The Quebec Liberal party's referendum manifesto was published early in 1980 and called for a revised constitution based on a recognition of Quebec's distinctive status: "We must affirm the fundamental equality of the two founding peoples who have given and still provide this country its unique place in the family of nations. This basic dualism must be consecrated in the supreme document of the country."[9] The Liberals took issue with the *Parti Quebecois* "pessimistic view" of Canadian history and asserted that "there has always existed in Quebec another viewpoint, resolutely open to a more optimistic perspective of confidence and cooperation." Asserting that exponents of this larger vision affirmed the right of Quebecers to choose their own future, the Liberal party concluded that "the best future for Quebec lies in a freely made decision to remain within the Canadian federation." Remaining part of the Canadian federation had two major advantages, it argued: Quebec can develop freely according to its own wishes, and it can also share in the "benefits and challenges of a larger and

[8] *Quebec-Canada: A New Deal* (Quebec City: Government of Quebec, 1979), p. 43.
[9] *A New Canadian Federation* (Quebec City: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1980), p. 22.

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much richer society."[10] In a word, the benefits of staying in Canada outweighed any advantage to be gained by leaving.

These three veiwpoints on the future of Quebec and Canada, espoused by three articulate French-Canadian political leaders, highlight the fundamental disagreement within Canada on how to solve this vexing problem, which has dominated Canadian politics since Britain conquered that land in the 1760s. In sum, Pierre Trudeau believes the only way Canada can survive as an independent country in North America is to increase the powers of the federal government; national unity and strength cannot be accomplished by giving additional powers to the provinces, he asserts. Rene Levesque is convinced that Quebec is more important than Canada and that the province will surely lose its distinctive language and culture unless it decides soon to declare its political independence. Claude Ryan concludes that a reconstituted federal system, recognizing the existence of two founding peoples, will succeed if all provinces are accorded a greater degree of autonomy and if Quebec is guaranteed the right to retain its distinctive language and culture.

There is a fourth position on constitutional change, one voiced by western Canada and particularly by Alberta's powerful premier, Peter Lougheed. He holds that the British North America Act is a fully satisfactory basis for protecting the interests of the resource-rich western provinces because it guarantees them control over their resources, including oil and gas, and also gives them a large voice in setting the prices for these products elsewhere in Canada. When Trudeau sought agreement from all provincial premiers to take up constitutional revision on an urgent basis following defeat of the Quebec referendum, Lougheed insisted that Alberta first wanted an agreement with Ottawa on the price of oil before negotiating the terms of a new constitution. Negotiations between Trudeau and Lougheed during the summer failed to break the impasse on energy prices and led to a confrontation between them in October 1980 concerning federal proposals to tax Alberta oil at a higher level.

Efforts to Accommodate Quebec

Constitutional revision designed to accommodate Quebec has been proposed and negotiated among the federal government and the ten provinces for the past twenty years. In 1960, Quebec began its "Quiet Revolution" after the Liberal party ousted the conservative Union Nationale from the government and then proceeded to enact sweeping social and economic reforms. A leader of this new government was Rene Levesque who insisted not only on greater political powers for Quebec but also on provincial ownership of certain private enterprises, such as Hydro Quebec, the major energy-producing complex in the province. Levesque broke with the provincial Liberal party in 1967, however, because he concluded that the party was not pressing Ottawa strongly enough for greater autonomy in running provincial affairs.

[10] Ibid., p. 10.

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Resurgent Quebec nationalism in the 1960s led federal Prime Minister Lester Pearson to appoint a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to recommend ways in which English and French Canadians could live together more amicably. The commission's widely acclaimed report in 1967 came out strongly in favor of a new partnership between "the two peoples which founded the Confederation," and it recommended equality between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians wherever they resided in Canada. In 1969, the Parliament passed the Official Languages Act, containing many of the commission's recommendations. English and French were made equal for official purposes throughout Canada, and this encouraged French Canadians for the first time to accept employment with the federal government in Ottawa. The 1969 act constituted a major step in the Trudeau government's effort to counter the Quiet Revolution's nationalist appeal by encouraging educated Quebecers to expand their loyalties beyond Quebec's borders. The measure was resented, however, by large segments of English-speaking Canada because it accorded equal status to the French language and culture and resulted in many federal and provincial officials being forced to learn French. For western Canadians, this seemed an unnecessary capitulation to French Canada by the federal government. On the other side, dedicated Quebec separatists such as Levesque saw the Official Languages Act as a half-measure that placated some Quebecers but failed to give Quebec the authority to run its own affairs. Levesque therefore formed the *Parti Quebecois* in 1968, and it ran candidates in the provincial elections of 1970. The *Parti Quebecois* obtained a surprising 23 percent of the vote and caused alarm among political groups throughout Canada. To Levesque and other Quebec separatists, English Canada would never agree to give Quebec real autonomy within a new Canadian constitution, and the alternative for them was to press for Quebec independence and negotiate later with Ottawa on economic and political relationships. From 1970 and onward, the struggle was joined between Trudeau and Levesque for the "soul of Quebec."[11]

Trudeau made a major effort between 1968 and 1971 to produce an agreement among the ten provinces on constitutional revision. Numerous conferences were held and agreement was found on many of the issues included in the agenda. The final conference, in Victoria, British Columbia, in 1971, resulted in preliminary agreement among all ten provincial premiers; but the Quebec premier, Robert Bourassa, was forced to withdraw his support the following week because of strong public opposition in Quebec over the Victoria Charter's failure to guarantee Quebec control over social policy. In fact, Quebec opinion had by then reached the point where only a significant devolution of federal powers, and a corresponding rise in the powers of Quebec's Assembly, would be acceptable to the province. Levesque's *Parti Quebecois*, although a small minority in the Quebec Assembly at that time, made it virtually impossible for the Bourassa government to accept a moderate solution to Quebec's

[11] The growth of Quebec nationalism and of the *Parti Quebecois* is discussed in detail in Edward McWhinney, *Quebec and the Constitution 1960–1978* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).

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demands for greater autonomy. Without Quebec's consent, constitutional revision in 1971 became impossible.[12]

Canada was thrown into near shock in November 1976 by the surprise victory of the *Parti Quebecois* in the provincial elections. Although the *Parti Quebecois* received only 41 percent of the vote in the elections, it captured a large majority of seats in the Quebec Assembly. Levesque became premier of Quebec, and what had for sixteen years been only a potential threat to Canadian unity then became a major political crisis for the Trudeau government in Ottawa. Levesque's party had campaigned on a platform to ensure good government rather than on a secessionist theme, but no one in Quebec or elsewhere doubted that he would use his new power position to press for Quebec's independence as soon as the time seemed suitable.[13] Trudeau's response was to adopt a reasonable posture toward Quebec. He stated that if Quebecers voted by an overwhelming majority in a referendum to ask for independence, he would not oppose it. He threatened to deal forcefully, however, with any "illegal actions" that separatist groups might take to bring about their goal. Trudeau also renewed efforts to reach agreement on constitutional revision, even though he realized that Quebec would not agree to a revised federal system until Levesque's government was defeated in the next provincial elections.

One of Trudeau's actions to strengthen the hand of antiseparatist forces in Quebec was the appointment of a Task Force on Canadian Unity in 1977, whose objective was to take a fresh look at the political and constitutional barriers to Canadian unity and make recommendations. The effort was similar to one Lester Pearson had made fourteen years earlier when he established a Royal Commission to study the problem. Known as the Pepin-Robards Task Force (for its cochairmen), this group of distinguished Canadians traveled across Canada and talked with a large number of individuals and groups representing a cross-section of Canadian society. The task force published its first report, *A Future Together,* in January 1979, as Trudeau was preparing for general elections. This bluntly written report received national attention in Canada and was reported on by major American newspapers as well.

The Pepin-Robards Task Force defined the problem sharply: "Canada and its constitutional system is in a protracted state of crisis: the primary, but not the only challenge, comes from Quebec; and the pressing need today, as it was then [in 1977] is to discover the basis for a fresh accommodation which will permit the people who inhabit this vexing and marvelous country to live together in peace, harmony and liberty." It asserted that Canadian unity must be based on the willingness of the various communities and governments of Canada to support and sustain the Canadian state, and that the main problem "does not lie in

[12] For a discussion of the Victoria Conference and its failure, see Donald V. Smiley, *Canada in Question,* pp. 47–50.

[13] Levesque's *Parti Quebecois* (PQ) had outlined its views on "sovereignty-association" before the election of 1976, but its victory at the polls had more to do with the ineffectiveness of the Liberal Bourassa government than it did with secessionist talk by the PQ.

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preserving or reestablishing unity, but rather in constituting it in the first place."[14] The task force also took a strong, and controversial, stand on the issue of Quebec separation. While asserting that Quebec should have the right to become independent, if this turned out to be the "clearly expressed and settled preference of Quebecers," it argued that this was not the real question to be addressed in the short term: "In our judgement, it is not a question of deciding in the abstract whether Quebec possesses a right of self-determination, but rather determining in the most practical manner possible what principles ought to govern Quebec's discussions with the rest of Canada as it faces the largest political decision it has had to make in the last century."[15] The task force thus extended an olive branch to those Quebecers who wanted substantial changes in the province's relations with the rest of Canada but who were not persuaded that the *Parti Quebecois*'s remedy was the best course.

In a section entitled "A Restructured Federalism," the task force report asserted that constitutional revision needed to provide the majority of Quebecers "an acceptable federalist response to their desire to maintain their distinctive cultural and social identity." To accomplish this, the task force proposed two alternative constitutional provisions regarding the distribution of powers between the central government and the provinces: assign to Quebec formal law-making powers, denied to other provinces, over such matters as culture, language, immigration, social policy, communications, and some aspects of international affairs; or, as a second choice, which the task force preferred, allot to all provinces the powers needed by Quebec to maintain its distinctive culture and heritage, "but to do so in a manner which would enable the other provinces, if they so wished, not to exercise these responsibilities and instead leave them to Ottawa."[16] In effect, the Pepin-Robards group suggested that all provinces achieve greater authority for running their own affairs but that only Quebec would have a need to exercise this authority. To underline its view that urgent action was required to preserve the Canadian federation, the task force asserted: "Let us put our conviction strongly: Quebec is distinctive and should, within a viable Canada, have the powers necessary to protect and develop its distinctive character; any political solution short of this would lead to the rupture of Canada."[17] Even though these recommendations were rejected by Trudeau and the national Liberal party, the Quebec Liberals found them to be close to their own philosophy on Canadian federalism.

Alienation of Western Canada

Until 1980 the major threat to Canadian unity lay in Quebec, and most scholarly writing as well as newspaper attention was directed at the *Parti Quebecois*'s

[14] Task Force on Canadian Unity, *A Future Together* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979), pp. 3, 6–7.
[15] Ibid., p. 113.
[16] Ibid., p. 81.
[17] Ibid., p. 87.

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threat to Canada's survival as a nation.[18] Two events early in 1980 changed that focus and brought to the fore the nascent, but real, disaffection of western Canada: the Liberal party's return to power in Ottawa following federal elections in February; and the defeat of the separatist referendum in Quebec in May.

The return of the Liberals, led once again by Pierre Trudeau who several months earlier had expressed his decision to retire from national politics, was a severe political blow to Canada's western provinces. The west has increasingly become the bastion of the Progressive-Conservative party, which had been out of power from 1963 until 1979. In the May 1979 federal elections, the Conservatives received a plurality of seats in the House of Commons and formed a minority government under the leadership of Joe Clark, a member of Parliament (M.P.) from Alberta. The four western provinces gave the Conservatives 58 of their 135 seats in the House of Commons while Trudeau's Liberals received only 2 seats. Quebec, on the other hand, gave the Liberals 67 seats and the Conservatives only 2. Ontario, the most populous province, held the balance of power between these two political blocs, and in 1979 it elected 57 Conservatives and 32 Liberals. The western-based Progressive-Conservative party, therefore, came back to power after sixteen years determined to change federal policy on a range of issues, the two most important being the pricing of Alberta's and Saskatchewan's oil and natural gas and federal policy toward Quebec.

The west had never accepted Trudeau's bilingualism as national policy and it resented the influence exerted on his government by Quebec nationalists. Clark's problem was that he lacked a majority of seats in the House of Commons and had to rely for support on the tiny Social Credit party of Quebec to sustain confidence in his government. He expected to call new elections in 1980 and, as has usually been the case in Canadian politics, to secure a majority on the second try. His government lost a vote of confidence on its budget bill in December 1979 because the Social Credit party abstained, and he was therefore obligated to call new elections.

The Liberals won a smashing victory in the elections of February 1980, capturing seventy-three out of Quebec's seventy-four seats and increasing their representation in Ontario from thirty-two to fifty-two—thus wiping out nearly all the Conservatives' gains there from the previous year. In the four western provinces, the Conservatives lost nine seats to the leftist New Democratic party, but the Liberals again captured only two seats—in Manitoba; they currently have no representation from British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. The key to the outcome of the February 1980 elections was the shift of Ontario voters back to the Liberals.[19] Two factors influenced Ontario's voters: fear that

[18] See, for example, Richard Simeon, ed., *Must Canada Fail?* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977).

[19] In 1979 the Liberals got thirty-two seats out of a total of ninety-five in Ontario, but in 1980 they raised this by twenty seats. The Liberals also gained six seats in Quebec and two in Nova Scotia, to give them a comfortable majority.

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the Clark government would substantially raise the price of gasoline and natural gas in order to meet Alberta's strong demands that it should be allowed to charge more than $14 per barrel of oil at a time that world prices had risen to $30 or more; and a view shared by many Ontario residents that Pierre Trudeau was the only national leader who had the ability to keep Quebec in Canada.

From February 1980 onward, the leaders of the four western provinces adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude toward Trudeau's energy policies, his drive to defeat the Quebec referendum, and his proposals for amending the North America Act. Since Trudeau's political support derives almost entirely from eastern Canada, particularly from Quebec and Ontario, western leaders have felt a growing alienation from the east and are reluctant to support Trudeau's efforts at constitutional reform unless he is more flexible in handling western interests. When the prime minister announced his new budget in October 1980 and proposed a significant increase in federal taxes on Alberta's oil and gas, as well as taking other measures that threatened the province's economic freedom of action, Premier Peter Lougheed announced his intention to reduce the province's oil production by 15 percent in 1981 and thus force eastern Canada to import much higher-priced foreign oil. Lougheed declared in a television address to the people of Alberta on 29 October that the federal government's action amounted to an "outright attempt to take over the resources of this province." He charged that Ottawa, without negotiation or agreement, "simply walked into our homes and occupied the living room."[20] Trudeau's action and Lougheed's response represented a dramatic example of the gulf that has now opened between the western provinces, led by Alberta, and the federal government following Trudeau's return to power early in 1980.

The fundamental political fact now facing Canada is that the country is sharply divided along sectional lines; a Conservative west, a Liberal east, and a divided Ontario. The west is unlikely to agree to significant constitutional changes if this enhances the power of eastern Canada, meaning Ontario and Quebec, at the expense of the west—and certainly not if this gives the federal government authority to set energy prices and production levels. Trudeau also faces an ominous political challenge: if Quebec decides to leave Canada, the Liberal party will be all but finished as a national political force because the loss of its numerous Quebec constituencies will shatter its voting strength in Parliament. Defeating Levesque's separatist challenge is, therefore, a matter of survival for the Liberals, as well as for Canadian unity. Western Canada is far less concerned than Ontario or the Atlantic provinces about whether Quebec remains in the Confederation because the Conservatives have little influence in Ottawa. They believe that making concessions to keep Quebec in Canada is not worth the price unless all the provinces are accorded increased powers, a proposition that is unacceptable to Trudeau. The basic political divisions of Canada, therefore, are a serious impediment to constitutional reform and to a strengthened Confederation.

[20] Quoted in *Maclean's* Magazine, 10 November 1980, p. 29.

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TRUDEAU'S PROPOSED "NEW FEDERALISM"

Following the failure in 1971 of the Victoria Conference on constitutional revision, many Canadian groups, individuals, provinces, and political parties put forward proposals for breaking the impasse and stimulating renewed efforts to replace the British North America Act with a Canadian Constitution. The Task Force on Canadian Unity was the best known of these efforts. But its preliminary report was so at variance with what the Trudeau government had in mind for constitutional revision that its recommendations were ignored by the prime minister. Trudeau's concept of a renewed Canadian federal system puts the emphasis on *Canada*—on building a national consciousness and patriotism around the idea of the Canadian federation being more important than any of its constituent parts. He opposes a special status for Quebec, or any other province, believing that it would detract from the overriding need to strengthen Canadian institutions. Trudeau asserts that local and ethnic loyalties must recognize a higher loyalty to Canada and that the national interests of the state must take precedence over provincial and local interests.

In *A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federation*, the Trudeau government in 1978 set forth its own concept of national unity: ". . . too many outdated myths and old hang-ups persist in various parts of the country. They are like millstones around our necks; we must break the chains that bind us to them. Let us forget once and for all about the Plains of Abraham; the vanquished and vanquishers are dead. Let us 'decolonize' Quebec in our minds: Quebec is in full renaissance."[21] Trudeau argued that the unity of Canada must transcend the identification Canadians have with provinces, regions, and linguistic or other differences. If such a loyalty to Canada is to be achieved, Trudeau maintained, "there must be a sense that it does serve, as a country, the vital needs of all its citizens and communities. Each must feel that Canada, and the federal parliament and government acting on his of her behalf, are the best guarantors of the security, progress and fulfillment that derive from the common action of free citizens in a democratic country."[22] Nothing is said in this government White Paper about special concessions to Quebec; the emphasis is on clarifying the central government's authority, giving the provinces a greater voice in decision making at the federal level, and increasing communications between various parts of the federation. The duality of Canadian language, culture, and institutions is recognized but in the context of a strong and united Canada, not in a loose arrangement between semisovereign provinces. There is, therefore, a fundamental difference of views between Trudeau and Quebec Liberal leader, Claude Ryan, even though both profess to favor renewed federalism.

A Constitutional Conference of First Ministers was held in Ottawa in September 1980 to see whether the provincial premiers and the Trudeau govern-

[21] *A Time for Action,* p. 2.
[22] Ibid., p. 12.

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ment could reach agreement on a new constitution and then ask the British Parliament to relinquish to Canada the North America Act and its amendments. The eleven first ministers met for six days of intensive negotiations and debate and finally had to admit failure. A principal stumbling block was the unwillingness of several provinces, particularly Quebec, to accept Trudeau's plan to have entrenched in the new constitution a provision enabling French and English minorities in any province to educate their children in schools of their own language. For his part, Trudeau refused to accept demands from Alberta and Newfoundland that the constitution guarantee not only that the provinces could control their own natural resources, but also that the federal government could not levy an export tax on these resources. Some premiers charged that Trudeau expected the conference to fail and therefore refused to make any significant concessions so that he could push ahead with his plan to employ parliamentary action to "patriate" the constitution. Trudeau commented after an impasse had been reached that "there are, indeed, two conceptions of Canada, and that is why we failed."[23] Given the strongly held centralist views of the prime minister and the equally strong decentralist views of most provincial premiers, it was probably inevitable that this 1980 conference on constitutional reform would fail. They were in fundamental disagreement on what kind of Canada they wanted.

Patriation of the Constitution

On 2 October 1980, the Trudeau government moved to carry out the prime minister's earlier threat to act unilaterally on the constitutional issue if the first ministers failed to reach agreement. In a nationwide radio and television address that day, Trudeau explained why it was necessary to break the "tyranny" of the unanimity rule of provincial consent to amending the constitution. He reminded the public of the commitment people in all parts of the country had made in May 1980 to the people of Quebec, citing the "the social contract" in which he said all can share fully in Canada's heritage. Trudeau's appeal for support made clear that constitutional reform was directly tied to his government's referendum pledge to Quebec: "It was more than a commitment to Quebecers, even though the Quebec referendum was the immediate reason for it. The commitment was from each Canadian to every other Canadian to change our country for the better."[24]

The Joint Resolution introduced in Parliament on 2 October contained three major provisions: a grant to Canada of its constitution through a formal request to the British government; an amending provision that would allow two years for the provinces to reach agreement on a formula for amending the basic law; and a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that would guarantee civil rights to all

[23] Quoted in *Maclean's* Magazine, 22 September 1980, p. 21.

[24] "Statement by Prime Minister Trudeau on Constitutional Change," Ottawa, 2 October 1980, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (CR-1), p. 8.

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Canadians. The amending provision, criticized by most of the provinces, authorized the central government to enact its own formula within four years and take it to the electorate in a national referendum if no agreement was reached with the provinces. In effect, Trudeau issued an ultimatum to the provinces to agree on an amending formula within two years or stand aside and let him decide it for them.[25]

The key provision of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, insofar as Quebec was concerned, was the education question: "Minority language educational rights, which provide that citizens of the English-speaking or French-speaking minority of a province have the right to educate their children in that minority language, wherever numbers warrant."[26] This provision directly contradicted the Quebec Language Act of 1977, passed by Levesque's majority in the Quebec Assembly, which declared that French would be the only official language of Quebec and that all children, with a few exceptions, must be educated in the French language. The provision would also force Ontario and several other provinces to provide French-language schools wherever there existed large segments of French-speaking people. Another provision affirmed that both English and French were official languages, again challenging Quebec's language law.

The Joint Resolution also contains an "equalization and regional disparities" provision that confirms what is already a basic part of Canadian law: the principle of making equalization payments to the poorer provinces, promoting equal opportunities, furthering economic development to reduce disparities, and "providing essential public services at a reasonable level to all Canadians."[27] This provision could be interpreted as giving the central government greater authority to transfer funds from richer to poorer provinces, thereby diminishing provincial powers.

As expected, Trudeau's action brought a storm of protests from the provinces, and several threatened to take legal action to prevent him from proceeding with his unilateral plan. Quebec Premier Rene Levesque called the action a flagrant betrayal of promises the prime minister had made before the Quebec referendum: "We're running the danger of seeing an obsessed politician unilaterally impose a constitution that would be a monument to himself, built on the grave of our aspirations and rights." Peter Lougheed, premier of Alberta, asserted that the amending formula proposed by Trudeau "changes the basic federal character of Canada," and he promised to fight the measure "by every means that we can devise." Brian Peckford of Newfoundland said he doubted that Trudeau had the legal authority to proceed alone to transfer the constitution to Canada and that he would consider a court challenge. Trudeau's only support among the provincial premiers was Ontario's William Davis who said that it was important to accomplish patriation of the constitution and that there

[25] Highlights of a Proposed Resolution Respecting the Constitution of Canada," 1 October 1980, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (CR-5), pp. 3-4.

[26] Ibid., p. 2.

[27] Ibid., p. 3.

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was room for further negotiations with the provinces before final parliamentary action was taken on the government's proposal.[28]

Trudeau's confrontational politics also stirred up strong emotions in the House of Commons. Opposition leader Joe Clark charged that the prime minister "offers Canadians the prospect of divisive referenda, prolonged constitutional challenges in the courts, and federal-provincial turmoil. That is a betrayal of those Quebecers who voted 'No' in the Quebec referendum, and all other Canadians who seek genuine renewal of our Confederation." Clark called attention to the fact that Trudeau's Liberal party had a majority in Parliament and "will not be stopped unless the people of Canada can be aroused to the abuse—to the potential damage to our country—that the government now proposes." He promised in the ensuing weeks "to fight this arbitrary measure and to try to achieve a genuine consensus in this country on constitutional change."[29]

Leader of the New Democratic party (NDP), Ed Broadbent, told Trudeau that he would be willing to support the Joint Resolution if the prime minister agreed to include in it a statement confirming the provinces' ownership and control of their natural resources. Broadbent, mindful of NDP electoral support in the western provinces, complained: "When these Canadians, [westerners] therefore, look at tonight's proposals, they will feel cheated, not because they oppose entrenchment of rights, not because they don't want their own constitution, but because the matter of greatest concern to them stands out because of its omission."[30] In a letter dated 21 October 1980, the prime minister accepted Broadbent's argument and agreed to include an amendment that confirmed provincial jurisdiction over nonrenewable natural resources and forestry resources so long as "the increased provincial power could only be exercised in a way that does not allow a province to discriminate against other parts of Canada."[31] By this move to gain support of the New Democratic party, Trudeau increased the parliamentary majority in favor of the Joint Resolution, thereby isolating the Progressive-Conservatives. Trudeau also hoped to reduce the appeal of Alberta's Peter Lougheed in the west and then engage him in negotiations on the price and production of oil and gas from his province in return for support on the new constitution. To insure that action in Parliament would not be thwarted by endless debate and political maneuvering, Trudeau employed a little used cloture rule to cut off debate on the first reading of the Joint Resolution in the House of Commons and set a deadline of 9 December 1980 for the appropriate

[28] "Reactions by Some Provincial Premiers to Prime Minister Trudeau's Constitutional Proposals," 4 October 1980, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (CR-4), pp. 2-3.

[29] "Statement of the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark on the Proposed Parliamentary Resolution Respecting the Constitution of Canada," Ottawa, 2 October 1980, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (CR-2), pp. 3-4.

[30] "Comments Made by Ed Broadbent, New Democratic Party Leader, on the Proposals for the New Constitution," Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (CR-3), p. 2, reported in *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 4 October 1980.

[31] "Exchange of Letters Between Prime Minister Trudeau and New Democratic Party Leader Ed Broadbent on Natural Resources Control," Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (CR-10), p. 2.

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committees to report their findings. He told the Canadian people that he wanted final parliamentary action by the end of the year. This deadline was moved back under political pressure and the resolution was debated early in 1981. He also sent a delegation to London both to explain to the British government his plans for moving the constitution to Canada and to lessen the possibility that the British Parliament might question why a request from Canada did not have the concurrence of the provinces, as envisaged in the Statute of Westminster.[32]

Prospects for Canadian Unity

In their introduction to *Canada Challenged: The Viability of Confederation,* R. B. Byers and Robert Reford pose this prospect for Canada: "Despite the diversity of views, the confusion, the uncertainty which currently exists, one of two outcomes appears inevitable: either there will be some form of renewed federalism enabling Ottawa to continue to speak and act for Canada in international affairs and to propose and develop national policies designed to benefit the country as a whole, or the existing structure will break up into at least two separate and distinct entities."[33]

That prognosis was probably correct in 1979, when it appeared that the real problem for Canadian unity was the potential separation of Quebec from the Confederation. The way to deal with Quebec's grievances, so it was argued, was to adopt a program similar to that proposed by the Task Force on Canadian Unity. By the end of 1980, however, the political situation in Canada had changed and with it the outlook for resolution of the political and constitutional crisis facing Canada. Pierre Trudeau's decision to challenge the unanimity rule on provincial consent to constitutional revision was a new element in the political struggle to determine what kind of Canada should prevail in the 1980s. Whereas before 1980 the principal question was whether constitutional reform could provide sufficient decentralization of the Confederation to persuade Quebecers that there was no need to leave Canada, Trudeau's return to the prime ministership and the failure of the Quebec referendum opened up a new possibility that he immediately seized upon. Instead of decentralization, he decided to press for a centralized Canada by using the federal Parliament as the vehicle to restructure the constitution. In sum, Trudeau's unilateral action at the end of 1980 to push for patriation of the constitution was a daring power move whose outcome could radically change the relationship between the central government and the provinces. It also carried the large risk that Rene Levesque would capitalize on Trudeau's "power play," as he called it, and turn it to his own advantage in the next provincial elections.

This risk became a reality on 13 April 1981 when the *Parti Quebecois* won a resounding victory in the provincial elections. Not only did the party increase its

[32] Smiley, *Canada in Question,* p. 8.

[33] R.B. Byers and Robert Reford, *Canada Challenged: The Viability of Confederation* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979), p. 3.

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percentage of the vote, from 41 percent in 1976 to 49 percent in 1981, it also increased its already large majority in the Assembly, to 80 out of 122 seats. The Liberal party increased its percentage of the vote as well, to 46 percent, but it received only 42 seats. The outcome was a personal victory for Rene Levesque who only six months earlier appeared to be on his way to defeat. The election outcome reopened the issue that most Canadians thought had been settled in May 1980, when Quebecers voted in a referendum to reject Levesque's plan to negotiate "sovereignty-association" with Ottawa. Although he stated during the 1981 election campaign that he would not schedule another referendum if his government won the election, Levesque is now in a strong position to press his case for independence if events during the next several years push Quebec public opinion in that direction.

The Quebec election was a defeat not only for Quebec Liberals, but also for Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. He had struggled since becoming prime minister in 1968 to persuade Quebecers that their future lay with Canada, not with the vision of the *Parti Quebecois.* After thirteen years of effort, he failed in this mission and Levesque was more strongly entrenched in Quebec than ever. Moreover, Levesque's victory strengthened the position of the other seven provincial premiers who opposed Trudeau's constitutional reform package and made the outcome of that Trudeau initiative uncertain. Although the prime minister's Liberal party clearly had the votes in the House of Commons to enact the constitutional package and send it to the British Parliament, the political price of doing so clearly rose following Levesque's election victory. If Trudeau persists in the coming months in his plan to force constitutional revision on eight of the provinces without their consent, he increases the probability that Levesque will renew his efforts to take Quebec out of the Confederation.

Western Canada strongly opposes Trudeau's decision to go it alone on constitutional revision, but public-opinion polls show that only about 25 percent of the people of that region favor secession from Canada. It is therefore likely that Trudeau will in the end be able to satisfy westerners with his decision to include an amendment to the Joint Resolution reaffirming provincial rights to own and control their natural resources. If he succeeds in placating moderate opinion in the west, Peter Lougheed of Alberta and William Bennett of British Columbia will have to negotiate their differences with Trudeau and settle for increased central powers in a renewed federalism.

The stakes involved in Trudeau's drive to enhance the central authority in Canada are very high. If he succeeds, Canada will be a more united, more assertive country than before. If he fails, Canada could divide into two or more separate countries, either in a loose association along the lines proposed by Levesque or as completely independent entities. In any of these cases, Canada will not be the same kind of country it has been in the past.

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Indira's India: Democracy and Crisis Government

AARON S. KLIEMAN

So thoroughly unanticipated yet seemingly conclusive was the personal defeat handed Indira Gandhi by the Indian electorate in March 1977 that the only event of comparable political significance was her dramatic return to power less than three years later. Mrs. Gandhi's victory at the polls in January 1980 has prompted renewed concern about the likely future course of national politics in India and the prospects for democracy there. By the same token it forces a reconsideration of the earlier 1975–1977 period of emergency rule.

In the euphoria of 1977, outside observers, including close followers of Indian politics, generally tended to gloss over the emergency experience. They were inclined to dismiss it for the most part as an unfortunate episode—a brief departure from traditional democratic government that, in any case, had evolved from a unique set of circumstances virtually impossible to replicate. Accordingly, the 1977 election was interpreted, instead, as a ringing confirmation of long-standing and positive assumptions: the essential soundness of the Indian political system; India's deep commitment to democracy; and, most emphatically, the maturity of the Indian people.[1]

According to the optimists, the decisive intervention of the Indian masses had

[1] See, for example, Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed, *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behavior in India* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978). In a postscript, "Democracy in India Has Roots," the authors described the election as "a momentous act, a veritable revolution, one which changed the course of history" and returned India to a competitive, pluralistic, democratic polity in which there had emerged "a democratic political culture at the mass level" (pp. 296–303).

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saved India at the last possible moment from what threatened to become a permanent dictatorship. Acting through available channels for political expression, by their intuitive sound judgment and vigilance in the defense of personal freedoms, the masses had emerged as a central pillar of Indian representative government.[2] Nor were the implications confined to India alone. Going one step further, Western proponents of liberal democracy sought to place the 1977 general elections in a broader context: Far from irrelevant or on the wane, the democratic model as confirmed by the events in India had much to offer other developing countries in Asia, Africa, and the Americas as well.

For these reasons Mrs. Gandhi's loss in 1977 was widely perceived at the time as the last hurrah of a discredited authoritarian leader who had committed the fatal mistake of allowing free elections. Given this windfall opportunity to express themselves in the aggregate, millions of Indian voters had proceeded to exact a full measure of retribution from Prime Minister Gandhi, her government, and her party: for high-handedness (and not merely "administrative excesses," as she insisted), for infringing upon individual rights, and for systematically subverting parliamentary institutions. The world's largest practicing democracy had weathered its worst crisis.

But has it? Are those previous twenty-one months of emergency rule presided over by Indira Gandhi simply a temporary aberration or just possibly a hint of things to come? Does the earlier experiment in constitutional dictatorship indeed reflect a healthy Indian polity or perhaps, upon second thought, some fundamental structural and procedural weaknesses? And how can these favorable assessments be reconciled with the strange love-hate relationship that apparently exists between Indira Gandhi and the Indian people? When, in other words, was the Indian electorate mature and enlightened? When it rejected Mrs. Gandhi's claim to leadership in 1977? Or, alternatively, when it reelected her by an even more impressive margin in 1980, despite the experience of emergency rule and the very real prospect of its being repeated—this time without elections?

There has been little serious effort at addressing these questions: certainly not after 1977 when democracy appeared to be healthily restored to India; and even less so now when Gandhi's comeback happened to coincide with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which pushed larger regional and geopolitical issues to the forefront. Since then attention has been focused almost exclusively upon Gandhi's foreign-policy orientation, to the near-total neglect of domestic affairs and the implications of a return to power by the "empress of India."

Preconditions of Emergency Rule

The Indian dilemma since 1975 would seem to lie in the need to choose between efficiency and freedom, with no middle ground or viable third option in sight.

[2] Rupert Emerson once wrote: "The best of all safeguards for the survival of democracy or for a return to it would be the mobilization of a populace vigilant to defend its rights and manage its own affairs" (*From Empire to Nation* [Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1962], p. 292). In this vein, the 1977 restoration of freedom was attributed to "the deeply-rooted democratic instincts of the Indian people" ("The World's Largest Democracy?" *Washington Post*, 22 March 1977).

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Gandhi, on the one hand, offers the hope of more resolute government, although perhaps at the expense of democracy; her opponents, on the other hand, as demonstrated when in power from 1977 to 1980, stress greater freedom, although it may result in inefficiency and license.

Statistics from the last three elections indicate the extent of this public ambivalence. In 1977, for example, of 539 seats contested in the *Lok Sabha,* or lower house, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party managed to secure only 28 percent (153 seats), compared with previous and subsequent highs of nearly 70 percent in 1971 and in 1980 (352 out of 518 places and 351 of 528, respectively). This extreme shift is also apparent in the Congress party's share of the popular vote: 43.6 percent in 1971, declining to 34.5 percent in 1977 before rising again in 1980 to 42 percent.[3]

In 1971 Mrs. Gandhi won a seat to Parliament in her own constituency of Rae Bareli, in Uttar Pradesh, by a margin of 110,000 votes; in 1977 she lost by 55,000 votes to the same opponent, Raj Narain. Then, in a remarkable personal triumph last January, she regained her seat by an impressive 51,592 vote margin over her rivals. No less ignominious had been the defeat of her son Sanjay, in his first attempt at elective office in 1977. Losing then by 76,000 votes, he proceeded in 1980 to win in Amethi by a margin of 35,449. These voter behavioral patterns thus suggest wild oscillations in public opinion. India's acting president insisted in 1977 that the people had given "a clear verdict" in favor of "individual freedom, democracy and the rule of law, and against executive arbitrariness, the emergence of a personality cult and extra-constitutional centers of power."[4] From the added perspective of 1980 that verdict no longer seems quite so clear-cut as it did then.

The sharp discrepancy in voter preferences is easily explained. In 1977 the Congress party was afflicted with the kinds of cleavage and complacency known to befall dominant political parties after years of uninterrupted holding of power. By contrast, the opposition succeeded for the first time in presenting a united front, and this loose coalition of the Janata party proceeded to mount an effective campaign on the theme of "Democracy versus Dictatorship" which appealed to many Indians freshly sensitive to police brutality, bureaucratic arrogance, and the government's sterilization program. The prime minister herself, moreover, campaigned under a cloud of suspicion and was being held directly responsible for the harsh administration of many of the emergency reforms. By 1980 the situation had been reversed. Itself beset by internal dissensions, the Janata government coalition was disintegrating, its performance in

[3] Statistics derived from Eldersveld and Ahmed, *Citizens and Politics*, p. 298; and Myron Weiner, *India at the Polls* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp. 68, 74. Unofficial 1980 returns from *The Economist*, 12 January 1980, p. 39, and the Information Department of the Embassy of India.

[4] Acting president, Basappa Jatti, in his formal opening address to a joint session of Parliament, quoted in William Borders, "India to Move Quickly to Expand Freedoms," *International Herald Tribune*, 29 March 1977.

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office a major disappointment. Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand, had managed not only to revitalize the Congress-I (for Indira) party but to exonerate herself and once again gain public esteem. This was made possible, in part, because of the Janata coalition's inability to hold Mrs. Gandhi legally accountable for the abuse of emergency powers.

Thus even the motivations behind the sudden proclamation of national emergency on 26 June 1975 remain a source of controversy. While scholars may differ, it seems clear that essentially three preconditions had made such an extreme step possible: the uniqueness of the situation, the personalities of the prime actors, and the complete absence of elements or agents of resistance. Each of these ingredients, moreover, continues to exist in India today, salient and unrelieved despite the earlier close brush with dictatorship.

Declaring a state of emergency is meant to be the democratic response to grave threats arising at home or outside the country.[5] Economic, social, and political problems inside India contributed to such an atmosphere of imminent danger and chaos in 1975; this provided both the backdrop and pretext for Mrs. Gandhi's recourse to government by decree. By 1980 neither the twenty-one months of authoritarianism nor thirty-three months of the Janata alternative had succeeded in arresting, let alone resolving, any of these staggering domestic problems. Some problems, such as inflation and caste differences, have actually worsened. And India's external security position in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the determination of the United States to supply Pakistan with arms have further aggravated the situation.

The mood that prevails, therefore, is one of potential crisis. Should India's leaders choose to convey and magnify this as an acute danger at once clear and present, it would justify resorting again to emergency powers prescribed by the constitution. Article 352 of the Indian Constitution, which serves as the basis for crisis government, was amended by the Janata government. As it now reads, to be lawful, a declaration of emergency can only derive from an armed rebellion, rather than the previously more vague "internal disturbance." One may find comfort in this tightening of legal terminology; yet, even this wording gives sufficient latitude and discretion to those wielding actual political power.

Constitutional provisions by themselves, however, are insufficient as a deterrent to the misuse of emergency powers. Both the decision to introduce and to terminate a state of emergency involve acts of judgment on the part of political leaders; thus, the personality and earlier experiences of these leaders play a central role. Long respected as a gifted tactician, the daughter of Jawarhalal Nehru also earned the reputation for being impulsive at times, but always decisive and resolute; some observers go so far as to see in her a predisposition toward crisis

[5] The theory behind the use of emergency powers is discussed in the earlier works of Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, 4th ed. (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1968), and in Clinton Rossiter, *Constitutional Dictatorship* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948). A more recent comparative study is Aaron S. Klieman, *Emergency Politics: The Growth of Crisis Government* (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976).

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situations as well as a preference for autocratic rule freed of cirticism and dissent.[6] Certainly an inclination to equate challenges to her personal authority with a threat to the entire nation has to figure prominently in Mrs. Gandhi's 1975 declaration of emergency. There are few signs at present that she has been chastened by the earlier criticism and defeat, or that she would be unduly reluctant to apply emergency powers a second time if, in her opinion, the situation warranted it. Indeed, her popularity restored, Indira Gandhi can cite the massive victory in January as complete vindication of her earlier policies in 1975–1977.

A people's hold over its leaders is always tenuous; but never more so than in the midst of a national crisis. For at that point autonomous political and social mechanisms dear to democracy are permitted by law to lapse as the heavy but unavoidable price for a collective response to the emergency. This insight has been confirmed in the case of India. The conversion process whereby an alert public is forced into passivity and compliance proved surprisingly short in 1975 as, within but a few weeks or, in some cases, days, each of the representative institutions and intermediate agencies were disarmed. Parliament, political parties, opposition groups, trade unions and other interest groups, and the media each eventually was either neutralized or actually transformed with relative ease into an instrument of the regime, while Indians themselves slipped into the comfortable role of loyal, passive subjects in the name of national solidarity and discipline.

The Absence of Resistance

These observations merit closer analysis and comment in considering future scenarios for Indian politics. Discussions in the postemergency period have tended to concentrate upon either the situational or the personality factor. The third variable, with its necessarily disquieting evidence against the notion of an alert citizenry and a structurally sound political system, by contrast has received little attention. Few lessons have been drawn from the earlier experiences and the disappointing performance of democratic safeguards. Even fewer of these lessons have been acted upon in order to insure against any recurrence of discretionary emergency government without absolute justification *in extremis* at least in the foreseeable future. It is this failure to introduce real as opposed to paper

[6] This point, the need to dominate lest she be dominated, is made effectively by Henry Hart, "Indira Gandhi: Determined Not To Be Hurt," in *Indira Gandhi's India*, ed. Henry Hart (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), pp. 241–67. Other insightful biographical studies of Mrs. Gandhi include: Mary C. Carras, *Indira Gandhi: In the Crucible of Leadership* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1979); Krishan Bhatia, *Indira* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974); and Uma Vasudev, *Two Faces of Indira Gandhi* (New Delhi, India: Vikas Publishing House, 1977). On the general theme of personality in politics, see James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978); and E. Victor Wolfenstein, "Some Psychological Aspects of Crisis Leaders," in *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies*, ed. J. Lewis Edinger (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 155–81.

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reforms, to repair defects, or to strengthen institutions that more than anything else suggest greater caution if not outright pessimism. A second enactment of "constitutional dictatorship" indeed could easily take place in India if for whatever political or personal reasons Mrs. Gandhi or, more likely, a future successor should resolve to do so.

Reflecting upon what actually happened to the Parliament, the multiparty system, the judiciary, the constitution, the public media, the bureaucracy, the military, Indian federalism, and the electoral process in the period from June 1975 to March 1977, one discovers that in truth each of these popular supports for democracy either crumbled or malfunctioned. Until the emergency, and ever since it ended, India has claimed to be a vibrant democracy on the strength of its popular base, with citizen awareness manifesting itself through such functioning representative organs. What transpired during those two years, however, presents a serious indictment of this claim.

Parliament and the Political Parties

India's Parliament was an embarrassment throughout the emergency, but especially in the initial stage when it proved to be a willing tool, acting as a rubber stamp for actions taken by Mrs. Gandhi. Meeting in special session less than a week after the proclamation, the lower house approved the emergency by a vote of 336 to 59. Under new procedural rules, the effect of which curtailed discussion and questioning, the Parliament then proceeded to pass amendments to the Indian Constitution by such lopsided votes as 342 to 1 and 336 to 0. Nor were these changes insignificant: the Thirty-eighth Amendment barred law courts from hearing petitions that challenged a proclamation of emergency or any rules imposed under such a proclamation. On 5 August the lower house amended the Representation of the People Act of 1951 in such a way as to deprive the courts of the right to decide on the punishment of a legislator found guilty of an electoral offense; purposely made retroactive, it had the effect of making the prime minister immune to criminal proceedings.

This transformation of Parliament was the product of a number of factors: some two dozen opposition members of parliament (M.P.) had been arrested in the early hours of 26 June; other M.P.s boycotted parliamentary sessions in protest against opposition speeches going unreported by an Indian press, which at that time was operating under a stringent censorship code. The few speeches critical of the emergency proclamation were given little circulation and at best had only a marginal impact. Clearly, Parliament could not and did not stand as a forum for dissent or critical review of government practices during the nation's crisis.

Of direct concern for the workings of Parliament at the time was the change wrought in the multiparty system. Most adversely affected, naturally, by the emergency were the opposition parties. Prominent critics of the government and leaders of the opposition were rounded up and thrown into prison, and charged

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with promoting forces of disintegration, inciting the armed forces to mutiny and, most damning of all, seeking in the name of democracy to negate the very functioning of democracy. Government spokesmen admitted to 676 arrests on the first day of the emergency and to more than 1,200 by the end of that first week. The numbers of those detained by the police, who cooperated fully with the government, eventually reached into the thousands. On 4 July, the ninth day of the new order, the government banned twenty-six different political organizations. As a result the opposition parties were deprived of their leadership and forced to suspend their activities; only a small number, such as the socialist leader George Fernandes, chose the only alternative of going underground.

For the ruling Congress party the implications of prolonged emergency rule were understandably quite different. Of the Congress party it can be said that on the whole it was content to play a supportive role. In late December 1975, meeting in conference, the party resolved to advise the prime minister against any precipitate national elections, preferring another year of emergency rule, inactive democracy, and silent opposition. The rank and file endorsed the government's tough stand in quashing dissent and pledged support for reform, greater efficiency, and stability. In Parliament, Congress party M.P.s, whether for reasons of career, conscience, or party discipline, voted the straight party line with unfailing regularity, thus assuring an automatic and easy majority for all government-sponsored legislation. This Congress party unity held essentially for the entire emergency period. Whatever dissent that did in fact take place inside the party was kept well in check. A few Congress party members did oppose Mrs. Gandhi vocally in party forums and spent the duration of the emergency in jail along with opposition party politicians. There was also evidence of an underground opposition. However small and ineffective, it conceivably might have grown had the emergency persisted. Only much later, in February 1977, did an open split occur with the defection of Jagjivan Ram. With the opposition incapacitated and the dominant Congress party guilty of complicity in perpetuating and condoning the emergency, the vaunted Indian multiparty system could no more be a defender of democratic freedoms than could the emasculated Parliament.

The Judiciary and the Constitution

The same must be said for the Indian courts, although, to their credit, submissiveness came only after an initial struggle. On 15 September 1975 the Delhi High Court ruled that the editor of the *Indian Express*, who had been arrested after the onset of emergency rule, was to be released because specific charges had not been brought against him. In the opinion of the court the rule of law did not permit the arbitrary exercise of executive authority to deprive an individual of personal liberty. The judgment reaffirmed the courts' right both to review detention cases, even under emergency rule, and to require that the authorities

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satisfy the courts of the genuine need for detention. Many saw this judicial decision as implying that the court would refuse to recognize the validity of Parliament's amendment to the law barring court reviews of those arrested during the emergency period.

But such hopes were soon dashed. The judiciary proved no match for Mrs. Gandhi in this essentially political struggle. She used Parliament to circumvent the judiciary through passage of special legislation and constitutional amendments that curbed the scope for judicial action. Remembering the courts' actions just prior to the emergency and dealing from the position of strength afforded by emergency rule, Mrs. Gandhi continued her battle with the legal system.

In a series of moves, Mrs. Gandhi managed to break the judiciary's spirit of resistance as well as its independence and supremacy. First, in November 1975 a five-judge bench of the Indian Supreme Court unanimously upheld the appeal by the prime minister against the earlier June ruling of the Allahabad High Court; she was found to be innocent of corrupt campaign practices. Second, in the following March, the government refused the permanent appointment of Justice R. N. Aggarwal to the Delhi High Court. Not by coincidence he had participated in the ruling against the government in the earlier case of the editor of the *Indian Express*. In a resolution adopted unanimously, the Supreme Court Bar Association charged that the nonconfirmation was likely to erode further the independence of the judiciary and to be taken as pressuring of the judiciary by the executive. Finally, in April the Supreme Court handed Mrs. Gandhi's government a major victory when it ruled that during a national emergency the government has the power to suspend virtually all individual rights, including the right of prisoners to challenge their detention. The decision barred political prisoners detained without trial since the beginning of the emergency from seeking their freedom through *habeas corpus* petitions to lower courts. It also ended the last outstanding legal challenge to the sweeping executive powers being exercised by Mrs. Gandhi under emergency rule. Thereafter the Indian judiciary maintained its silence while citizens were being deprived of their fundamental rights.

With the courts unable to defend it, the Indian Constitution proved little more than a parchment barrier against emergency authoritarianism. During the twenty-one-month state of emergency, Mrs Gandhi claimed constitutional justification for all her actions, including the suspension of civil liberties. At the same time, however, she proceeded to tamper with the fundamental character of the constitution. Her efforts at restructuring Indian institutions reached a peak in November 1976 with passage of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Bill. Denounced by the futile opposition as a blueprint for dictatorship, this omnibus legislation virtually rewrote the constitution. Both the lower and upper houses, by votes of 366 to 4 and 191 to 0, respectively, approved the set of amendments that enlarged the powers of Parliament and the prime minister at the expense of those previously possessed by the courts and the presidency.

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These included suspension of judicial review and granting the president of India, who was obliged to act in accordance with advice given by the prime minister and at her direction, the formal authority for two years to amend the constitution by executive order in any way that would serve this broad legislation. By codifying the state of emergency, passage of the bill thereby conferred a new aspect of permanence to many of the changes made since the emergency's inception and to a state of affairs originally presented as temporary. By the end of 1976 the Indian Constitution had become virtually a dead letter, the power given to Mrs. Gandhi limitless, and the safeguards against tyranny destroyed.

The Public Media

Sadder still was the ineffectiveness of the nation's press and other media to withstand the pressures of crisis government. The power of the press as an agency for mobilizing public opinion made it one of the first targets for repression. On 26 June 1975, the government introduced press censorship for the first time since independence, issuing a set of guidelines prohibiting such items as the publication of rumors; the reproduction of objectionable matter already published in any Indian or overseas newspaper; and the publication of anything likely to cause hatred or contempt for, or to incite disaffection toward, the government. Foreign correspondents were warned that they risked expulsion if they failed to submit dispatches or broadcast scripts for censorship before sending them outside India.

An order issued on the twenty-sixth by the Delhi district magistrate prohibited public meetings, processions or demonstrations, the carrying of firearms, shouting of slogans, and the printing, publication, or circulation of material likely to cause disharmony among different sections of the society. Further regulations in July prohibited publication of opposition statements made in Parliament or the proceedings of the Supreme Court. As if to bring home this message of the government's determination to prevent the danger of "objectionable literature inciting people to agitational and subversive activities" the minister of state for home affairs let it be known in May 1976 that a nationwide total of some 7,000 persons had been arrested since that previous June for circulating clandestine newspapers. In July 1976, the New Delhi monthly, *Seminar,* which had dared to print both strong statements of opposition to emergency practices and parliamentary speeches critical of the government, also ceased publication.

Therefore the government had less and less need for such harsh measures, which were then replaced by a number of ingenious and subtle controls, such as the cutting off of electric power to offending papers. Increasingly the press assumed a more supportive role. The twenty-year-old wife of Sanjay Gandhi began publishing a monthly magazine, *Surya* (sun in Hindi), which dedicated itself to portraying "the dynamics of a changing India in a positive, confident way." Soon the other journals and newspapers followed suit. In an affirmative

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kind of censorship, India's press moved from accepting controls as a necessity to actively promoting the government's point of view. The effect on public awareness, as one might expect, was devastating: "I find that reading these statements month after month about how wonderful everything is, I begin to believe it," noted a Bombay lawyer. "And in the absence of articles criticizing what is going on, I tend to forget that the opposition exists at all."[7] In this way a sanitized press took its place alongside the other disarmed former pillars of Indian democracy.

The Bureaucracy, the Army, and the States

The bureaucracy and the army, two apolitical agencies, continued to function irrespective of the profound, antidemocratic changes taking place around them. If anything, in the lower echelons of administration, officials were even more arbitrary in carrying out government policies, such as family planning at the grass-roots level. Junior officials, terrified of losing the security of a government job, interpreted rules to the narrowest degree. Bureaucratic zeal and loyalty thus contributed to the transformation of what had been a diffuse and pluralistic structure of participation into a centralized apparatus of control and power. The army, too, abstained from opposing the government. Despite the hopes of some people, the military refused to intervene in the defense of democracy. On strict grounds of professionalism, for one thing, the state of emergency gave the prime minister constitutional authority to use the army to maintain public order. Moreover, all officers were bound by an oath of loyalty to support the duly-elected and constituted government—one that insisted that the time had come for national discipline. Like the bureaucracy and army, the police and intelligence services, both at the central and state levels, supported the crisis government throughout, thereby constituting the nucleus on which Mrs. Gandhi could rely in institutionalizing the emergency.

That the "empress of India," as she soon became known, would not be content with anything less than complete and absolute obedience became apparent by her systematic removal of those last pockets of resistance. In June 1975, her Congress party controlled governments in twenty of the twenty-two states; only Tamil Nadu and Gujarat remained in the hands of her opponents. Following the emergency decree, these two states were much less stringent than the others about enforcing the emergency regulations. After initially tolerating them as bastions of resistance, however, the central government finally took over these defiant states early in 1976, consolidating its nationwide control. Invoking the constitution, Mrs. Gandhi dissolved the opposition state government in Tamil Nadu on charges of corruption and plotting secession; administration was assumed by the federal government. Shortly thereafter the same fate befell Gujarat State, whose chief minister, Bahubhai Patel, had insisted the previous

[7] Quoted in William Borders, "In Year and a Half, India's Press Moves from Accepting Censorship to Actively Promoting Regime's Views," *New York Times*, 5 December 1976.

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July that "the people have the right to speak and oppose Indira Gandhi" and who had defiantly permitted rallies protesting her rule under the declared state of emergency.

The neutralization of India's elaborate federal structure, however, might have been the easiest to predict since the flow of power from the periphery of a political system to its center and the concentration of authority therein is one of the most important transformations brought about by any national emergency. In India the political flaw in federalism had been exposed considerably earlier; several precedents already existed of states being placed under what is known as president's rule under certain circumstances, one of these being the declaration of emergency in a state experiencing political instability.

In short, Indira Gandhi's call for elections found India operating under a transformed political system: a Parliament subdued, giving automatic approval for government policies which extended to tampering with the constitution; a press chastened, the judiciary curbed, the opposition parties tamed; and the people deprived of judicial and civil rights more thoroughly than ever before. And as a result of sweeping amendments, the prime minister and executive branch stood unaccountable to legislature, judiciary, or country.

The Public

The Indian people went along with the emergency rule, first, because they had little choice, and second, because Indira Gandhi was able to assuage public discontent by adopting a tactic of "divide and rule." In this regard the economic policies of the Gandhi administration seem to have been singularly effective. Political changes met with almost total indifference; reports of economic progress, however, were applauded. Mrs. Gandhi's appeal offered something for everybody. She sought support primarily from the mainstream of both the Congress party and the nation. Her twenty-point economic program, revealed on 1 July 1975, made a number of promises: provision of land reforms, construction of rural housing, abolition of bonded labor, liquidation of rural indebtedness, adoption of measures against tax evasion and smuggling, expansion of worker participation in industry, and enhancement of employment opportunities for women. More important, the program was accompanied by almost immediate economic relief. Industrial production rose, public services improved, prices stabilized, and the number of days lost because of labor disputes reduced sharply. Police cracked down on smugglers and black marketeers. The business community was gratified at this new labor peace and with government slogans calling for hard work and discipline. Such early economic results, together with the prospect of further tangible benefits, were understandably viewed as deserving public support.

Emergency rule also appealed to different sectors in the society. The majority of Indians were disgusted with civil disorder. For reasons of patriotism they accepted the conspiracy argument put forth by the prime minister and her plea

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that the nation's unity, stability, and integrity had to be safeguarded. For millions of illiterate, simple people it was Mrs. Gandhi's national appeal and stature that assured their compliance. Besides, she assured her countrymen, as law-abiding citizens they need have no fear. Those more sophisticated took heart from her repeated promise that the emergency and its restrictions would only be temporary; hence they convinced themselves it would be wise to adopt a "wait and see" attitude. Even intellectuals became immobilized, torn as they were by bitter self-accusation for the earlier failings of democracy and preoccupied with denouncing the previous conduct of politics.

One can point in retrospect to a number of isolated signs of discontent: demonstrations and police brutality at the Turkoman Gate and in the city of Muzaffarnagar; petitions circulated in Delhi against an urban-renewal scheme supported by Sanjay Gandhi; an increase in the number of forged sterilization certificates; failure of bureaucrats to enforce directives; resentment by Congress party veterans at the increasing prominence of Sanjay Gandhi and his Youth Congress. But such dissent was isolated, sporadic, and unconcerted. Consequently, it posed little threat to the regime in 1977. Its potential effect was contained through police surveillance and censorship. This dissent neither prompted Indians in large numbers to risk abandoning the path of caution and conformity adopted in 1975 at the time of the emergency, nor persuaded Indira Gandhi in January 1977 to abate or end her autocratic rule.

In short, during the Indian emergency the notion of an alert democratic citizenry did not hold up well when put to the test. Contrary to the democratic assumption, individual and collective citizen adaptation to the permanent emergency state is a fairly easy process. There is seemingly no limit to public ingenuity or inventiveness in rationalizing the need for curtailed freedoms and for strong, centralized government. Certainly in the case of India at least, the Indian public demonstrated a remarkable ability to make the adjustments required of them in order to survive under such strict rule. Only when the crisis leader miscalculated in authorizing elections did India gain a reprieve; but not because the political system itself, or any one of its component parts, had performed well up until then.

The Electoral Process

The evidence points to the inability either of the Indian people or of their representative institutions to genuinely influence, let alone control, political events during the extended period of emergency rule. Yet that Indira Gandhi—and by extension her government, her party, and her policy of social reform through emergency powers—was so soundly defeated at the polls does seem to suggest the opposite; namely, that Indians were in fact determinant in terminating the emergency rule. How, in other words, does this impotence on the one hand reconcile with the election results on the other?

Part of the answer, of course, is simply that the 1977 Indian elections fall into

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the category of a political fluke. By right, and by what scholars know of political dynamics in the ongoing emergency state, the elections should not have taken place, or at least only when no room had been left for the contingent and unexpected. As regards the actual outcome, however, to a certain limited extent the public did speak out, letting their voices be heard in an expression of outrage reverberating far beyond New Delhi. But not necessarily for reasons of the common citizen's overwhelming preoccupation with democratic freedoms. Other forces were at work in producing the final outcome.

The defeat can be explained, for example, as resulting from a natural process of the decline of the Congress party. After thirty years of exclusive power not only had the Congress, because of its unwieldy size and broad base of support, become weakened by irreconcilable internal contradictions but it also had turned into a tired political machine headed by older leaders who were convinced that victory was assured. By 1977 the Congress had become basically unresponsive to those at the bottom of society; it had lost touch with the youth of the country as well. This precisely at a time when students of Indian politics were cautioning that the Indian electorate, believed inert and incapable of dramatic choice, was showing signs of revolutionary change and a potential break with the past.[8] The first explanation, therefore, puts the onus upon party dynamics. The Congress machine did not mount an effective campaign and lost to a more vigorous opposition.

A second explanation, while also citing natural causes of political decline, stresses instead the estrangement between the Indira Gandhi government and its national constituency. The public expressed its deep resentment in the voting booth—resentment against the growing disparity between official pledges and social, economic, and political realities. The basic needs of millions of Indians for food, work, and shelter had not been attended to, despite three decades of promises by Congress party ministers. Even the extraordinary political methods used during the emergency rule failed to ameliorate the unfavorable relationship between Indians and their environment. Thus in the final months of 1976, prices of essential commodities were reported to have risen by about 10 percent, a sign that for all their severity emergency controls were not working.

This perceived inability of the government to cope must certainly be considered a major factor in the large anti-Congress voting turnout. Quite possibly it was only a matter of time before some Indian government would have been held accountable for India's manifold problems and that at some point this national frustration would inevitably be translated into voting preferences. It so happens that the explosive point was reached in 1977; though not solely or directly to blame for many of these deep social ills, Indira Gandhi was the one who had to pay the price. In this context Jayaprakash Narayan's importance during the preelection campaign was not so much a direct political threat to the regime but the symbol for popular dissatisfaction with the Congress govern-

[8] See Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), p. 189.

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ment's ineptitude, misrule, and corruption over such a long period. Thus in some significant ways 1977 represents a protest less against the emergency rule than against those fundamental and still far from resolved problems of India's national emergence.

To the extent that the election results did reflect popular disapproval of the state of emergency, it is more plausible in the sense of specifically perceived and defined excesses rather than on the basis of general democratic principles. Some votes in all likelihood were cast in protest against the way the emergency had been imposed; others against the manner in which it was being administered; still others because there was no assurance the emergency measures would be terminated permanently. Such votes would indicate a degree of citizen alertness in the traditional sense.[9] Yet, practically speaking, how many people in India can be said to have been really prompted to vote by abstract principles such as due process or separation of powers? The Indian vote was not a response to the question of whether the emergency was constitutional, or whether it ought to continue. These issues, having their origins in political philosophy, were too remote and peripheral, too large and complex for most of the society.

A Vote for Social Freedom

What evoked an outpouring of antigovernment, anti-Congress, anti-Indira Gandhi sentiment was not the theoretical side of democratic freedom but rather freedom in its most elementary form. The election returns amounted to a reprisal; a reprisal against the excesses of the emergency state and a reaction to government's penetration into the most private concerns of a human being. One major example was the forceable removal on short notice of thousands of slum residents in India's major cities as part of large-scale urban-renewal projects. But more than anything else it was the emergency government's birth-control program and manner of implementation that both mobilized and motivated Indians against the Gandhi regime. Sterilization, in effect, became the only really popular issue of the 1977 election, "popular" in the sense of evoking wide public interest.

Population control has been a critical matter in India for many years. But it received new impetus in June 1975, when the central government offered strong encouragement. Declaring the need to act decisively in order to bring down the birth rate, Mrs. Gandhi announced: "We should not hesitate to take steps which might be described as drastic. Some personal rights have to be kept in abeyance

[9] Weiner, *India at the Polls,* provides an analysis of the 1977 election returns and an explanation of voting behavior derived from the aggregate data. He argues that the election offered the disadvantaged and alienated groups, such as the Muslims and the Untouchables, a weapon of defense, but does not adequately account for the regional disparity in the returns. Also useful is Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susan Hoeber Rudolph, "India's Election: Backing into the Future," *Foreign Affairs* 55 (July 1977): 836–53. In light of more recent developments, however, their description of the voting as "a striking repudiation of authoritarian rule" (p. 853) no longer seems quite so conclusive and definitive.

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for the human rights of the nation: the right to live, the right to progress."[10] Administrators of the program were quick to take the prime minister at her word; certainly the stern climate of the emergency period made it easier for them to take firm action while discouraging criticism or actual resistance. At the federal level it was announced that any civil servant who became the parent of a fourth child after September 1977 would lose his job. Disincentives of this nature were mixed with positive incentives such as cash bonuses to men who signed up for vasectomy operations, by which government officals hoped to produce impressive statistical proof of success. In 1976 birth-control clinics around the country performed 7 million sterilization operations. This led one public health worker to rhapsodize, "This kind of impetus from above is all we've needed—it's wonderful."[11]

Yet in their zeal to produce swift and impressive results, government officials were guilty of excesses. Reports filtered out of compulsory sterilization, with men rounded up arbitrarily for vasectomies. Using such high-handed tactics to meet regional and local quotas led on several occasions to spontaneous resistance and violence. In October 1976, for instance, police in the northern city of Muzaffarnagar killed several dozen citizens protesting the sterilization program. Only after the end of emergency rule could the minister of health in the new government inform Parliament that 207 persons had died during or after vasectomy operations performed between July 1975 and March 1977.

To many millions this was the real meaning of the emergency period. Sterilization, regardless of how it was presented to the Indian public, would be viewed as an affront to the deepest, personal, religious and social sensitivities. When applied so crudely it became the symbol and basis for the closest thing to social rebellion in India. Among villagers as election day neared the slogan became, instead of "*garibi hatao*" (abolish poverty)—which had been Mrs. Gandhi's 1971 election theme—"*Indira Hatao, indiri bachao*" (abolish Indira and save your penis). This draws attention to two other features of the election. First, voting behavior was influenced more by local concern than by national issues of economics, security, or foreign policy. Second, with the country's press exercising circumspection in its campaign coverage, informal, personalized lines of communication between voting groups were more effective in the formulation of public opinion than were formal channels. This transferring of ideas by word of mouth, of bringing news and ideas, of passing on rumors from one place to another in an atmosphere of emergency and repression played a major role in the election outcome. In such states as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Hiryana, where the sterilization program was implemented with the most zeal and least concern for legality, the defection from the Congress party proved the most dramatic.

[10] Quoted in William Borders, "India Reports Gains in Population Drive," *New York Times*, 16 September 1975.

[11] Both the figures and the comment are cited in William Borders, "India's Crown Prince," *New York Times Magazine*, 13 February 1977, p. 13.

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On the other hand, given the many provocations and the genuine disappointment offered the Indian people by their crisis government, it is surprising how much support it did have in the election. A by no means insignificant percentage of the electorate did vote for the Congress party, even though this implied democracy would remain in abeyance. The Congress did lose some 200 seats; but it also collected 34.5 percent of the vote (the Janata coalition achieved its success in parliamentary seats with a share of only 43 percent). Some 193 million people voted, representing 60.5 percent of the eligible electorate, while 127 million others did not. If the latter are added to the 67.5 million Congress party supporters, the statistics indicate that nearly 200 million people in effect, by either voting or abstaining, gave their mandate to institutionalized crisis government.

This does not take away from the positive, hopeful aspects of the 1977 elections. But it should suffice to keep students of emergency politics from being led into thinking that the future of democracy in India is so strongly secured or the role of an alert, active citizenry assured.

The Postemergency Period

The emergency, although ended, was intensive and long enough to leave some permanent scars. Much of the authoritarian apparatus was quickly dismantled by the Janata government; the press laws were repealed and the omnibus bill adopted by Parliament altering the constitution struck down.[12] Still it is doubtful whether the process of politicization in the institutions of government can be entirely reversed.

Once the clouds of fear and uneasiness lifted, it was Indian politics and factionalism as usual. In June there were renewed instances of political violence during the state elections. The return of seasonal floods, with their devastation and human toll, reconfirmed the cyclical nature and despair inherent in life in India. In short, the old problems of India persist, and the Janata government's response to these problems proved no more effective than other methods had been in the past. Like so many other countries in a similar position, India is struggling for an accommodation between the appeal of democracy and the need for efficiency.

The election and change of government left the Indian people with high hopes that their new leaders had the most difficult time fulfilling. Without the use of emergency powers, it became harder yet for the Janata government to control smuggling, the black market, strikes, and social protest. Therefore, the seeds of social and political discontent are very much present in postemergency India. Moreover, the provisions for a proclamation of emergency, even as amended, remain part of the Indian Constitution and hence available for use. Certainly there now exists the precedent for such a step, whether or not Mrs. Gandhi

[12] Michael Henderson, "Setting India's Democratic House in Order: Constitutional Amendments," *Asian Survey* 19 (October 1979): 946-56.

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chooses to recognize it as such. At the same time, no one has produced a satisfactory solution to insure that the Indian people and their democratic institutions will not be quite so vulnerable to subversion again through the logic of emergency.

In this regard the observations of the Shah commission are particularly instructive. As early as 28 May 1977 the newly installed government of Morarji Desai had appointed a special commission of inquiry into allegations of abuse of authority, excesses, and malpractices during the emergency. For those willing to ponder its findings, the commission delivers more of an indictment against the political system as a whole than against the Gandhis, mother and son, alone. Its report, finally published on 26 April 1978, detected "a general erosion of democratic values" under emergency rule. The nation "was initially in a state of shock, and then of stupor," while on the part of the general run of public functionaries there had been "a paralysis of will."[13]

The Shah commission insisted that the manner in which the emergency was declared and the ease with which it was accomplished ought to serve as a warning. It found, for example, that Indira Gandhi had not even consulted the cabinet beforehand. The report noted that Mrs. Gandhi had been "motivated by considerations of exigency only," since there was uncovered "no evidence of circumstances which would warrant the declaration of an emergency."[14] And yet, thousands were detained, and a series of totally illegal and unwarranted actions followed that involved "untold human misery and suffering." Evidence of "patent collusion" between the police and the magistracy in denying citizens their basic freedoms by arrests and detentions was also discovered. The 241-page report goes on to catalog in detail this breakdown of democratic constraints, before ending with the hope of generating a public debate on the vital issues raised by the emergency.

The report, unfortunately, had but a minimal and momentary effect. Its publication did not occasion sustained debate, nor did it achieve its main objective of devising "corrective machinery and remedial action." Instead, it was overtaken by events. Mrs. Gandhi succeeded in defying both the courts and the government over alleged improprieties committed even before the emergency. Concurrently, she proceeded with her determined political comeback even as the Janata party was in the process of falling apart, thus setting the stage for the 1980 elections.

Lest one conclude optimistically that Indira Gandhi returned to office contrite, almost immediately there were signs of a shift once more toward the centralization of power. First, the two special courts that had been set up to hear charges that she, her son, and others had abused their powers during the emergency, shortly after the 1980 elections adjudged themselves to be constituted illegally and dissolved themselves; the charges were speedily dismissed,

[13] Shah Commission of Inquiry, *Interim Report II* (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1978), esp. pp. 140–47.

[14] Ibid., p. 141.

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effectively wiping clean the ledger on the emergency. On 20 March the government even went so far as to ban any further circulation of the Shah commission report. Second, and most important, on 17 February 1980, nine states ruled by opposition parties were placed under president's rule, giving the central government direct control, particularly over police functions. Enjoying overwhelming support in Parliament, Mrs. Gandhi then proceeded to win control over most of the twenty-two state governments, as elections at the end of May resulted in convincing victories for the Congress–I party in eight of the nine states contested. In doing so she has also demonstrated the ineffectiveness of her opponents in offering a serious alternative political program or choice.

An ominous sign that the emergency period had not passed into history without leaving behind a political residue came in September 1980. Mrs. Gandhi by executive fiat revived government powers to send to jail for one year without trial anyone deemed to be "acting in any manner prejudicial to the defense of India or the security of India." The official statement justifying the new ordinance claimed it was needed in "the prevailing situation of communal disharmony, caste conflicts, social tensions, extremist activities, atrocities on minorities and other weaker sections of society and the increasing tendency of interested parties to engineer agitation of different issues."[15] This catalog of contemporary domestic instability applies with ease to most of the developing countries and to quite a few of the Western countries as well. Reminiscent of the mid-1970s, the National Security Ordinance passed into law with little difficulty at the close of 1980.

Whether a return to the themes of law and order, the need for discipline, and an atmosphere of crisis do in fact forecast a reenactment of the state of emergency by Mrs. Gandhi or her immediate successors remains to be seen. Considering the failure to heed the Shah commission's call for political reform, however, one is reminded of its concluding remark to the leaders and people of India that "on the ease and speed with which this is done will depend the vitality and resilience of our democratic processes and institutions."[16] Meanwhile, the social, economic, and political situation in India in itself represents a cogent if ominous argument in favor of centralized power and authoritarian rule. Should conditions continue to deteriorate—marked, for example, by the shocking violence in Tripura and Assam in June in which the local population not only massacred Bengali immigrants but defied army and paramilitary forces ordered into the disturbed areas—this will encourage a tightening of governmental control over the country.

With the accidental death of Sanjay Gandhi in June, speculation over the prospects for a family dynasty came to an abrupt end. The real question, beyond the immediate effects of the tragedy in accentuating Mrs. Gandhi's sense of isolation, is the political legacy she will leave behind. As the Janata coalition discovered for themselves, the governance of India in the 1980s suggests few

[15] "Mrs. Gandhi Finds Another Emergency," *New York Times*, 28 September 1980.
[16] Shah Commission of Inquiry, *Interim Report II*, p. 147.

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choices. There is the path followed in 1977–1980 of greater freedom, less government, and recourse to palliatives rather than root treatment of the problems confronting India—what John Kenneth Galbraith has termed "functioning anarchy." Or there is the second course briefly embarked upon by Indira Gandhi in 1975 of strong leadership at the top, imposing discipline and going so far as to employ special constitutional emergency powers on a permanent basis in the ongoing desperate attempt to avoid chaos and the breakdown of the system.*

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Presidential Press-Conference Schedules: Who Hides, and When?

WILLIAM W. LAMMERS

Variations in approaches to key routines reveal important differences both between presidents and in the evolution of the modern presidency. As Hugh Heclo correctly observes, crisis events have received a disproportionate amount of attention by presidential scholars.[1] For Richard Neustadt, schedules take on a specific importance as one of the traditional constraints on presidents—and a constraint that was substantially reduced in the 1960s.[2] A president and his staff feeling unconstrained by any necessity for fixed schedules can rather easily, as in the Johnson presidency, fall in to a "chicken little" syndrome in which frenzied White House activities replace more structured routines.

Important questions can be asked regarding the scheduling of press conferences as one aspect of presidential routines. Do some presidents tend more than others to hide from press conferences during difficult situations, such as a Cuban missile crisis or urban riots? Do all presidents, or some more than others, seek to avoid interaction with the press as their popularity undergoes a major slide in the polls? Have some presidents simply stuck to their schedules regardless of events? Historically, has the creation of press conferences as primarily televised events altered their regularity in use? Both individual

[1] Hugh Heclo, *Studying the Presidency* (New York: Ford Foundation Press, 1977).

[2] Richard E. Neustadt, "The Constraining of the President: The Presidency after Watergate," *British Journal of Political Science* 4 (October 1974): 383–97.

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behavior and changes in the presidency over time can be assessed by looking at press-conference schedules.

The avoidance of press conferences constitutes, of course, only one of several methods for dealing with potentially difficult questions. A president may, as did Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs incident and Eisenhower after the U-2 incident, simply indicate at the outset of the next conference that no questions in a difficult area would be entertained. Evasive answers, with indications of perhaps a desire to wait for further reports, or an effort at humor, are always a possibility. A series of lengthy introductory comments and long-winded responses on secondary issues can similarly reduce the focus on key issues.[3] Holding conferences outside Washington may also lead to a less carefully prepared and less-informed set of inquiries. Nonetheless, there is always that first question from the senior press corps figure to confront, and a series of evasions will do little to enhance presidential standing with either the press or, at least during difficult periods, the nation at large. The only sure method for avoiding an embarrassing public display of uncertainty or ignorance is still to avoid a conference altogether. Schedules thus constitute important data about presidential behavior and the president's relationship with the press.

The Research Design

A recent expansion in published presidential records makes it possible to examine press conferences for the entire fifty-year period, 1929–1979.[4] Records for earlier conferences, which date basically from Theodore Roosevelt's greater interest in the press, have not been sufficiently compiled to facilitate ready examination. The recent publication of Hoover's public papers has made an important addition, however, since it is now possible to look at the scheduling behavior of two presidents prior to the advent of the United States's dominant international position following World War II.

The question of what constitutes a press conference deserves brief consideration, since the officially published numbers are not entirely accurate. In the Roosevelt record, conferences were on occasion numbered and not held, and meetings with specialized groups, such as minorities and business editors, although listed as press conferences, would not be similarly categorized today.

[3] The major work on presidential press-conference strategies is Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966). See also, Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Effete Conspiracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) and Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1973).

[4] All of the press conferences are published for presidents since Hoover by the Government Printing Office as part of the *Public Papers of the Presidents*. The Roosevelt press conferences are also available in a thirteen-volume series published in 1972 by DaCapa Press, New York. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon conferences are now also available through Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, New York. A convenient set of news summaries as well as conference transcripts is also available for the Kennedy period in Harold W. Chase and Allen H. Lerman, *Kennedy and the Press* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Publishers, 1965).

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For Truman there were also such instances as his announcement of the Soviet Union's entrance into the war in the Pacific in which he is cited in the record as having held a press conference and yet not a single question was asked. In other situations, conferences as listed in the public papers of the presidents were obviously very short and occasionally even occurred more than once on the same day. Rather than try to discriminate among the briefer conferences, it seems more appropriate basically to follow the existing compilations, while concluding that a press conference did occur when some component of the press was able to ask questions of the president and an official record was kept.[5]

The comparison of conference frequency over time is of course in some respects unfair to the more recent presidents, because the magnitude of the gatherings categorized as press conferences has become much more substantial in the post-World War II period. A nationally televised event attended by 400 reporters is obviously a different occasion than a meeting in the Fish Room of the West Wing with perhaps a score of press room regulars. Some of the "evening with the president" types of meetings held by recent presidents more closely resemble the early press conferences than do the contemporary televised conferences. Furthermore, the use of background briefings and the extensive interaction between the press and the now much larger White House staff create a very different set of channels for press coverage of the president.[6] Nonetheless, press conferences differ from other meetings in the entire period in that the press conferences virtually always prevent the not-for-attribution type of information flow with its reduced possibility for accountability, and the conferences substantially reduce the extent to which presidents can mold gatherings by inviting only individuals they wish to see. In addition, it is important to emphasize that because the conferences have not differed substantially *within* a single presidency, it is possible to talk with particular assurance about changes in a given president's behavior. Finally, while conference formats have obviously influenced their frequency, the issues of conference avoidance during difficult situations and declining popularity are generic to presidential behavior despite the variety in specific conference format.

Several measures have been developed to operationalize the concepts of frequency and regularity. In an initial analysis, schedules were examined on the basis of the mean deviation from the average interval between conferences and the extent to which the two most common intervals occurred.[7] Ultimately, it was

[5] The occasional Roosevelt meetings with newspaper groups, other than the White House regulars, have been left in for the yearly totals. Since they usually occurred on the same day as a regularly scheduled conference, however, the zero interval was not computed.

[6] A recent discussion emphasizing different phases in president-press relationships is contained in Michael B. Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, "The White House and the News Media: The Phases of the Relationship," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Spring 1979): 37-53.

[7] These data are reported in William W. Lammers, "Presidential Press Conference Schedules: Who Hides, and When?" (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 31 August 1979). The seemingly unorthodox use of the *two* most common intervals was used to capture the extent to which earlier presidents would stick to a semi-

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decided that the best single composite measure of scheduling behavior was a combined frequency and regularity score. This step was necessary to avoid penalizing presidents who had frequent conferences and were thus apt to have a higher mean deviation from the average interval than those who had long intervals between conferences. Individuals with low frequency-regularity scores are thus the ones who both met the press frequently and avoided long gaps. The frequent and regular conferences of the pre-World War II period, therefore, produced scores in the 50 to 70 range, while the presidents after 1945 had scores ranging from a typical 200–250 range to Nixon's unique score of 796.

The analysis of responses to changes in popularity requires important decisions regarding the most appropriate time frame and the level of change to deem significant. Quarterly data prove to be superior to either annual or monthly data, since yearly figures camouflage too many differences, and monthly data suffer from too few time points for early poll results and too few press conferences.[8] In addition, quarterly data facilitate contrasting analyses between time periods with roughly comparable events, such as periods in which Congress is in session or when an incumbent is seeking reelection. A slide or rally in the polls is in turn defined as a change of 5 percentage points or more in the average from the previous quarter. After experimentation with a 10-point shift (which produced virtually no rallies) the 5-point shift was judged to capture reasonably the magnitude of change that would be apt to warrant presidential attention in such various behaviors as press-conference scheduling.[9]

The analysis of gaps in press-conference schedules requires in turn a review of the historical record as well as an examination of actual dates. As a first step in examining conference avoidance behavior, all potential gaps (defined as 25 percent beyond the president's average conference interval for a given year) were examined to determine whether a difficult situation had occurred. Some of the potential gaps did, as expected, prove to be normal vacation or low political-issue periods. Second, chronologically organized biographies of each administration were reviewed for indications of situations that might have produced conference avoidance behavior, and economic data and urban political histories were reviewed for key dates of difficult domestic situations.[10] Political-

weekly, weekly, or bi-weekly schedule that included a frequent use of the same day and thus a similar interval. Mean deviations, as conventionally computed, constitute an additional measure of scheduling deviation from the average interval.

[8] For poll data, see George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–71* (New York: Random House, 1972), and idem, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1972–77* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Press, 1978). Carter's 1978 figures are available in the monthly reports.

[9] I am indebted to both Jarol Manheim and Bruce Miroff for suggesting that a change in popularity of less than the initially employed 10 percent over two quarters constitutes a more appropriate measure of the type of change that is apt to cause concern and potential behavioral change in the White House.

[10] For each president, at least two chronologically organized histories were reviewed plus, where available, presidential memoirs. The annotated bibliography by Fred I. Greenstein, *The Evolution of the Modern Presidency: A Bibliographical Survey* (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise

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corruption issues were also reviewed for instances of likely major presidential embarrassment over charges against key presidential aides and department heads.[11] Although these indicators are somewhat circumstantial, since one cannot ascertain from the public record that a conscious decision to avoid a conference was made because of concern over a dominant issue, the evidence does show when a president was unwilling during a difficult situation to take a positive step toward meeting with the press.

Several specific hypotheses can be examined with the basic data. From the existing literature, one might expect that:

- —presidents are less apt to have conferences as their tenure in office increases.[12]
- —presidents are less apt to hold conferences when their administration is confronting a difficult or embarrassing situation.
- —presidents are less apt to hold conferences when they are suffering a loss in popularity.
- —presidents categorized as active-negative (using David Barber's classic typology) will be less regular in their conferences and more apt to engage in avoidance behavior during difficult situations or when they suffer a loss in popularity.[13]
- —presidents are more apt to avoid press conferences during difficult foreign-policy situations than during economic, domestic, or political-corruption crises.
- —presidents are less apt to hold conferences since they became substantially televised events in 1955.

Press-Conference Scheduling Behavior

Fundamental differences are apparent in the scheduling behavior of presidential press conferences. Presidents have varied considerably, from Hoover's virtually complete use of three- and four-day intervals in 1929 (which constituted the most consistent year in the entire fifty-year period) to Johnson's wide fluctuation in frequency and Nixon's near-total abandonment of press conferences. In terms of difficult situations, Hoover hurried back to Washington to have a press conference in the wake of the market crash in 1929, and Roosevelt consistently

Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977) is an excellent source for locating materials on each administration. For Carter, the basic source was the author's weekly president watching log which summarizes presidential and presidentially related events.

[11] A helpful recent addition to the standard literature is contained for top staff aides in Michael G. Fullington, "An Organizational Analysis of Scandal in the White House," (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, June 1979).

[12] For the "increasing isolation" view, see George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: Mentor Books, 1970).

[13] See James David Barber, *Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House,* 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977).

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met with reporters during difficult military situations; but a generation later Johnson avoided a press conference for more than three months as he expanded the U.S. commitment in Vietnam in 1965. In assessing the changing scheduling patterns, it is appropriate first to sketch the basic performance by each president and then systematically examine the impact of televised conferences, longevity in office, opinion poll changes, the responses to difficult situations, and the generalized personality dimension.

President Hoover stands out not only as the most consistent and frequent in his scheduling behavior (in 1929), but also as a clear example of a progressive unraveling of basic scheduling patterns by 1931 and 1932. This is the case even when the final two quarters of 1932 are excluded from the analysis. President Roosevelt, in turn, shows both extreme regularity and a high frequency of press-conference interaction. It was not until health limitations began to intervene in 1943 that Roosevelt's pattern changed, and even in 1944 he held press conferences at fairly regular intervals. Roosevelt's early wartime continuation of conferences was reflected, for example, by his willingness to meet at a normal interval even after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.

The most striking aspect of Truman's record is the greater regularity of press-conference interaction in the second term. The shakiness of Truman's first term, and the "growth in office" view of Truman are both supported by these data. For Eisenhower, the aggressive reassertion in 1959 is particularly striking. As various scholars have suggested, Eisenhower made a definite attempt to assert presidential leadership in the wake of the disappointing 1958 congressional elections. His effort to "come out fighting" is reflected in increased frequency and regularity of conferences in 1959. The Kennedy record shows both the rocky nature of his first year in office and a growing regularity and frequency in the second and third years of his presidency. Once again, the handling of a basic routine supports a common view of Kennedy's gradual maturation while in the Oval Office. Despite his widely acclaimed press conferences, and live televised approach for the first time, Kennedy was nonetheless both less frequent and less regular than Eisenhower.

Johnson's record is intriguing on all dimensions. Some of the variability in Johnson's conferences is reflected in their very structure. He reverted periodically to untelevised conferences and on occasion even to a "not for attribution" basis (as in aspects of his discussion of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution). Johnson's approach on a graph almost resembles the letter *W*, but without the final upward surge. His 1964 record was fairly frequent and reasonably regular, but in 1965 he became highly erratic and then abandoned conferences all together with a gap of over three months. In 1966, however, there was a sharp increase in the frequency of his conferences, which occurred at reasonably regular intervals. Yet as the fortunes of his presidency continued to decline, the late 1966 increase was abandoned and he declined on all measures to low levels in 1967–1968.

The Nixon presidency is more difficult to analyze simply because there were so few conferences. When a president is having only six to eight conferences a year, patterns are not easily discernable. The Nixon presidency does stand out,

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however, in its extremely large overall frequency-regularity scores. These are generated by the small number of conferences combined with limited regularity in their use. Gaps of 132, 91, and 90 days occurred even during the first term. While both Nixon and Johnson had long gaps in their records, it is Nixon who stands out for having both infrequent and irregular conferences throughout his presidency. Yet because he had no periods of frequent conferences, Nixon was in that respect more consistent than Johnson.

Presidents Ford and Carter (in the first two years) produced a substantial return to earlier post-World War II levels of frequency and regularity of press conferences. Ford's record is in some respects too short to give a clear perspective, in part because of the tendency for reelection years to be less consistent for all presidents. In looking only at data for the first two years for all of the presidents, it is clear that Carter's performance was substantially better than not only Nixon's and Johnson's, but Kennedy's and in several respects Eisenhower's as well. Carter's first-year performance, for example, was the most regular and consistent for a new president since Truman in 1945. Overall, press-conference scheduling behavior thus shows substantial variation both over time and among presidents confronting roughly similar issue agendas and conference formats.

The Advent of Televised Conferences

As a first line of analysis, it is useful to confront directly the question of the extent to which the televising of press conferences has had an impact on scheduling behavior. In making this comparison, the Johnson pattern becomes somewhat ambiguous because of his periodic use of untelevised conferences. It is also not entirely clear how best to categorize Eisenhower's televised conferences (beginning in 1955), because he required a tape delay in their release. The annual figures nonetheless do show a sharp drop in frequency and regularity if one compares all years before and after 1955, even when the Johnson conference record is discounted. The easiest conclusion is that presidents have had fewer conferences in the televised conference era. Yet in terms of frequency and regularity, the clustering tends to show not one jump but two. For the 1929–1944 period, the average score is 55, while the postwar, pretelevision period average score jumps to 122. In the periods since televised conferences became predominant, the late Eisenhower years plus the Kennedy presidency produce an average of 238, and the Ford-Carter years produce an average of 235. Johnson's combined use of televised and off-camera conferences produce a score of 243. Nixon, at a unique third level, has an average score of 796 for his first five years. The televised conferences of the recent period thus have come at the price of less frequency and regularity. The jump in average scores for the 1945–1954 period, however, also indicates that both the nature of dominant issues and the conference formats deserve consideration. While television has had a clear impact, differences within periods of similar use point to the importance of other possible explanations of changes in scheduling behavior.

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The Impact of Longevity

Turning to questions of change in individual behavior, presidents have *not* shown a tendency to withdraw from press conferences as their officeholding longevity increases. George Reedy's increasing isolation hypothesis is basically invalid for both the two-term presidents in their second term and within the first terms for all presidents. Regarding a possible second-term syndrome of increasing isolation after reelection, it is possible to examine effectively Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower. The war years for Roosevelt represented different and not really comparable issues, while Nixon's second term was too short and atypical to warrant analysis.

President Truman was strikingly more frequent and regular in his second term than in the first on *all* basic measures. Truman had more conferences and held them with much greater regularity in his second term. His use of similar intervals increased from 47 percent in the first term to 76 percent in the second. The use of a highly consistent weekly schedule at points rivaled the consistency of FDR in his prewar years and was markedly higher than any of Truman's successors.

Roosevelt presents, although not as dramatically as Truman, a second case of greater consistency and more extensive press interaction in the second term than the first, clearly holding more conferences in the second term than in the first, even after adjusting for the shortened first year in 1933. FDR was also more consistent in terms of a smaller mean deviation away from the average number of days between conferences, although he was somewhat less apt to use the same interval in the second term than in the first.

The Eisenhower case does give some indication of increasing isolation in the second term, but the evidence is mixed. He has slightly fewer conferences, although that was primarily a function of his drop to a low of sixteen in 1960; a drop that began with the U–2 incident and ultimately affected his totals for the entire year. Eisenhower also had about a 10 percent decrease in the percentage of similar intervals (65 to 53 percent) and increased his mean deviation slightly. Yet in evaluating a possible second-term syndrome it should also be emphasized that 1959 was a consistent, regular, and aggressive year, rivaled on most measures only by 1954. Although there is the seemingly inevitable "small n" problem in presidential analysis, the evidence from existing cases certainly does not support the thesis of a second-term syndrome of increasing isolation from the press.

Evidence from an analysis of each four-year term, or of terms not quite four years, also strongly suggests that presidents do *not* manifest increasing isolation from press interaction as their years in office increase. Interestingly enough, the one case of a clear progressive decrease in the extent and consistency of interaction between the president and the press is that of Herbert Hoover. There is actually a substantial indication that presidents engage in a greater degree of experimentation, and have greater difficulty, in the first or second year in office

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than in subsequent years.[14] In looking at the ten four-year terms (including Kennedy, but excluding Ford and Carter) it is possible to assess the differing responses by considering which year was most often the best, the second best and the worst on the frequency-regularity score. If presidents were doing the best at the outset and then becoming isolated, the average figure for the best year would be 1. In fact, the average is 3, indicating that very often the third or fourth year was the best. Because of the inherent problems involved in computing the reelection year scores, the "second best year" figure is also revealing: an average of 2.5.[15] Conversely, in asking when the president had the least consistent and least extensive press interaction, the yearly average is 1.4, again indicating that the first or second year is generally the least regular and frequent. Analysis on other measures generally supports the same conclusion: presidents not only do not tend to become isolated over time in their first terms; they are more apt to have their best year in the latter stages of their first term. Thus, insofar as longevity in office does help to explain changes in scheduling behavior, the results are in the opposite direction from those initially anticipated.

Responses to Popularity Changes

There is also a striking *absence* of the expected withdrawal from press conferences as presidents' popularity sags in the polls. Indeed, at first glance it almost seems as though presidents may be producing their demise in the polls by increasing the number of press conferences as their popularity begins to decline! More plausibly, presidents in some situations seem willing to fight their declining popularity by increasing the frequency of press conferences, while refusing, on the other hand, to jeopardize high popularity by making an inadvertent blunder at a press conference.

Several factors appear to be contributing to the lack of support for the view that presidents will withdraw as their popularity declines. First, presidents have fewer conferences, and generally rising popularity, in the context of reelection years, and particularly in reelection quarters. Also, retiring or defeated presidents are apt both to have fewer conferences at the end of their administration and to experience some rise in their popularity. Even if those situations are eliminated, however, there are major limitations with the withdrawal thesis. Some presidents have sought additional press exposure to help boost their popularity. The most dramatic case was with Johnson in 1966, when he moved from sixteen conferences in 1965 to forty in 1966 as his popularity continued to

[14] For new evidence of initial experimentation in press-conference behavior, see Jarol B. Manheim, "The Honeymoon's Over: The News Conference and the Development of Presidential Style," *Journal of Politics* 41 (Spring 1979): 55-75.

[15] To avoid penalizing presidents for the fairly common tendency to avoid press conferences during the campaign and in the weeks following an election, the scores for the fourth year were calculated using only the first two quarters.

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decline. Finally, some events, such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco, may produce an outburst of patriotism and thereby cause a short-run increase in popularity, even though presidents may be less than anxious to discuss these events.

The tendency to hold fewer conferences during surges in popularity and more conferences during slides is nonetheless quite striking. To analyze this issue directly, presidents were first examined in terms of the number of conferences held during quarters in which they experienced either an increase or decrease of 5 or more percentage points from the previous quarter in the Gallup Poll. The remaining quarters were then categorized as ones of limited change. Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter had their most extensive conference scheduling in the quarters involving at least a 5 point drop in the polls, and Ford produced a tie at slightly above his quarterly average. Furthermore, while the differences were marginal for several of the presidents, Johnson's figures for quarters involving declining versus rising popularity scores were, respectively, 7.8 and 3, while Kennedy's comparable figures were 6 and 4. Nixon, in contrast, has low numbers in all categories, but a marginally greater number (2 to 1.3) when rising and falling popularity levels are compared. Eisenhower gives the one fairly clear indication of withdrawal during falling popularity, as he had 6.5 conferences each quarter when his popularity was increasing, 6.4 when there was little change, and 5.8 during periods of declining popularity.

The tendency for presidents to make some response to shifts in the polls was also reflected in the consistency with which the quarters of limited change produced a second or third level of poll frequency. All presidents except Truman and Ford had their second most frequent number of conferences during periods of limited change, and the Truman and Ford performance during normal poll periods was in each instance their lowest level of conference frequency. Despite their periodic denials, presidents do seem to read the polls as they schedule conferences—but more often to increase rather than decrease conference frequency as their popularity falls. Poll changes thus join longevity in office as explanatory factors having some impact, but in an unexpected direction.

Behavior during Difficult Situations

There *are* substantial tendencies for presidents to avoid press conferences when they are confronting difficult issues. Whereas declining poll support has not generally had the expected impact on the regularity and frequency of press conferences, trouble with key issues has had a strong impact. Concern with specific issues, more than a general sense of negative electoral perceptions, has clearly had the more important influence on at least the avoidance or "gapping" aspects of press-conference schedules. Fundamentally, an analysis of gapping tendencies show that all postwar presidents have at least periodically avoided conferences during difficult situations; and that the events producing these gaps have most often occurred in the area of foreign policy. A brief summary underscores basic tendencies for each president.

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The frequency of press conferences during the Hoover and Roosevelt presidencies makes it readily apparent that major gaps could not have occurred. In checking potentially difficult situations for possible brief gaps, the Roosevelt record is particularly impressive. FDR persisted with the regularly scheduled press conferences even in the wake of such events as Pearl Harbor, the Battle for Britain, and American losses in the Pacific. Similarly, conference regularity continued in 1937 despite the divisive impact of the court-packing scandal and Roosevelt's generally deteriorating relationship with Congress. For Hoover, there was some trailing off in the number and regularity of conferences in the first months of 1932, and there are indications of minor gaps surrounding the sales-tax revolt in Congress during March and the uncertainties created by the Bonus March in June of that year. Despite the longer than usual gaps in 1932, Hoover nonetheless held four conferences in March and three in June. Thus, while somewhat less accessible, he certainly did not disappear from opportunities for scrutiny by the press.

The Truman presidency began a pattern of more persistent gaps during difficult situations, but primarily in his first term. In his first term, some avoidance occurred following Churchill's speech on the cold war in March 1946 and in the context of the strikes in May of that year. Truman was even more persistent in avoiding press conferences in 1947, after the fall of Greece (he held out for nearly a month despite a ten-day average interval), and in 1948, in the context of the uncertainties surrounding the establishment of Israel and the Berlin blockade. Yet in his second term, Truman showed substantially greater regularity in the face of difficult situations. He held conferences with unusual regularity as the situation in China became increasingly hopeless during 1949 and at about the normal interval during the start of the Korean War, the controversial firing of McArthur, and the 1952 decision by the Supreme Court to overturn Truman's temporary nationalization of the strike-paralyzed steel industry. Only the period of uncertainty in Korea as the Chinese entered the conflict in November 1950 produced very clear indications of avoidance behavior, and even in this instance a conference was held about ten days after the public became aware of the Chinese intervention. Truman thus began the postwar pattern of avoidance during some foreign-policy events, but primarily in his first term.

Despite an occasional willingness to face the press during difficult situations, the Eisenhower presidency stands as a strong example of gapping tendencies in scheduling behavior. In terms of resisting potential gaps, Eisenhower did meet with the press regularly during the Army-McCarthy hearings in the spring of 1954, and in 1957 he was fairly persistent in scheduling conferences despite the sharply increased criticisms of his shifting budget positions. Eisenhower also held a conference immediately after the Little Rock school-desegregation crisis began, but it had been scheduled prior to the advent of the crisis, and questions on that topic were ruled out at the outset.

The Eisenhower tendency to avoid conferences during difficult situations reveals a persistent and substantial deviation from his ten- to twelve-day annual

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average intervals. The consideration of military intervention in Indochina in April of 1954 produced a conference interval of twenty-two days, and a debate within the administration over responses to the 1954 Formosa crisis produced an interval of seventy-one days, including a gap of fifty-five days following the initial crisis event. The combined impact of the Suez crisis and the Hungarian uprising in October 1956 similarly produced a gap of thirty-four days between conferences, a gap that is difficult to explain simply in terms of the reelection campaign.

In Eisenhower's second term, the controversy over Sherman Adams and his subsequent resignation also produced a gap of thirty-five days, although the president did meet with the press ten days after his acceptance of Adams's resignation. The decision to send the marines to Lebanon in July 1958 occurred with a total interval of thirty-four days, and with twenty-two days elapsing between the initial commitment and the next press conference. The controversy over Quemoy and Matsu in September 1958 produced another gap of thirty-five days. Then, in 1960, Eisenhower assuaged his keen embarrassment over the U–2 incident by ruling out any questions at his press conference held five days after the incident and just as he was heading for Europe. Perhaps even more dramatically, he then went fifty-six days before the next conference. With substantial persistence, Eisenhower displayed a preference for dealing in particular with foreign-policy crises without having to discuss his views with members of the press.

The most dramatic avoidance behavior for Kennedy also came with a foreign-policy issue, as he deviated from his nine-day average interval in 1962 and allowed an interval of thirty-five days between the start of the Cuban missile crisis and his next press conference. Furthermore, the total interval was uniquely lengthy for Kennedy, as fifty-five days passed between press conferences. His response to the Bay of Pigs invasion had been, conversely, not to avoid a conference but rather to avoid questions. Although a conference was held six days after the initial invasion, he adhered to a strict, "no questions on Cuba" position. Kennedy also displayed at least a partial gap as tensions in Berlin mounted in August 1961, although that came in the context of a generally less frequent use of conferences during the last six months of 1961.

On domestic issues, Kennedy displayed a willingness to meet with the press in the wake of the Mississippi school-desegregation controversy in September 1962 and in the context of the racial tensions in Birmingham in May 1963. Significantly, however, he chose to leave for Europe in June 1963 without a conference—and at a time in which both his economic policy and his position on civil rights was under heavy attack. Overall, the clearest and most dramatic instances of conference avoidance behavior again came in the area of foreign policy.

Johnson's scheduling behavior showed major shifts in both the frequency of conferences and the tendency either to avoid the press or to use conferences to undertake aggressive efforts at building support during difficult situations. In his responses to various Vietnam crises, Johnson was anxious to meet with the

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press after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, holding a conference just four days after the initial incident. Johnson displayed a similar eagerness in 1968, holding a conference three days after the Tet offensive. Yet in other instances, Johnson went to extreme lengths to avoid conferences that might focus on Vietnam issues. The major decisions of February 1965 came with a gap of thirty-seven days, and in the fall of 1965 Johnson avoided a conference for ninety-nine days as the United States expanded its war commitment. Similarly, during his period of reassessment of both the war and his personal reelection chances in early 1968, Johnson avoided a conference for thirty-five days. Gaps were also apparent in other foreign-policy situations, as the commitment of troops in the Dominican Republic was followed by a gap of thirty-four days, and the war in the Middle East in June 1967 occurred with a conference interval of twenty-six days. Because of Johnson's periodic frequency in conference scheduling, these gaps generally figured at least two weeks beyond the average yearly interval, and in some cases of even greater length.

Like his immediate predecessors, Johnson's domestic record was mixed. He continued with his conferences during the hearings on Bobby Baker's Senate activities in 1964, and he persisted with conferences within a week of the Detroit riots in 1967 and the riots following Martin Luther King's assassination in 1968. The only partial indication of a domestic avoidance strategy came with the interval of twenty-eight days between conferences in the midst of the Watts riots in Los Angeles in 1965.

The infrequency of Nixon's press conferences irrespective of specific conditions makes it less likely that major gaps would be apparent. Again, like Johnson, perhaps the most striking aspect of Nixon's scheduling behavior is the wide fluctuation in responses. The clearest instances of avoidance because of foreign-policy issues came in the context of the Vietnam protests in the fall of 1969, the publication of the *Pentagon Papers* in June 1971, and the Communist offensive in Vietnam in April 1972. In each of those instances, Nixon waited for more than two months until the next conference. Yet, he held a conference within ten days of the massive upheavals following the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State shootings in May 1970, and he held a conference within twenty days of the October 1973 eruption of the war in the Middle East and sixteen days after Agnew's resignation from the vice-presidency. Again with an apparent emphasis on his desire to prove himself during difficult situations, Nixon met with the press five days after the disclosure of the Watergate break-in in June 1972 and, more dramatically, only six days after the firing of Special Investigator Archibald Cox had led to the "firestorm of protest" against the Nixon administration in October 1973.[16]

Nixon's desire to prove himself during difficult situations nonetheless did not pertain to all possible cases. A gap of 114 days followed the departure of Haldeman and Ehrlichman in April of 1973, and the total interval between con-

[16] For an extensive discussion of Nixon's tendency to undertake unusual actions based upon a desire to prove his ability in crisis, see Bruce Mazlich, *In Search of Nixon* (Scranton, Pa.: Basic Books, 1972).

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ferences in that period was 160 days. Similarly, some 101 days passed in 1974 between Nixon's last conference and his departure from the White House. Thus a wide variation in personal responses, more than consistent responses to given policy situations, characterized Nixon's scheduling behavior.

The Ford and Carter responses, while returning a greater measure of regularity to scheduling behavior, were nonetheless not without instances of avoidance during difficult situations. Ford allowed an interval of thirty-three days in April 1975, as Saigon fell under North Vietnamese control (while producing an average interval of eighteen days that year), and he scheduled a marginally longer interval of twenty-four days around the *Mayaguez* incident. Similarly, while the holiday period may have had some impact in late 1974, Ford went fifty days between conferences as economic conditions rapidly worsened. Finally, the Nixon pardon found Ford holding a conference within eight days, but without the question having been directly confronted in a press conference prior to his final personal decision. Overall, the clearest instance of a gap was in the context of the fall of Saigon in 1975.

The fairly uniform scheduling of Carter's conferences during his first two years may have been in part a consequence of the limited number of foreign-policy crises initially confronting his administration. Carter's only tendencies toward avoidance behavior in the first two years came with an interval of twenty-nine days (in comparison with a yearly average interval of sixteen days) during the difficulties of the Burt Lance investigations in August and September 1977, and somewhat longer intervals in the spring of 1979 in the face of gasoline shortages. Yet with the cabinet reshuffle in July 1979, Carter again responded by holding a conference within seven days of that final announcement. The onset of the Iranian crisis in the fall of 1979 produced, in turn, the first major test of Carter's tendencies toward avoidance behavior during international crises. Carter did not hold his first press conference until more than three weeks after the seizure of the U.S. hostages, and the total gap between conferences was substantially longer than his already declining level of conference frequency in 1979. He then avoided having a second conference until over three months after the beginning of the hostage crisis, and he held a total of only six conferences in all of 1980. A substantial change in Carter's behavior took place following the Iranian crisis, with a strong emphasis on small group meetings and informal interviews in the White House and an avoidance of both press conferences and general public appearances.[17]

A tendency for all presidents to engage in some degree of avoidance behavior, particularly on foreign-policy matters, is apparent in the record since World War II. In terms of evaluating individual presidents, any effort at producing systematic scores would be unduly influenced by the number of foreign-policy

[17] An examination of Carter's public exposure behavior in the fourth year, in comparison with the actions of other presidents seeking reelection, is contained in William W. Lammers, "Presidential Uses of Public Exposure," in *The President and the Public*, ed Doris A. Graber (Philadelphia, Pa.: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, forthcoming).

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crises they faced, their length in office, and the frequency of conferences (with its resulting tendency for those with limited overall use of conferences to have less need consciously to avoid the press during difficult situations). At the level of subjective judgment, it nonetheless seems fair to conclude that Eisenhower had the most frequent use of clear gaps (usually around foreign-policy matters), while Johnson and Nixon had the longest gaps caused by crises in U.S. foreign policy and were more erratic in their avoidance responses. Truman had a fairly persistent pattern of gapping during his first term, but dropped noticeably away from that pattern during his second term. Kennedy, Ford, and Carter have also shown some gapping tendencies.

The Personality Dimension

There are obvious limitations to the precision with which presidents can be compared across differing levels of involvement in foreign policy and changing press-conference structures. Yet even taking these considerations into account, there are strong indications of the impact of personality on patterns of scheduling behavior. Furthermore, although the hypothesized tendency for the active-negative presidents to be the most persistent in avoidance behavior has not been substantiated, there are several suggestions that the presidents have differed in ways that are at least partially suggested by Barber's classic typology.

Insofar as Barber's typology can be expected to relate to such presidential routines as the scheduling of press conferences, one might anticipate that his active-negative presidents (Hoover, Johnson, and Nixon) would differ from Eisenhower (the passive-negative) and Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Ford, and Carter (the active-positives). In terms of tendencies to avoid difficult situations, the record is clearly mixed. Eisenhower, rather than one of the active-negatives, displayed the most consistent use of obvious gaps. Similarly, although Nixon and Johnson stand out for their overall lack of regularity, it is not clear that they were the most persistent users of gaps. Fundamentally, all presidents since 1945, regardless of personality characteristics, have often responded to foreign-policy crises by avoiding press conferences.

The active-negatives do appear, however, to support Barber's emphasis on their uniqueness on other grounds. Hoover was the only president to experience a progressive unraveling of his initial (and very high) pattern of regularity and frequency. In contrast, Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy showed tendencies toward lower (and thus improved) frequency-regularity scores as their time in office increased. This is in keeping with Barber's emphasis on the growth in office aspects of the active-positive personality. The Ford experience was basically too short to evaluate conclusively, but he appears to have differed from his two active-negative predecessors. Carter's behavior through the first two years was decidedly in keeping with the regularity that might be expected from an active-positive president. Beginning in 1979, and with greater intensity in 1980, Carter's behavior nonetheless did become more volatile. This may give some in-

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dication that events will overtake a personality-based inclination on matters of basic presidential routines—or that there were aspects of Carter's personality that differed from others who have been categorized as active-positive. In turn, as one looks at the active-negatives in terms of deviations from a pattern of growing steadiness while in office, each of the active-negatives was somewhat unusual. Besides Hoover's progressive disintegration, the data have revealed Johnson's unique lurching behavior and Nixon's periodic, very lengthy intervals followed by a partial willingness to have conferences during the "worst of times."

Eisenhower, the supposed passive, emerges from this analysis as an intriguing case. He did hold his first conference substantially later after inauguration than any of the others, and his overall number of conferences in the pretelevision days was somewhat lower than Truman's. His overall frequency, however, was higher than Kennedy's (with adjustments for the duration of his illness), and generally compares with other presidents in the era of the televised conference. In addition, Eisenhower chose to use increased conference activity as part of his more aggressive behavior in 1959. At the same time, of the postwar presidents, Eisenhower was probably the most persistent conference avoider during difficult situations, and he was also the only president to have fewer conferences in the wake of declining support in the polls. In some respects, conference avoidance could be interpreted as fitting the view of Eisenhower, the passive, as a president who enjoyed neither press conferences nor open public controversy. Yet this behavior clearly does not fit a view of Eisenhower as an apolitical president methodically following his schedule regardless of likely political consequences. As Fred Greenstein has recently suggested, the picture of Eisenhower as a benign but apolitical president deserves careful reassessment.[18] Despite the ambiguities of the Eisenhower case, the preliminary suggestiveness of scheduling data for larger constructs of presidential personality underscores again the importance of analyzing routines as well as crises events in the study of presidential behavior.

Conclusion

Sharply increased international involvement, televised conferences, and presidential personality differences have all influenced the shift toward less frequent and less regular press conferences in the past three decades. The importance of international involvement as an underlying force has been underscored by both the declining frequency and regularity of conferences between the end of World War II in 1945 and both the arrival of televised conferences in 1955 and the preponderence of foreign-policy crises as situations contributing to specific acts of conference avoidance. Personality differences have constituted a

[18] For an emphasis on Eisenhower as a more politically aware president than has often been suggested, see Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979-80): 575-99.

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third explanatory factor, but none of the presidents since Eisenhower has been able consistently to return to the pre-1950s level of frequency and regularity in conference scheduling. Personality differences have thus had their impact, but within an underlying set of forces tending to move presidents away from regular and frequent press conferences.

In normative terms, the assessments of forces altering press-conference scheduling behavior have both positive and negative implications. In favorable terms, it is important to emphasize that the search for deviation based primarily on length of service and on responses to changes in opinion polls has produced a surprising lack of support. Two specific findings are encouraging from a value perspective emphasizing regular and frequent conferences. First, there is little cause for concern that presidents will disappear from press scrutiny because their popularity is declining. Periodically, as with Johnson in 1966, Americans can actually expect presidents to have more conferences as they desperately seek renewed public support. Second, there is little evidence suggesting that presidents develop a case of increasing isolation from at least the conference aspects of press relationships while in the Oval Office. The isolation view was not true for the second terms of Roosevelt and Truman and was only partially true for Eisenhower. Also, in reviewing avoidance behavior during difficult situations, Truman showed less tendency to hide during his second term in office than he did the first four years. Regarding overall patterns of behavior within the first term, furthermore, the evidence quite strongly suggests that presidents are actually more apt to be irregular and infrequent early in their term. Thus in debating such tenure issues as a possible six-year term, it is important to emphasize that at least on this dimension there is not a deterioration of presidential behavior in the second term.

Ultimately, there are nonetheless substantial grounds for concern on the basis of recent experiences. Presidents since 1945 have been quite apt to withdraw during periods of uncertainty and possible embarrassment to their administrations. Avoidance has been particularly apt to occur during periods in which major policy options are being weighed within the White House. If a dramatic step has already been taken, such as entrance into the Korean War or the invasion of Cambodia, presidents may engage in press conferences in an effort to sell a fait accompli action to the nation.[19] Unfortunately, regardless of the type of presidential personality in the postwar period, presidents often have *not* held press conferences at precisely those times when their thoughts on policy options would have been of greatest concern. This relationship may in fact help to explain the frequent blandness of press conferences—they are too often held when the president has little of importance to say.

Despite their seemingly limited usefulness on some occasions, any deviation from regular and frequent conferences should be watched closely. The extent to which new policies and major commitments have emerged during periods of

[19] Presidential tendencies toward a fait accompli role, and potential consequences, are discussed in William W. Lammers, *Presidential Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), chap. 6.

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presidential retreat from press conferences underscores the importance of careful observation when a retreat occurs. Presidents may not reveal information of particular usefulness when they do meet the press, but they are all too apt to be telling the American public something of importance when they avoid opportunities for public questioning of their actions and intentions.

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Voluntary Retirement, Incumbency, and the Modern House

JOSEPH COOPER
WILLIAM WEST

In the last decade, students of the Congress have placed great emphasis on the analysis of membership change. Most of the work has centered on the House of Representatives, and the two primary topics have been the development of service into a profession or career and the advantages of incumbency. Aspects of one or both of these themes have been studied by a variety of political scientists, and "career" and "incumbency" have been treated as critical elements in explaining the character and performance of the modern Congress as well as the behavior of its individual members.[1]

In large part the results of this research have been compatible and reinforcing. Admittedly, there have been important differences in findings for the House and Senate and disagreement about causes. Nevertheless, notions of the development and impact of the incumbency effect have, in general, fit neatly with notions of the development and impact of service in the Congress as a career. It is thus ironic that within a short time after students of the Congress have discovered career and incumbency and have begun to treat them as key,

[1] On the professionalization of congressional service see, for example, Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968): 144–68, and H. Douglas Price, "Congress and the Evolution of Legislative Professionalism," in *Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform*, ed. Norman J. Ornstein (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 2–24. On incumbency trends and impacts see, for example, David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity* 6 (Spring 1974): 295–317, and Albert D. Cover, "One Good Turn Deserves Another," *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (August 1977): 523–41.

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TABLE 1

House Turnover Measured by Departures, 1957–1979

Congress	Intraterm Departures	End of Term Departures	Total	Percentage of Seats
85th (1957–59)	18	73	91	21.0%
86th (1959–61)	14	57	71	16.3
87th (1961–63)	14	68	82	18.8
88th (1963–65)	14	87	101	23.2
89th (1965–67)	9	71	80	18.4
90th (1967–69)	7	37	44	10.1
91st (1969–71)	13	52	65	14.9
92nd (1971–73)	13	64	77	17.7
93rd (1973–75)	10	91	101	23.2
94th (1975–77)	10	63	73	16.8
95th (1977–79)	10	73	83	19.1

and in some cases predominant, explanatory variables, a striking anomaly has become apparent. On the one hand, the incumbency effect, which increased in potency in the 1960s, remains strong. On the other hand, the rate of voluntary retirement from the Congress has substantially increased in the past decade. In short, whereas seats are safer than ever, members are voluntarily retiring at an increased rate.[2]

The increase in the rate of voluntary retirement is puzzling and potentially of great significance. Yet thus far only two articles on retirement have appeared in the literature.[3] As might be expected, therefore, a number of critical empirical and theoretical issues remain open and in need of further analysis. This article seeks to extend our understanding of this trend and to analyze its impact and significance. It focuses on the House of Representatives in the period from 1957 to 1979. This period both encompasses the transition from the committee-dominated House of Speaker Rayburn to the modern and far more decentralized House of Speaker O'Neill and includes the beginnings and intensification of the new trend toward voluntary retirement.

Turnover and Voluntary Retirement

The problem of measuring turnover is more complex than it appears on the surface. Table 1 presents data on turnover for the period from 1957 to 1979

[2] See newcomer tables in *Congressional Quarterly Almanacs* (Washington, D.C.:Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1945–1980) for the years from 1969 to 1979 and in Albert D. Cover and David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Dynamics and the Decline of Competitive Congressional Elections," in *Congress Revisited*, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 55–56. In addition, see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 25 March 1978, p. 755.

[3] Stephen E. Frantzich, "Derecruitment: The Other Side of the Congressional Career Equation," *Western Political Quarterly* 31 (March 1978): 105–26 and idem, "Opting Out: Retirement from the House of Representatives, 1966–1974," *American Politics Quarterly* 6 (July 1978):251–74.

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TABLE 2

Sources of House Turnover
1957–1979

Congress	Electoral Defeat			Retirement			
	Primary	Election	Total (%)	Intra-Term	End of Term	Total (%)	Death (%)
85th (1957–59)	3	37	40 (44.0)	3	33	36 (39.6)	15 (16.5)
86th (1959–61)	5	26	31 (43.7)	2	26	28 (39.4)	12 (16.9)
87th (1961–63)	12	22	34 (41.5)	6	34	40 (48.8)	8 (9.8)
88th (1963–65)	8	45	53 (52.4)	3	34	37 (36.6)	11 (11.0)
89th (1965–67)	8	41	49 (61.3)	4	22	26 (32.5)	5 (6.3)
90th (1967–69)	4	9	13 (29.5)	3	24	27 (61.4)	4 (9.1)
91st (1969–71)	9	13	22 (33.8)	5	30	35 (53.8)	8 (12.3)
92nd (1971–73)	13	13	26 (33.8)	6	38	44 (57.1)	7 (9.1)
93rd (1973–75)	8	40	48 (47.5)	4	43	47 (46.5)	6 (5.9)
94th (1975–77)	3	13	16 (21.9)	4	47	51 (69.9)	6 (8.2)
95th (1977–79)	5	19	24 (28.9)	6	49	55 (66.3)	4 (4.8)

measured in terms of departures rather than entrances.[4] Though it is more difficult to accumulate information on the number of departees than on the number of first termers, such data provide a more exact or precise measure.[5] This is true because in cases of death or resignation more than one person can occupy and give up a seat during the course of a Congress. As a result, the number of departees in a preceding Congress often exceeds the number of entrants in a new Congress.[6] Table 2 breaks the data in Table 1 down by source of departure. It thus deals with the basic components of turnover: defeat, retirement, and death.[7]

[4] Two basic sources exist for the data reported in the seven tables of this article: the annual *Congressional Quarterly Almanacs* for the years from 1957 through 1979 and the *Congressional Directories* (Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, 1865–1981) for the Eighty-fifth through Ninety-sixth Congresses (1957–1981).

[5] In addition, though data on length of service can readily be found in tables provided in the *Congressional Directories*, researchers who use these tables to measure turnover in terms of entrances can easily be misled. Entrants at times include persons with prior service and such individuals should be counted when turnover is at issue, even though they are not "first termers" in any strict or absolute sense. See Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rhode, and Peter Wissel, "Historical Change in House Turnover," in *Congress in Change*, Ornstein, pp. 24–58. Equally salient, an important group of entrants will be consistently excluded if persons who enter during the course of the preceding Congress are not counted. Yet, neither of these groups of entrants is categorized as "first termers" in the *Directories*.

[6] The only Congress in the period covered in this article in which entrants exceeded departees from the preceding Congress was the Eighty-sixth (1959–1961). And this anomaly is attributable to a very special situation: the admission of new states to the Union prior to the reapportionment of 1962. Nonetheless, the differences that result from these two approaches to measuring turnover are not substantial in the period covered in this article as long as "first termers" are counted so as to include the types of entrants identified in the previous note.

[7] Determining the component parts of turnover as well as the total number of departures is more

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Three basic points may be noted regarding the data presented in Tables 1 and 2. First, the turnover rate for the Eighty-fifth through Ninety-fifth Congresses (1957–1979) has been relatively stable or constant. In eight of the eleven Congresses involved the degree of variation in the turnover rate has been 5 percent or less. In ten of the eleven Congresses involved it has been 9 percent or less. It therefore is not surprising that the mean rate of turnover and the median are quite close for this period, 18.1 and 18.4 percent respectively.

Second, even though the turnover rate has been about 18 percent, the current tendency to discount or downgrade the importance of this amount of turnover should be substantially tempered. To be sure, it is low by nineteenth-century standards. Nonetheless, in absolute terms a biennial turnover of about one-fifth is not low. Indeed, depending on its dispersion, such a rate can substantially alter the composition of an institution or organization within a relatively short period of time. Thus, a turnover rate of this magnitude each Congress is not at all insignificant, but rather the source of a variety of important and continuing operational constraints and problems.

Third, and most important, if turnover has remained relatively stable or constant in the past quarter-century, its sources or components have substantially changed. Table 2 indicates a sizable increase in the rate of voluntary retirement since the late 1960s. The importance of this trend is confirmed by statistical tests of significance. Though such tests over limited time periods have a number of problems, the results in the case of the data presented in Table 2 are still quite impressive.[8] Similarly, Table 2 reveals that retirement has replaced electoral defeat as the primary source of turnover.[9] Thus, whereas electoral defeat accounted on the average for 48.6 percent of the turnover in the Eighty-fifth through Eighty-ninth Congresses (1957–1967), it accounted on the average for only 33.2 percent in the Ninety-first through Ninety-fifth Congresses (1969–1979). In contrast, in the same Congresses the average contribution of

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difficult than it appears. The *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* regularly provides a table on "Newcomers, Switched Seats, and Losers" and a table on "Membership Changes." The latter is a fully reliable source for ascertaining intraterm resignations and deaths. The former, however, is not a fully reliable source for data on electoral defeats or end-of-term retirements due to the impact of reapportionment and redistricting in the 1960s and early 1970s.

To ascertain the total number of departees and the reasons for departure, old and new state delegations were compared in every case where the *Quarterly* listed a "new district." In addition, delegation changes in all states affected by the reapportionments of 1962 and 1972 were investigated and the biennial reports on House elections in the *Quarterly* were examined. It should also be noted that the figures reported in the text with regard to primary and election defeats include all instances in which an incumbent defeated a fellow incumbent.

[8] A regression of retirement against time yields a R^2 of .51 for the whole time period and .96 for the past twelve years. The respective t-ratios are 3.057 and 10.3, indicating statistical significance beyond the .01 level in both cases.

[9] In this article we define and treat as retirees all those who voluntarily leave the House. Frantzich in contrast limits the term retiree to those who simply retire, and he treats those members who leave to run for or assume another public office as a separate and distinct group. See Frantzich, "Derecruitment," p. 113 and idem, "Opting Out," p. 253.

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TABLE 3

Aging and Patterns of Voluntary Retirement in the House, 1957–1979

Distribution of Retirees According to Age

	Age at Retirement				
	65+	*55–64*	*45–54*	*Under 45*	*Total*
Mean Percentage: 85th–90th Congresses (1957–1969)	29.9	28.9	24.7	16.5	100%
Mean Percentage: 91st–95th Congresses (1969–1979)	22.4	27.6	29.3	20.7	100%
Change in percentage, 85th–90th to 91st–95th	−25%	−4%	+19%	+25%	

Retirees as Proportion of Their Age Groups

	Age Groups			
	65+	*55–64*	*45–54*	*Under 45*
Mean Percentage: 85th–90th Congresses (1957–1969)	17.1	7.8	5.5	4.9
Mean Percentage: 91st–95th Congresses (1969–1979)	20.8	11.0	8.5	9.0
Change in percentage, 85th–90th to 91st–95th	+22%	+41%	+55%	+84%

voluntary retirement to turnover has increased from 39.4 to 58.7 percent. Thus, the stability in the turnover rate masks a critical development. There has been a significant increase in voluntary retirement as a source of turnover that has both made it the primary source of turnover and offset the overall decline in the vulnerability of members to defeat.

Traditional Explanations of Retirement

Various explanations account for voluntary retirement in the House. In the past, aging, political vulnerability, and political ambition have generally been relied upon to explain retirement patterns. More recently, a new factor has been suggested as a contributing cause—disaffection with House service per se.[10] The thesis of this article is that disaffection is in fact the primary cause of retirement trends in the modern House, but it is appropriate to begin by examining the more traditional explanations.

The rationale for attributing an important role to age as a causal factor in retirement rests on the disabilities old age presumably involves. Obviously, in the House, as elsewhere, some degree of relationship has always existed and continues to exist between increasing age and voluntary retirement. For example, Table 3 indicates that a higher proportion of those members who are over sixty-five retire than do members in other age groups or categories. Nonetheless,

[10] Frantzich, "Derecruitment," pp. 105–26, and idem, "Opting Out," pp. 251–74.

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it is very doubtful that aging exists as a substantial or significant explanation of the increasing rate of retirement in the House since the late 1960s.

The average age of House members, the number of House members reaching retirement age levels, and the average age of voluntary retirees have all declined in the 1970s. The average age of House members was 52.9 years in 1957 at the beginning of the Eighty-fifth Congress, fluctuated slightly in the 1960s but stood at 52.2 years in 1969 at the beginning of the Ninety-first Congress, and then steadily declined to 48.8 years in 1979 at the beginning of the present Congress. The average number of members 65 or older has fallen from 59.4 each Congress in the Eighty-fifth through Ninetieth Congresses (1957–1969) to 55.5 each Congress in the Ninety-first through Ninety-fifth Congresses (1969–1979). The average age of voluntary retirees has fallen both as a group and in particular categories. In the period from 1957 to 1969 the average age of all voluntary retirees was 57.2 years; the average age of voluntary retirees who left to run for or assume senatorial or gubernatorial office was 47.8 years; and the average age of voluntary retirees who simply returned to private life was 61.5 years. The comparable figures for the period from 1969 to 1979 are 55.1, 46.7, and 60.6.[11]

These data thus provide little support for two assumptions or propositions that are essential to validate the importance of aging as an explanation of recent trends: that some larger proportion of members has reached retirement age levels than in prior decades, and that the prevalence of this group or cohort accounts for some substantial part of the increase in retirement. Rather, these figures indicate both that the House is growing younger and that the age of retirees is declining at the same time that their numbers are expanding.

Table 3 provides additional and even more cogent evidence of the declining relationship between aging and retirement in the modern House. The data on the distribution of retirees across age categories indicate that in Congresses ending in the 1970s a smaller proportion of voluntary retirees derived from the ranks of older members than in Congresses ending in the late 1950s or 1960s. For example, the percentage of voluntary retirees who were sixty-five or older declined from an average of 29.9 percent each Congress in the Eighty-fifth through Ninetieth Congresses to 22.4 percent each Congress in the Ninety-first through Ninety-fifth Congresses. In fact, the percentage decline in the contribution of members sixty-five or older to voluntary retirement substantially outpaced the percentage decline in their numbers (25.1 percent to 6.6 percent).

[11] The data on the average age of House members have been taken from the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* for 1979, p. 5, and the other data presented calculated from the relevant *Congressional Quarterly Almanacs* and/or *Congressional Directories*. It may be noted that Frantzich also does not accord great importance to aging. He does argue, however, that age is an important factor in the sense that nearly half of simple retirees between 1966 and 1974, that is, retirees who did not run for or assume other federal or state office, were persons who entered the House at age fifty or more. See Frantzich, "Opting Out," pp. 258–60. The increasing rate of retirement in the 1970s, however, has affected this factor as well. In the period from the Ninety-first through the Ninety-fifth Congresses (1969–1979) only about a quarter of such retirees entered the House at age fifty or more.

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Similarly, the data on the percentage of retirees within particular age groups or cohorts also testify to the broad or pervasive character of recent retirement trends. To be sure, the average percentage of retirees among members sixty-five or older has increased from 17.1 percent to 20.8 percent each Congress in the Ninety-first through Ninety-fifth Congresses as compared with the earlier Congresses under study. The average percentage increases in all the other age categories, however, are even more marked. Thus, it is highly probable that the increase in the percentage of retirees among those sixty-five or older masks a more general and controlling factor, especially since in the Congress there is no necessary or close connection between continued service past sixty-five and physical incapacity or disability. On the contrary, for much of this century, the impact of aging as a motive for retirement has been delayed and offset by increases in the rewards attached to long continuance in office.[12]

A second traditional explanation of voluntary retirement is political vulnerability. Here the rationale is that fear of electoral difficulty or defeat motivates members to leave the House. Two specific types of linkage between vulnerability and retirement have been suggested: marginality and redistricting. Once again, however, while it would be a mistake to deny vulnerability a role in accounting for voluntary retirement, there is little reason to believe that it can serve as a major or primary explanation of recent retirement trends.

Stephen Frantzich found that the great majority of voluntary retirees in the period from 1966 through 1974 came from safe districts, that is, districts they carried by 55 percent or more of the vote in the preceding election.[13] Our data confirm and extend his findings. Moreover, these data indicate that, in line with the trend for all House members, the percentage of retirees who are marginal has declined.[14] For example, whereas about 30 percent of voluntary retirees were marginal in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in the two most recent Congresses (1975–1979) only 16 of 106 voluntary retirees, or 15 percent, had won their seats by less than 55 percent of the vote in the preceding election. Ironically enough, Frantzich discounts his own evidence on the grounds that vulnerability is primarily prospective, not retrospective.[15] His argument, however, is unconvincing. Since the great majority of districts that are safe in one election remain safe in the next, marginality data may well be taken as a valid indicator of

[12] T. Richard Witmer, "The Aging of the House," *Political Science Quarterly* 79 (December 1964): 526, and Price, "Legislative Professionalism," pp. 9–19.

[13] Frantzich, "Derecruitment," p. 115 and idem, "Opting Out," p. 260.

[14] The number and percentage of voluntary retirees from marginal districts for the Eighty-sixth Congress (1959–1961), Eighty-eighth Congress (1963–1965), Ninetieth Congress (1967–1969), Ninety-second Congress (1971–1973), Ninety-fourth Congress (1975–1977), and Ninety-fifth Congress (1977–1979) are as follows: 9 or 32 percent; 11 or 30 percent; 4 or 15 percent; 6 or 14 percent; 7 or 14 percent; and 9 or 16 percent. Approximate percentages for the total number of marginal districts in comparable years are as follows: 25 percent (1964); 15 percent (1968); 12 percent (1972); and 15 percent (1976). See graph published in Congressional Quarterly, *Electing Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1978), p. 33.

[15] Frantzich, "Opting Out," p. 260.

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vulnerability. In sum, then, not only do most voluntary retirees come from safe districts, their numbers have expanded at the same time that their marginality has declined.

As for redistricting, the actual link it establishes between vulnerability and retirement is not as strong as is often presumed. First, redistricting can be and often is used to increase rather than decrease the strength of incumbents, and even when this is not the case the amount of damage may be limited or even inconsequential.[16]

Second, when redistricting does have the effect of increasing vulnerability, it does not operate in isolation but rather in the context of other factors. Its impact on the decision to remain or retire is accordingly quite variable as well as difficult to determine. Frantzich's argument in support of the effects of redistricting thus conceals more than it reveals. He makes a strong point of his finding that 55 percent of the voluntary retirees who did not run for or assume other federal, state, or local office from 1966 through 1974 had been redistricted, as compared with only 40 percent of all other departees.[17] Frantzich, however, includes in the category of all other departees not only voluntary retirees who did run for or assume other public office, but also involuntary retirees who left the House because of death or defeat. Moreover, when data reported by him in a preceding article are used to break this category down into its components, the results are highly inconclusive.[18] In the case of voluntary retirees who did seek or assume other public office, 46 percent had been redistricted. Since this group might be presumed to be more influenced by ambition, what should be concluded from the fact that it differs by only 9 percent from simple retirees? In the case of involuntary retirees, the great preponderance of whom were defeated candidates, 38 percent had been redistricted. Since defeat confirms a status of extreme vulnerability, what should be concluded from the fact that roughly four out of every ten members who were defeated sought to remain even though redistricted?

Third, redistricting is a highly irregular rather than regular phenomenon. Thus, not only are the results of redistricting mixed or not necessarily controlling, the scope or dimensions of its negative effects, even when realized, are intrinsically tied to the pace of redistricting. As a consequence, whatever the impact redistricting has had on retirement over the past quarter-century, and our intent is not to deny it a causal role, this impact has fluctuated greatly and cannot explain the increasing rate of retirement in the House.

[16] Congressional Quarterly, *Electing Congress*, p. 35. This is not to argue, however, that redistricting accounts for the overall increase in the strength of incumbency after the early 1960s. See John A. Ferejohn, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 71 (March 1977): 166–77. It is only to argue that the impact of redistricting can be and often is positive, rather than negative, for incumbents, especially when their fellow partisans control the state legislature. For further supporting evidence see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 8 July 1972, pp. 1661–64 and *National Journal*, 24 March 1979, p. 486.

[17] Frantzich, "Opting Out," p. 261.

[18] Frantzich, "Derecruitment," p. 115.

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Table 4 demonstrates this point. It presents a count of "new districts" by Congress for the period 1957–1979. It should be noted that this count is not a count of redistricted districts or of new districts in the sense of additions to state allotments. It is taken rather from the *Congressional Quarterly*'s biennial newcomers and switched seat tables, and the term applies to districts whose dimensions had been altered so substantially as to preclude identifying a particular member as the prior incumbent. Whatever its limits, however, Table 4 does provide a valid measure of the pace of redistricting, and as such it indicates something of great importance—the lack of correlation between the pace of redistricting and the increasing rate of voluntary retirement, both overall and in particular categories.

A final traditional explanation of voluntary retirement is political ambition. This factor, however, cannot explain the behavior of most voluntary retirees. In Congresses ending in the late 1950s and 1960s, 58 percent of those who voluntarily retired did not run for or assume other federal, state, or local office. In Congresses ending in the 1970s, 54 percent did not run for or assume other public office. Overall, 55.9 percent did not run for or assume other public office (Table 4).

Moreover, even in the case of those members who did run for or gain appointment to other public positions, it should not be presumed a priori that ambition was the only or even the major motivating factor. Table 4 indicates that about three-fourths of this group left to run for or assume the office of senator or governor. Yet, whereas the average number of such retirees in each Congress almost doubled in the period from 1969 to 1979 as compared with the period from 1957 to 1969 (16.8 to 9.2), the success rate of those who ran in the 1970s was about 10 percent lower than in the late 1950s and 1960s. In short, more

TABLE 4

House Voluntary Retirees and New Districts, 1957–1979

Congress	New Districts	All Voluntary Retirees	Retirees for Governor or Senator	Retirees for Other State and Local Office	Retirees for Other Federal Office	Other Retirees
85th (1957-59)	0	36	7	3	1	25
86th (1959-61)	0	28	7	2	0	19
87th (1961-63)	18	40	14	3	4	19
88th (1963-65)	7	37	7	2	3	25
89th (1965-67)	19	26	8	3	3	12
90th (1967-69)	6	27	12	2	0	13
91st (1969-71)	2	35	22	2	3	8
92nd (1971-73)	19	44	12	0	4	28
93rd (1973-75)	1	47	14	0	4	29
94th (1975-77)	0	51	20	1	2	28
95th (1977-79)	0	55	16	4	3	32
Total Number		426	139	22	27	238
Percentage		100%	32.6%	5.2%	6.3%	55.9%

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members were leaving to run for senator or governor, even though prospects for success were less.

As for the far smaller number of members who left to run for or assume other public offices, here too the evidence on ambition is mixed. Some indeed have retired for positions that are clearly more desirable—for example, vice-president of the United States and cabinet posts. But many others have retired for positions whose superior status vis-à-vis House membership is not clear or is even doubtful—federal district judgeships, state judgeships, and lesser state and federal offices.

All these facts suggest that powerful forces have been at work, other than ambition. Once again, while no one would deny ambition a role in accounting for voluntary retirement, it provides only a part of the puzzle and this is true even among those members whose departures are usually explained wholly or largely in terms of ambition.

Disaffection and Retirement

The traditional explanations of voluntary retirement in the House thus no longer suffice. While aging, political vulnerability, and political ambition may have been adequate to account for such behavior in the past and still retain some causal impact, they cannot account, either singly or in combination, for the explosive increase in retirements in the 1970s. Rather, the key causal factor at present is something that is quite new in the twentieth century: growing dissatisfaction with service in the House as a career. In large part members are now retiring simply because they no longer desire to continue, because as one member put it, "not only is the job not fun anymore, it's downright distasteful."[19]

To demonstrate the validity of this argument it is necessary first to explain why the benefit-cost ratio of service in the House declined over the course of the last two decades and second to provide evidence of strong disaffection linked to retirement. Both can be done without difficulty.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, disaffection with service in the House as a career was far more limited than it is today. Rather, most members on balance found the job satisfying and even richly rewarding.[20] The explanation of a substantial reduction in the net level of members' job satisfaction since that time lies in a number of mutually reinforcing trends that have served to increase the costs of service while decreasing the benefits.

[19] The member quoted is Congressman David R. Obey (D.-Wis.). See *Parade* Magazine, 5 November 1978, p. 11. For examples of similar comments by other members see *National Journal*, 11 March 1978, pp. 391-93.

[20] See Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 437; and Roger H. Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus Press, 1969), p. 66. In addition, see Jim Wright, *You and Your Congressman* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1965), pp. 182-83; Joe L. Evins, *Understanding Congress* (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1963), pp. 24 and 52; and Clem Miller, *Member of the House* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp. 82-83.

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For a variety of reasons the personal costs of service have greatly increased. Issues are far more numerous, complex, and interrelated in the 1970s than they were in the late 1950s or early 1960s. The current House thus spends far more time in session, in committees, and simply voting than the House of Rayburn or McCormack. Nonetheless, the combined effects of a growing workload and cumbersome organization and procedures have canceled out the benefits of added inputs of time and attention on the part of members. Though legislative pressures and demands on members have increased, the House's ability to handle its workload in a coherent and deliberate fashion has declined as has the ability of members to master even the most critical issues of a session. Moreover, the emergence of a politics of scarcity and of single-issue voting groups has made the tasks of representing constituent interests and working with other members far more difficult and frustrating. Last, but not least, the constituent workload, trips back to the district, and the amount of funds needed for reelection campaigns have grown substantially. In short, in the current House serious sources of strain proceed both from the political and the technical, or organizational, dimensions of legislative life.[21]

As a result, the job of the congressman is far more onerous and unpleasant than it was a few decades ago. Members now lead very hectic and frenetic lives. The combination of their Washington and district duties results in long hours on the job and frequent travel. They thus have little time to spend with their families, and the pressures of the job also appear to cause more health problems at earlier ages than in the past. When in Washington, members are constantly confronted by the need to vote on numerous issues they know little about, frustrated by conflicts in committee meetings and overlaps in jurisdictions, and debilitated by the need to run continually from office to committee to floor and vice versa. They find practicing the basic politician's art of compromise more difficult and encounter considerable internal conflict between their desire to spend their time as legislators working on substantive policy questions that interest them and their perceived need to satisfy constituent requests, maintain a personal presence in their districts, and electioneer. Indeed, many find a variety of the aspects of their jobs both in Washington and the district trivial and even highly irksome, for example, voting on hundreds of minor bills, attending banquets, and raising campaign funds.[22]

[21] On the growth of the workload, time pressures on members, information needs, and committee conflicts, see Volume 1 of the Final Report of the Commission on Administrative Review, *H. Doc. 95-272* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 11-43 and 613-94. See also Wave I and Wave II Member Surveys of the Commission on Administrative Review in Volume 2 of the Final Report, *H. Doc. 95-272*, pp. 865-90 and 941-81. On the growth of campaign costs, single-issue voting, and new forms of lobbying see *National Journal*, 30 April 1977, p. 686, 8 April 1978, pp. 557-61, 29 April 1978, pp. 677-79, 27 May 1978, pp. 832-37, and 5 August 1978, p. 1257. In addition, see Thomas P. Murphy, *The New Politics Congress* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 139-55 and 285-303.

[22] See comments of members on various facets of service they dislike in *Parade* Magazine, 5 November 1978, pp. 11-15; *U.S. News and World Report*, 1 May and 5 June 1978, pp. 37-38 and

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It is true, of course, that members now enjoy greater aids in terms of staff and allowances and that most districts are "safe." However, these items are not free; they come at a price. The price of staff and allowances is a heavier workload since these resources permit and indeed generate extra work, especially on the constituent side. They are not simply responses to demand, but sources of it. Nor is the price of "safeness" negligible in personal terms. Rather, what is required is constant attention and vigilance.[23] It is also true that the frustrations and trivialities of serving in the House are usually not as intense in the first few terms, when the excitement of being in Congress is fresh, as in subsequent terms. Nonetheless, as data presented in Table 5 indicate, frustration builds more quickly now than in the past.

The increases in the costs of service have been accompanied by decreases in the rewards or benefits. Congressional salary, though at an all time high, has not kept pace with the increase in the cost of living during the late 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, opportunities to earn outside income have been limited and disclosure requirements have been tightened. Conversely, opportunities for retired members to earn more money working as lobbyists, in law firms, and in private business appear to have expanded. The prestige of the institution and membership within it has fallen. The rewards that derive from feelings of camaraderie and close personal friendship have decreased as these facets of congressional life, so prevalent in the days of Sam Rayburn, have contracted. Committee and subcommittee chairmanships do not carry with them the same amounts of prestige and power as in the years before the caucus reforms of the early 1970s. Finally, the satisfactions members receive from realizing policy goals have declined as the difficulties of building majorities behind coherent and meaningful programs have increased. Members, in short, have increasingly begun to doubt that they can, in fact, have an impact on the course of the nation, that they can play a vital and significant role in shaping national policy. By way of summary, then, two of the most critical positive motivations of members, according to Richard Fenno, have been undermined—power and policy—and several subsidiary and reinforcing incentives have been negatively affected as well.[24]

23–24; and *National Journal*, 24 June 1978, p. 1023 and 11 March 1978, pp. 391–93. In addition, see Frantzich, "Opting Out," p. 264. For data on conflicts in member role orientations see Wave I Member Survey of Commission on Administrative Review, Tables 5, 6, 7a, 7b, and 8a in Volume 2 of the Final Report, *H. Doc. 95-272*, pp. 874–85.

[23] Thomas Mann, *Unsafe at Any Margin* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp. 102–3. For information on the present dimensions of member allowances see *National Journal*, 4 February 1978, pp. 180–83 and Congressional Quarterly, *Inside Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1979), pp. 122–32.

[24] Richard F. Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), p. 137. See the sources cited in notes 22 above and 37 below for evidence on current organizational disarray and member attitudes or feelings of low prestige, growing frustration, and increased fractiousness. For information on salary and alternative job opportunities see the report and study of the most recent federal salary commission reprinted in Financial Ethics,

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TABLE 5

Characteristics of Voluntary Retirees 1957-1979

	Retirees 85th-90th Congresses, 1957-1969 (N = 194)			*Retirees 91st-95th Congresses, 1969-1979 (N = 232)*		
	Number	*Percentage of All Retirees*	*Average per Congress*	*Number*	*Percentage of All Retirees*	*Average per Congress*
Under 65 with more than 3 terms	86	44.3%	14.3	114	49.1%	22.8
Under 65 with less than 3 terms	50	25.8	8.3	66	28.4	13.2
Republicans	98	50.5	16.3	106	45.7	21.2
Democrats	96	49.5	16.0	126	54.3	25.2
Committee, Subcommittee, and Party Leaders*	98	50.5	16.3	140	60.3	28

* Includes chairmen, ranking minority members, Speaker, majority and minority leaders, and chief whips.

The consequence of increasing costs and decreasing rewards has been greater disaffection with service in the House as a career.[25] Such disaffection is clearly visible in current assessments of the House as an institution and the job of the congressman by individual members.

Note, for example, the following words of some recent retirees.

> What it takes to get the job done is eighty hours a week. That's not compatible with how much time I'd like to spend with my family. I just wanted to get to know my kids before it was too late.
>
> Because of the proliferation of problems for which Congress is expected to find solutions, you can't concentrate on anything very long. You wind up with an attention span microseconds long. Some of us don't like that.
>
> You simply burn yourself out. You get to a point where something has to give. Either your health suffers or your constituents suffer.
>
> Being expected to put in a full day's work at the office and a full night's appearance on the banquet circuit can get to be and has come to be a bore. . . . People bug me more

Hearings Before the Commission on Administrative Review (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 311-472. See also Congressional Quarterly, *Inside Congress*, p. 118. For information on outside income limitations and disclosure see Congressional Quarterly, *Inside Congress*, pp. 153-64.

[25] Improving pension benefits have also played a role in inducing retirement. Nonetheless, this factor serves primarily to reinforce the impact of disaffection and is subsidiary to it. Thus, the percentage of voluntary retirees per Congress eligible for full benefits has declined as the number of retirees has increased. For example, the average for 1957-1965 is 44.3 percent as opposed to 38.8 percent for 1971-1979. For information on the pension system see Congressional Quarterly, *Guide to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1976), p. 475, and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 11 March 1978, p. 636.

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> than they used to. They are asking their government to do more for them and are willing to do less and less for themselves. . . . So much of the work is nit-picking trivia.[26]

Nor are complaints limited to the costs of House service. There is also strong dissatisfaction with the current rewards of House service. The following quotes, also taken from the comments of recent retirees, illustrate the point.

> I just don't want to be a congressman anymore. I want to practice law while I'm still young enough to pursue another career. I'm going to triple my income.
>
> Congress is a disappointment. I don't see movement or progress. When I was mayor of Syracuse, I could watch downtown being rebuilt. The legislative process here is cumbersome; the system isn't designed to take on major reforms. I ran because I was unhappy with the political scene. I'm still unhappy and I don't believe in doing something I don't like.
>
> Chairmanships are not the satisfying commands they once were. . . . The Democratic caucus has brought about a sharp change in the operation of the House—for good or for bad.[27]

Comments, such as these, regarding the high costs and inadequate rewards of House service, are now legion and many more could be cited. But the case for disaffection as the key or primary factor in recent retirement trends can also be supported by reference to statistical evidence.

Table 5 reinforces and extends the data in Table 3 on the broad or pervasive character of recent retirement trends. Three conclusions may be drawn from it, which together with the evidence in Table 3, strongly suggest that retirement and disaffection are closely linked in the modern House.

First, voluntary retirement has increased among members under sixty-five who have served six years or more and among members who have attained leadership positions. Thus, retirement has grown in the ranks of those members who ought to be the most resistant to it: among members who have made substantial personal commitments to and investments in House careers and who have attained important institutional rewards for their service. Moreover, this is true despite a sizable decline in the average age of House members.

Second, voluntary retirement has also increased among members under sixty-five who have served less than six years. This fact provides additional evidence of the general or pervasive character of current retirement trends by indicating

[26] The speakers and sources of the quotes are in order of their appearance in the text as follows: Congressman Gary Myers (R-Pa.), *Parade* Magazine, 5 November 1978, p. 11; Congressman Thomas Rees (D-Calif.), *U.S. News and World Report*, 1 May 1978, p. 37; Congressman David Henderson (D-N.C.), *Washington Post*, 16 April 1976; and Congressman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.), *Parade* Magazine, 5 November 1978, p. 15.

[27] The speakers and sources of the quotes are in order of their appearance in the text as follows: Congressman Charles Wiggins (R-Calif.), *Parade* Magazine, 5 November 1978, p. 12; Congressman William Walsh (R-N.Y.), *Parade* Magazine, 5 November 1978, p. 12; Congressman George Mahon (D-Tex.), *Houston Post*, 3 March 1978.

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that it has also had an impact on those who are still deciding on whether to invest heavily in a House career.

Third, voluntary retirement has increased among Democrats as well as Republicans. Given the frustrations involved in long and continued minority status, it might be expected that Republicans would be highly inclined to leave or retire. And they are. In the past several decades Republicans have constantly provided a higher percentage of retirees than their numbers would warrant. Nonetheless, in the 1970s, Democratic retirees have outpaced Republican retirees both in number and in rate of increase relative to the late 1950s and 1960s.

The evidence presented in Tables 3 and 5 admittedly does not directly or definitively prove that disaffection is the primary causal factor at work. The tie must be inferred from the broad or pervasive character of the trend. Nonetheless, given the evidence, such an inference is difficult to avoid. On the one hand, the traditional explanations in one way or another have segmented impacts. Only disaffection with House service per se can be hypothesized to have a general or undifferentiated one. On the other hand, since increases in retirement have occurred among groups or categories of members who are advantaged rather than disadvantaged by the manner in which organizational rewards are distributed in the House, some negative alteration in the benefit-cost ratio of service must have taken place.[28] If so, disaffection must also have increased as a concomitant effect and can be seen as the mediating link between changes in states of motivation and changes in actual behavior or action. In sum, though indirect or inferential, the statistical evidence that supports according disaffection a key role in explaining the increasing rates of voluntary retirement in the House is also quite powerful.

We would argue, then, on the basis of both qualitative and quantitative evidence that a major portion of the explanation of current patterns of voluntary retirement in the House lies in disaffection. Again this is not to deny that aging, vulnerability, and ambition also play roles as motivating factors, both apart from disaffection and in combination with it as secondary sources of reinforcement. The point simply is that the present situation with regard to voluntary retirement cannot be accounted for without according disaffection primary causal significance.

This obviously has not always been the case. In the late 1950s and first half of the 1960s, when more districts were marginal or in flux and the net level of job satisfaction higher, vulnerability and ambition can both be presumed to have been more important than disaffection. Similarly, aging can also be seen to have had a greater impact. In the absence of other negative considerations, aging

[28] A recent survey of third-term members provides some significant corroborating evidence. Though the sample is limited, the interview data strongly support the argument that job dissatisfaction substantially increased in the 1970s. See Burdett A. Loomis, "The 'Me' Decade and the Changing Context of House Leadership" (Paper presented at the Everett M. Dirksen Conference on Congressional Leadership, Washington, D.C., 10–11 June 1980), pp. 14–18.

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could serve as a decisive factor for those who did not retire because of vulnerability or ambition. Moreover, in the 1950s and early 1960s the link between aging and physical disability was stronger and more direct. In contrast, at present health problems appear often to result at earlier ages from the pace and pressure of congressional life and thus are part and parcel of the fabric of disaffection.[29]

The Significance of House Retirement Trends

An increasing rate of voluntary retirement, fueled largely by disaffection, represents a major departure in the history of the twentieth-century House where the trend ever since the election of 1896 has been toward the stabilization of service as a career.[30] It is accordingly a development whose impact and implications merit examination and analysis.

The impact and implications of recent retirement trends in the House pertain to the organizational or institutional context of decision making in the House, not to immediate policy outcomes. In his study of departees from the House between 1966 and 1974, Frantzich found that substantial amounts of change in liberalism scores occurred solely in the case of defeated members who were replaced by opposing partisans. Only marginal amounts of change took place in policy orientations in the case of members who replaced voluntary retirees.[31]

This is not surprising. The existence of a strong tie between policy change and switched seats has been demonstrated a number of times in the existing literature. In the great majority of cases, however, voluntary retirees are replaced by fellow partisans (73 percent of the cases in the last four Congresses). Significant changes in policy voting therefore do not occur. Nor are the underlying causes or determinants of such stability difficult to understand. The fact that few party switches occur in the case of retirees means that the controlling electoral forces here are similar to those that support incumbency. That is to say that local and idiosyncratic constituency factors, rather than parties as overarching and competitive policy coalitions, dominate the scene. Results with respect to voluntary retirement as with respect to incumbency thus testify to party weakness and may well be expected not to produce any major policy changes in voting.[32]

Yet, if voluntary retirement has not had a direct or immediate policy impact,

[29] Frantzich, "Opting Out," p. 259.

[30] See Barbara Hinckley, "Seniority 1975: Old Theories Confront New Facts," *British Journal of Political Science* 6 (October 1976): 393. See also Witmer, "The Aging of the House," pp. 538–41; Polsby, "Institutionalization," p. 146; and Price, "Legislative Professionalism," pp. 9–19.

[31] Frantzich, "Derecruitment," pp. 123–26 and idem, "Opting Out," pp. 267–70.

[32] On the relation between switched seats and policy change and the importance of party strength as a factor in policy change see David W. Brady and Naomi B. Lynn, "Switched-Seat Congressional Districts: Their Effect on Party Voting and Public Policy," *American Journal of Political Science* 17 (August 1973): 528–44, and Patricia A. Hurley, David W. Brady, and Joseph Cooper, "Measuring Legislative Potential for Policy Change," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2 (November 1977): 385–99.

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it remains a phenomenon of great importance. It is necessary, however, to look beyond individual voting scores to understand why.

One crucial fact that students of the House have now begun to recognize is that different types of Houses exist in different periods of time in response to changing environmental constraints and internal pressures. The nature and impact of environmental interaction can therefore be very different at different points in time as can House norms, structures, and leadership styles.[33] From the late 1930s to the late 1960s a very distinctive type of House existed, which took shape over several decades in response to the breakdown of the highly partisan and centralized House of Reed and Cannon. This House, which may for convenience be called the Rayburn House, was distinguished by the high degree of allegiance commanded by a constellation of norms quite familiar to the present generation of political scientists: seniority and apprenticeship, reciprocity, specialization, civility, accommodation, tempered partisanship, and institutional patriotism. In terms of structure it was dominated by committee power, and leadership style was permissive, personal, and informal.[34]

By virtue of historical accident this type of House was at full strength at the time of the behavioral revolution in political science with the result that its norms, structures, and incentives were treated for many years as if they were permanent or defining features of congressional politics. Indeed, this was even largely true when students began to view the House developmentally.[35] Events since 1969, however, have shattered the illusion of an ahistoric or even archetypal House, and it is now clear that a very different House has been emerging in the 1970s. In terms of norms, adherence to seniority, respect for apprenticeship, deference to committees, willingness to compromise, and the "to get along, go along" Rayburnian ethic all have greatly declined in strength. So too in all probability have tempered partisanship, civility, and institutional patriotism.[36]

In terms of structure, both the Speaker and subcommittees have gained power

[33] See Joseph Cooper, "Organization and Innovation in the U.S. House of Representatives," in *The House at Work*, eds. Joseph Cooper and G. Calvin Mackenzie (Austin: University of Texas Press, forthcoming), and Joseph Cooper, "Congress in Organizational Perspective," in *Congress Reconsidered*, Dodd and Oppenheimer, pp. 140–63.

[34] On the emergence and character of the Rayburn House see Joseph Cooper, *The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House* (Houston, Texas: Rice University Publications, 1970), pp. 116–30. See also Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn" (Paper presented at the Everett M. Dirksen Conference on Congressional Leadership, Washington, D.C., 10–11 June 1980).

[35] See, for example, Polsby, "Institutionalization," pp. 144–45.

[36] Although much has been made of Fenno's point regarding the tendency of members to run against the Congress, the implications of his insight with respect to changing House norms has been ignored. See Richard F. Fenno, "If, as Ralph Nader Says, Congress Is 'the Broken Branch,' How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?" in *Congress in Change*, Ornstein, pp. 265–77. Such behavior strongly suggests a decline in institutional patriotism and thus it is probably no accident that this phenomenon was first identified in the literature in the early 1970s. For additional evidence on changing House norms, see the material cited in the following note and Loomis, "The 'Me' Decade," pp. 6–14.

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at the expense of committees, and party units have begun to play a greater role. Nonetheless, the net result has been greater fragmentation. The increase in partisan spirit, to the degree that it has occurred, has been confined in impact to personal relations and the distribution of rewards. It has had little impact on party coherence. The increased powers of the Speaker have not compensated for either the proliferation of subcommittees or the declining ability of the party to provide a nexus for building majorities on critical issues. Leadership style remains very personal, though less permissive and somewhat more institutionalized. On the whole, it is the individual member who has gained increased independence at the expense of institutional capacity for integration; and the resuscitation of the caucus as a forum for ventilating policy views and grievances, rather than as the vehicle for enforcing discipline, is part of the general pattern of heightened individualism, not an indicator of greater centralization.[37]

Current patterns of voluntary retirement exist as an integral aspect of the emergence of this new type of House. On the one hand, voluntary retirement has had a direct and important role in causing the alterations in norms and structures that have taken place. On the other hand, voluntary retirement testifies to changes in the incentive system that are of great and general significance.

It is commonly recognized that the proportion of junior members in recent Congresses has increased and that this increase was one of the factors involved in the success of the caucus reforms adopted in the 1970s.[38] Table 6 demonstrates that the proportion of junior members has indeed increased. It may be noted that the proportion of members who have served less than four full, consecutive terms now stands at 52.4 percent; that the previous trend toward increases in the proportion of House careerists, that is, members with ten or more full, consecutive terms, has been reversed; and that members on the brink of making a permanent commitment to a House career, that is, members with four but less than seven full, consecutive terms, are opting to leave far more often than in the past.[39] What has been overlooked, however, is the key

[37] The best sources of evidence on the character of the House that has emerged in the 1970s are *Congressional Quarterly* and the *National Journal*. In the former case see the first and second editions of *Inside Congress* (1976 and 1979). In the latter case see the articles on party leaders, informal groups, freshmen, and results of reforms in recent volumes.

[38] See Hinckley, "Seniority 1975," pp. 393–94. In addition, see *National Journal*, 14 December 1974, pp. 1881–90; 25 January 1975, pp. 129–34; 14 February 1976, pp. 189–96 and 20 March 1976, pp. 370–74; 9 July 1977, pp. 1080–81 and 31 December 1977, pp. 1994–95; 29 July 1978, pp. 1203–5; and 27 January 1979, p. 150.

[39] For evidence on past trends in these regards see Charles S. Bullock, "House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition," *American Political Science Review* 66 (December 1972): 1295–1301, and Witmer, "Aging of the House," pp. 538–41. It may also be noted that Loomis in 1980 found that about 70 percent of his sample of third-term members were thinking seriously about either retiring from the House or running for higher office. See Loomis, "The 'Me' Decade," pp. 4 and 18.

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TABLE 6

Tenure Distribution of House Members, 1957–1981

	Full Consecutive Terms			
Congress	*1–3* *N (%)*	*4–6* *N (%)*	*7–9* *N (%)*	*10+* *N (%)*
85th (1957–59)	172 (39.7)	135 (31.2)	68 (15.7)	58 (13.4)
86th (1959–61)	182 (41.8)	137 (31.5)	63 (14.5)	53 (12.2)
87th (1961–63)	166 (38.2)	132 (30.3)	72 (16.6)	65 (14.9)
88th (1963–65)	190 (43.8)	105 (24.2)	74 (17.1)	65 (15.0)
89th (1965–67)	203 (46.7)	96 (22.1)	75 (17.2)	61 (14.0)
90th (1967–69)	192 (44.1)	104 (23.9)	70 (16.1)	69 (15.9)
91st (1969–71)	179 (41.1)	123 (28.3)	62 (14.3)	71 (16.3)
92nd (1971–73)	163 (37.8)	121 (28.0)	66 (15.3)	82 (19.0)
93rd (1973–75)	166 (38.4)	130 (30.1)	62 (14.4)	74 (17.1)
94th (1975–77)	205 (47.1)	98 (22.5)	74 (17.0)	58 (13.3)
95th (1977–79)	221 (50.8)	87 (20.0)	68 (15.6)	59 (13.6)
96th (1979–81)	227 (52.4)	89 (20.6)	68 (15.7)	49 (11.3)

role increasing rates of voluntary retirement have played in expanding the proportion of junior members.

Part of the impact voluntary retirement has had lies simply in numbers. As noted earlier, in the 1970s voluntary retirement, rather than election or primary defeats, has been the single greatest source of turnover. Nonetheless, the sheer number of departees who were voluntary retirees is less important as a cause of the increased proportion of junior members than is another facet of voluntary retirement—wide dispersion across tenure ranks. Table 1 contains a startling fact. The total amount of turnover in the Eighty-fifth through Eighty-seventh Congresses (1957–1963) was virtually the same as in the Ninety-third through Ninety-fifth (1973–1979). The respective totals are 56.1 and 59.1 percent. Yet, the proportion of members at various tenure categories remained quite stable and relatively balanced in the late 1950s and early 1960s; it changed markedly, however, in the late 1970s (Table 6). What is critical, then, is not simply the amount of turnover, but its dispersion. Otherwise, persons of only junior rank can turn over without altering the relative proportions of the various ranks. It is here that voluntary retirement assumes its greatest significance. As Table 7 indicates, turnover caused by electoral defeat tends to be confined to junior ranks; in contrast, turnover caused by voluntary retirement tends to be widely dispersed across tenure ranks. In sum, the shift from electoral defeat to voluntary retirement as the predominant source of turnover did far more than simply maintain the overall level. Rather, it altered the range and impact of turnover, and in so doing negatively affected tenure trends that had prevailed throughout the twentieth century.

The impact of voluntary retirement, however, is not limited to the role it has played in increasing the proportion of junior members. What the increased rate

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TABLE 7

Tenure of Defeated House Members as Compared to Voluntary Retirees, Selected Congresses, 1957–1979

	Full Consecutive Terms			
1957–1963	*1–3* *N (%)*	*4–6* *N (%)*	*7–9* *N (%)*	*10+* *N (%)*
Members Defeated in Elections or Primaries	59 (56.2)	26 (24.8)	13 (12.4)	7 (6.7)
Members Voluntary Retired	28 (26.9)	36 (34.6)	18 (17.3)	22 (21.2)
Voluntary Retirees as Percentage of Total	32.2	58.1	58.1	75.9
1973–1979				
Members Defeated in Elections or Primaries	46 (52.3)	23 (26.1)	9 (10.2)	10 (11.4)
Members Voluntary Retired	43 (28.1)	37 (24.2)	32 (20.9)	41 (26.8)
Voluntary Retirees as Percentage of Total	48.3	61.7	78	80.4

of voluntary retirement bears testimony to, given the fact that it has been fueled largely by disaffection, is a significant change in the incentive system of the House. An organization dominated by norms, such as seniority, reciprocity, and civility, is an organization in which members expect and desire long and stable careers. When disaffection for continued service grows, so does reluctance to accept the limitations sanctioned by these norms. This is true both because senior members who adhere to these norms become disenchanted and leave and because members of only moderate tenure and new members begin to resist them more strenuously. The incentives provided are simply no longer able to motivate the high degrees of tolerance, patience, cooperation, and self-denial these norms require to be fully operative and controlling. To be sure, they do not disappear, but they do erode and become less influential determinants of behavior.

In short, then, as the benefit-cost ratio of service in the House altered, there was an inevitable impact on norms and structure. Thus, it was not simply the desire of nonsenior members for more power, for a greater piece of the action, that made them a force for change in the Democratic Caucus, but also the weakening of the rewards or satisfactions of membership that in past years had buttressed existing norms and structures. This is not to argue that other factors were not involved in the reforms of the 1970s. Certainly, the growing numerical dominance of Northerners within the Democratic party and the policy dissatisfactions associated with Southern control of chairmanships were also of major importance. Nonetheless, the passage of time itself would shortly have greatly ameliorated this aspect of the problem.[40] A full explanation therefore requires attention to a factor that has largely escaped notice—the impact of a declining benefit-cost ratio with regard to service in the House, especially in the case of members with only moderate or limited amounts of seniority.

[40] Norman J. Ornstein and David W. Rhode, "Seniority and Future Power in Congress," in *Congress in Change*, Ornstein, pp. 72–88.

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Conclusion

The new House that is emerging is more junior, more fragmented, more fractious, and more individualistic than its predecessor. To be sure, changes in the incentive system are not alone responsible. The general decline of the parties that has taken place over the past several decades has also played a critical role. Nonetheless, the reduction in the net level of members' job satisfaction has had an important impact both directly and indirectly through growing rates of voluntary retirement.

What appears to be reemerging is a House that in a number of key respects is like Houses in many periods of the nineteenth century, even though more elaborate or sophisticated in terms of resources, structures, and procedures. These Houses too had problems with the net level of members' job satisfaction. These Houses too were highly junior, fractious, fragmented, and individualistic.[41] Indeed, if the trend toward voluntary retirement intensifies or if the rate of electoral defeat increases, the amount of turnover could again approach nineteenth-century levels. Whether this will happen is, of course, not clear, though some analysts argue persuasively that the present incumbency advantage may well disappear in the future.[42] What does seem clear is that as long as the rate of voluntary retirement does not diminish and nothing occurs to resuscitate the party as an electoral and legislative force, the type of House that has emerged in the 1970s will become further stabilized and entrenched. As this occurs, it is also quite possible that a new type of member will begin to be recruited for service, a type of member more attuned to the benefit-cost ratio that now prevails.[43] This type of member is also likely to be even more self-oriented and independent than those now in office and thus likely to intensify further the tendencies toward fragmentation, fractiousness, and exploitation of position.

In closing, then, though the present generation of political scientists has made much of the increased strength of incumbency and its policy implications, the dynamic aspects of the situation have been largely ignored. At the start of this article the irony of a strengthened incumbency effect combined with an increased rate of retirement was noted. The key to understanding this anomaly lies in understanding the underlying causes and effects. Many of the same factors that are believed to have worked to strengthen the advantage of incumbents, for example, party weakness, bureaucratic power, and constituent service, have also worked to increase the costs and decrease the benefits of service in the

[41] For a classic study of a nineteenth-century House of this type, see James S. Young, *The Washington Community: 1800–1828* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). In addition, see Leonard D. White, *The Republican Era: A Study in Administrative History, 1869–1901* (New York: Free Press, 1958), pp. 48–54; Price, "Legislative Professionalism," pp. 9–19; and Polsby, "Institutionalization," pp. 144–68.

[42] Mann, *Unsafe at Any Margin*, pp. 106–7.

[43] See James L. Payne, "Show Horses and Work Horses in the U.S. House of Representatives," *Polity* 12 (Spring 1980): 428–57, and, idem, "The Personal Electoral Advantage of House Incumbents, 1936–1974" (unpublished paper, 1979). In addition see Congressional Quarterly, *Electing Congress*, pp. 38–40.

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House. A concomitant feature of a heightened advantage for incumbents has thus been an erosion of the incentives that supported the traditional institutional order. For this and other reasons a new type of House has emerged, and so too, perhaps, will a new type of member. Yet, the ability of this type of House to mobilize its norms, structures, and incentives to conquer the problems of fragmentation and provide the policy accomplishments and rewards on which the maintenance of its institutional role so vitally depends appears highly conjectural. What is more likely is growing disaffection both within and without the House, leading ultimately to greater losses of power and autonomy to the presidency and bureaucracy.

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Presidential Reorganization Authority: Is It Worth the Cost?

LOUIS FISHER
RONALD C. MOE

The president's authority to propose executive reorganization plans to Congress, subject to veto in either house, expired 6 April 1981.[1] Both houses, at the request of President Ronald Reagan, must once again consider the value of this process and the wisdom of extending it.

Like most students of government, we had long assumed that the president's reorganization authority served the interests of both branches. The more we explored the subject, however, the more we doubted our preconceptions. As our research continued, we gained more respect and appreciation for the arguments against granting this power to the president. We now conclude that the drawbacks of the reorganization plan process are so serious, and the premises behind it so weak, that both branches would benefit by not renewing the authority.

The nation functioned reasonably well throughout most of its history without the reorganization plan authority. Indeed, through at least a third of its fifty-year existence, the reorganization plan authority has been allowed to lapse without any evident threat to the polity. In short, the law is not a critical element

[1] The one-year extension of the president's reorganization authority (P.L. 96-230) to 6 April 1981 was not viewed by the chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee as a ringing endorsement of the concept or of the law. Rather, it was renewed "in case minor adjustments" needed to be made. The year was to be used by the committee as a time for "further study" of the law and its procedures. U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record,* 96th Cong., 2d sess., 2 April 1980, 126: S3502 (daily edition).

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in our system. This being the case, the burden of proof for its renewal rests with the proponents, who should be prepared to prove that the law meets a demonstrated need and that it does not engender significant unanticipated and undesirable side effects.

Our studies indicate that from the passage of the first reorganization act in 1932 to the present certain fundamental issues have resisted resolution. Key questions raised long ago and never satisfactorily answered are seldom addressed today. It is not even clear who benefits, if anyone, from this legislation. What is certain, however, is that the successive reorganization laws have tended to degrade the institutional relationship between the president and Congress.

"Economy" in Government

The issue of renewing the president's reorganization authority in 1981 needs some historical perspective.[2] The decision in 1932 to give the president authority to submit reorganization proposals did not emerge out of whole cloth. It was the logical outgrowth of two powerful concepts that enjoyed favor at the time—the notion that a theory of administration could be developed that was at once apolitical and scientific, and the idea that the president should actively "manage" the executive branch. Both strains of thought found expression in the broader movement to reorganize the executive branch.

"To Herbert Hoover," noted Herbert Emmerich, "belongs the undoubted credit for the invention and espousal of the important peacetime reorganization device—presidential initiative subject to the legislative veto."[3] This "invention" was not a pure creative act. Herbert Hoover, a product of the Progressive Era, believed in the tenets of Frederick W. Taylor's "Scientific Management" movement. Taylor wrote that there was One Best Way to manage a manufacturing activity. Although he was specifically concerned with managing the work process in the factory, he was convinced, as were his followers, that the principles of Scientific Management were applicable to public administration as well.[4]

Scientific Management was influential not so much because of its specialized procedures as the fundamental idea it fostered—namely, the infinite perfec-

[2] For a detailed historical discussion of successive reorganization acts, see Louis Fisher and Ronald C. Moe, "Delegating With Ambivalence: The Legislative Veto and Reorganization Authority," in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Rules, *Studies on the Legislative Veto*, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (committee print, 1980), pp. 164–247.

[3] Herbert Emmerich, *Federal Organization and Administrative Management* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1971), p. 43.

[4] Many public administrators, over several decades, would pin their hopes and aspirations for a better world on Taylorism. "Our administrators of the future," John Pfiffner declared in 1940, "must be good managers. They must know the techniques of scientific management. Indeed, it may well be that the principles of Frederick W. Taylor, adopted to social ends, will some day free the world of drudgery. . . . What is needed is the development of a school of management research technicians who possess the just, wise, and omniscient qualities of Plato's guardians" (*Research Methods in Public Administration* [New York: Ronald Press, 1940], p. 25).

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tibility of human institutions.[5] The public administration community was persuaded, as were most political reformers, that the proper vehicle to achieve this infinite perfectibility was the institutionalized presidency. In the 1920s the president gradually emerged as the dominant force in supervising the administrative agencies.[6] It was also during these years that Herbert Hoover became the most "prominent theoretician-practitioner in American public administration."[7]

Shortly after Hoover entered the White House in 1929, the Great Depression descended upon the nation. Hoover had long been a proponent of the idea that Congress should delegate to the president authority to propose reorganizations in the executive branch.[8] In 1929, the new president asked Congress to give him authority to reorganize the executive branch, subject to some form of congressional disapproval.[9] Congress was unreceptive to this entreaty. In 1932, however, with the presidential campaign under way, both political parties called for drastic reductions in federal spending as a means to combat the depression.

Congress decided to shift to the president the authority to initiate reorganizations rather than tolerate the delays in the legislative process attributed to the influence of interest groups. Although legislators expressed apprehension about delegating such power to the president, they were disillusioned by their own performance. Congressional sentiment is reflected by Senator David Reed:

> Mr. President, I do not often envy other countries their governments, but I say that if this country ever needed a Mussolini it needs one now. I am not proposing that we make Mr. Hoover our Mussolini, I am not proposing that we should abdicate the authority that is in us, but if we are to get economies made they have to be made by some one who has the power to make the order and stand by it. Leave it to Congress and we will fiddle around here all summer trying to satisfy every lobbyist, and we will get nowhere. The country does not want that. The country wants stern action, and action taken quickly. . . .[10]

Hoover received authority to reorganize the executive branch, subject to a simple resolution of disapproval (one-house veto). When Congress reconvened on 5 December, he issued eleven Executive orders consolidating some fifty-eight governmental activities. But by that time Hoover had been repudiated in the

[5] Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, 4th rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955), p. 21.

[6] Peri E. Arnold, "Executive Reorganization and Administrative Theory: The Origins of the Managerial Presidency" (Paper presented at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September 1976).

[7] Ibid., p. 12. See also Peri E. Arnold, "The 'Great Engineer' as Administrator: Herbert Hoover and Modern Bureaucracy," *Review of Politics* 42 (July 1980): 329.

[8] Speaking as secretary of commerce in 1924, Hoover had recommended that Congress give the president authority, under specified limits, to reorganize the executive departments and agencies. See U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Reorganization of the Executive Departments, *Reorganization of the Executive Departments*, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1924, p. 353.

[9] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Herbert Hoover, 1929* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 432.

[10] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 1932, 75, pt. 9: 9644.

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general election. In the closing days of the lame-duck Congress, legislators decided to leave reorganization changes to the next occupant of the White House, Franklin D. Roosevelt. All of the Executive orders were disapproved by the House of Representatives.

Hoover, anticipating this vote, recommended that future reorganization efforts should be free of the legislative veto to avoid "merely make-believe politics."[11] Congress followed that advice by passing the Economy Act of 1933, enacted one day prior to Roosevelt's inauguration. The delegation of power in that act was extraordinary. The statute did more than allow the president to transfer functions. It authorized him, for a two-year period, to "abolish the whole or any part of any executive agency and/or the functions thereof." Moreover, it eliminated the check of a one-house veto.

The early reorganization acts coincided with a period in which Congress doubted its own capacity to act rapidly and in the "public interest." These feelings were most evident in matters involving administrative organizations and appropriations. Many legislators had abandoned hope that cutbacks in government spending could ever be realized with congressional participation. Senator Arthur Vandenberg spoke for many members in 1933 when, after they had disapproved Hoover's Executive orders, he remarked: "Let us confront the precise situation and the realities. We now face the necessity for drastic retrenchment and reorganization of the bureaus, departments, and so forth. We have just witnessed the impossibility of achieving even an incidental step in that direction by presidential order so long as Congress, with its diverse interests, retains the veto."[12]

Acting under this statutory authority, Roosevelt issued several Executive orders transferring various agencies and functions. But the actions were not very controversial or far-reaching.[13] Between 1933 and 1935, Roosevelt had little interest in executive branch reorganization; he permitted the authority to lapse in 1935.

Roosevelt's interest in executive reorganization was rekindled later in 1935, however, when the Supreme Court limited the president's authority to remove members of the independent regulatory commissions, a move the president viewed as severely restricting his administrative capacities. Roosevelt now turned to administrative reorganization "as a possible means of trying to integrate all of the separate independent agencies into major executive departments where they would clearly be subject to the president's administrative supervision."[14]

[11] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Herbert Hoover, 1932-33* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 920.

[12] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 2d sess., 1933, 76, pt. 3: 2587.

[13] See Lewis Meriam and Laurence F. Schmeckebier, *Reorganization of the National Government* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1939), pp. 200-212, and A. J. Wann, *The President as Chief Administrator: A Study of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 193.

[14] Wann, *The President as Chief Administrator*, p. 193.

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Roosevelt harbored no illusions about saving money through reorganization. In 1936, the president told Louis Brownlow and Luther Gulick: "We have to get over the notion that the purpose of reorganization is economy. I had that out with Al Smith in New York. . . . The reason for reorganization is good management."[15] Extensive economy, he told Congress two years later, "depends upon a change of policy, the abandonment of functions, and the demobilization of the staffs involved," all of which were outside the scope of his request for reorganization authority.[16]

In 1938, the House of Representatives refused to grant Roosevelt substantial new powers to reorganize the executive branch. The next year, a more modest bill, drafted by congressional leaders, became the Reorganization Act of 1939. Its preamble contained a statement of the Scientific Management ideal and the invocation of economy, the latter point having been added to the bill by Senator Harry Byrd.[17]

The preamble of the 1939 act had as its first objective: "To reduce expenditures to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient operation of Government." To make sure that cutbacks did not touch favored programs, Congress exempted a number of agencies, commissions, boards, and public corporations from the reorganization process. Also, Congress reserved to itself the right to disapprove reorganization plans by a concurrent resolution of disapproval to be passed by both chambers (two-house veto).

The objective of expenditure reductions remained in the preambles of all subsequent reorganization acts. The creation in 1947 of the first Hoover Commission reflected the belief that only a comprehensive reorganization effort could bring "economy and efficiency" to the federal government. Former President Hoover, chairman of the commission, held out the promise that the proposed changes could save billions of dollars. The commission recommended that Congress renew the president's reorganization authority, which Congress did in 1949; but as the price to pay for avoiding exemptions in the bill for favored agencies, Congress simplified the disapproval procedure by adopting a one-house veto.[18]

The Truman administration submitted forty-one reorganization plans under the 1949 statute. Only a handful gave any hope of saving money. When a member of Congress suggested to an agency official that it would be refreshing to hear the administration admit that a reorganization plan would not save

[15] Louis Brownlow, *A Passion for Anonymity*, vol. 2 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 382.

[16] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 5 (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 676.

[17] Richard Polenberg, "Roosevelt, Carter, and Executive Reorganization: Lessons of the 1930s," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 9 (Winter 1979): 43.

[18] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, *Reorganization Act of 1949: Report to Accompany S. 526*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, S. Rept. 232, pp. 12–15.

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money, the official replied, "It might be refreshing but it might also be disastrous."[19]

As it turned out, the principal achievement of the first Hoover Commission was to sanction the managerial presidency, not the achievement of "economy" in government. Peri Arnold summed up the commission's work: "It was the supreme political accomplishment of the first Hoover Commission that it masked the managerial Presidency with the older values of administrative orthodoxy and, to a significant degree, undercut the conservative and congressional opposition to the expansive executive. . . . In the end, Hoover and his Commission provided the bridge over which the congressional opponents of Franklin Roosevelt could embrace the managerial Presidency."[20]

Between 1949 and 1980, presidents submitted 103 reorganization plans to Congress, 83 of which became effective. Rarely, however, can reductions in expenditures be directly traced to these reorganization plans.[21] It appears, nonetheless, that the paucity of demonstrable savings has not substantially diminished the appeal of the economy premise for executive reorganizations.

In 1977, President Jimmy Carter requested that the itemized-savings requirement of the reorganization act be deleted; in its place the president offered to provide information on the improvements in management, efficiency, and delivery of federal services that his plan would produce. The Senate balked at this request and reinserted the old requirement that there be an itemized estimate of any reduction or increase in expenditures anticipated in the plan.[22] Furthermore, in 1980, at the request of the House Government Operations Committee, the president submitted a report on the "savings"—they were modest—that had resulted from his first nine reorganization plans.[23] Whatever else may have been accomplished by the reorganization plan process, the formal objective of substantially reducing government expenditures has not been achieved.

Constitutional Expediency

The delegation of reorganization authority to the president has been accompanied by statutory standards that are vague, outmoded, and in some cases dis-

[19] Quoted in William E. Pemberton, *Bureaucratic Politics: Executive Reorganization During the Truman Administration* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979), p. 62.

[20] Peri E. Arnold, "The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial Presidency," *Journal of Politics* 38 (February 1976): 49–50.

[21] "Of the reorganization plans transmitted to the Congress from 1949 through 1978, only six . . . were supported by precise dollar estimates of savings. . . . Granted executive branch reluctance to offer savings estimates which can be later used in evidence by the appropriations committees, it is clear that the failure to itemize expenditure reductions reflects the reality that economies are produced by curtailing services and abolishing bureaus, not by reorganization" (Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*, 3rd rev. ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1980], p. 13).

[22] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, 123, pt. 5: 6147.

[23] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, *Extension of Reorganization Authority: Report to Accompany H.R. 6585*, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, H. Rept. 805, pp. 3–4.

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ingenuous. Ill-defined standards raise the question of an unconstitutional delegation of authority, while the legislative veto has been accommodated only with substantial discomfort and strained analyses.

Although Hoover was the first president to ask for reorganization authority, subject to a legislative veto, he was also the first to question the constitutionality of this disapproval procedure. Near the close of his term in 1933, Hoover vetoed a tax bill that contained a committee veto provision. To his veto message he attached an opinion by Attorney General William Mitchell, who said that the one-house veto in the reorganization act "raises a grave question as to the validity" of the entire procedure.[24] Senator James F. Byrnes, member of the Appropriations Committee, successfully offered an amendment in 1933 to delete the legislative veto from the reorganization authority after concluding that the attorney general was "probably correct."[25]

Roosevelt initially opposed the legislative veto. A draft bill by the administration in 1937, to revive the president's reorganization authority, did not include a one-house or two-house veto. Congressional disapproval would require a regular bill, subject to presidential veto. When the bill passed the Senate in 1938, Roosevelt argued that the only permissible constitutional route for disapproving an Executive order was by joint resolution (requiring action by both houses and signature by the president). He stated "categorically that if such a joint resolution were passed by the Congress disapproving an order, I would, in the overwhelming majority of cases, go along with carefully considered congressional action." His opposition to the two-house veto was unequivocal.

> But there are two cogent reasons why the [administration] bill should go through as it is now drawn. The first is the constitutional question involved in the passage of a concurrent resolution which is only an expression of congressional sentiment. Such a resolution cannot repeal Executive action taken in pursuance of a law. The second is the very remote possibility that some legislative situation might possibly arise in the future where the President would feel obligated to veto a joint resolution of the Congress and properly require a two-thirds vote to override his veto. I repeat that I visualize no such possibility between now and 1940, when the authority given is to end.[26]

The Senate bill met unexpectedly strong resistance in the House. Within a matter of days Roosevelt reversed his position. The administration now supported an amendment to allow Congress to reject any Executive order by a majority vote of both houses (a concurrent resolution). Congressman Martin Dies justified the amendment by referring to the president's willingness to abide by the concurrent opinion of Congress: "This being true, neither he nor anyone else should have any objection to the incorporation in specific terms of that provi-

[24] *Opinions of the Attorney General*, vol. 37 (1933): 63–64. For Hoover's veto, see U.S., Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 2d sess., 1933, 76, pt. 3: 2445–46.

[25] Quoted in U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 2d sess., 1933, 76, pt. 4: 3538.

[26] Quoted in U.S., Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 75th Cong., 3d sess., 1938, 83, pt. 4: 4487.

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sion in this law."[27] This rationalization ignored Roosevelt's description of a concurrent resolution as "only an expression of congressional sentiment." Such resolutions, he had insisted, "cannot repeal Executive action in pursuance of a law."

Other arguments were offered to support the administration's switch. The president would be acting as an "agent" of Congress, subject to the conditions established by the legislative branch. The legislative veto became the vehicle by which Congress could announce that the president had violated his power of agency.[28] Second, administration supporters distinguished between the use of a concurrent resolution applied to past laws and those to laws "in the making." The latter was constitutional; the former was not.[29] When another reorganization bill was offered in 1939, Executive orders were replaced by reorganization *plans*. The White House hoped that the notion of a "plan" would appear to be a less obtrusive request for authority than action through an Executive order.[30]

The lure of economy, always beckoning on the horizon, has caused some members of Congress to abandon certain constitutional principles. Congressman Robert Rich, a staunch advocate of tight legislative reins on the Treasury Department, told his colleagues in 1945 that he was willing to suspend his constitutional doubts about the legislative veto because of what he perceived to be a financial crisis facing the country: ". . . if this was 6 months ago," noted Rich concerning his support of the committee bill on renewing the reorganization act, "I would not do it. I know if you are going to save this Nation, if you are going to get any economy in Government, if you are going to reorganize, the only way to get results is to do it this way, even if it is the wrong way, because I do not have the faith in Congress that they will do it. They are afraid to do the job. This is the reason I am going to take a chance on President Truman. If he does not do it, God save America."[31]

Also in the spirit of crisis, Senator Harry F. Byrd abandoned his previous insistence that Congress act affirmatively on reorganization plans. He was willing, in 1945, to let a plan take effect after sixty days unless disapproved by a concurrent resolution. Byrd explained that the organizational structure of the Government had deteriorated to the point where constitutional misgivings had to give way to practical politics: "I am convinced, after 12 years of study on the subject of reorganization, that the only way to get a worth-while, honest-to-goodness reorganization is to abolish bureaus and agencies of the Government and reduce

[27] Ibid., p. 4603.

[28] Ibid., p. 5004.

[29] Ibid., p. 5005.

[30] Regarding the substitution of a *plan* for an Executive order, one study noted: "If, constitutionally, Congress could not disapprove reorganization proposals when embodied in executive orders, then perhaps it might properly reserve the power to disapprove *plans*. The issue of constitutionality versus unconstitutionality has in the past been determined by differences no more substantial than mere phraseology" (John D. Millett and Lindsay Rogers, "The Legislative Veto and the Reorganization Act of 1939," *Public Administration Review* 1 [Winter 1941]: 180).

[31] U.S., Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt. 7: 9447.

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the number of personnel wherever possible, rather than merely to shift one bureau to another. I think the only way to accomplish that is to give the President the power to do it, after exempting the quasi-judicial agencies of the Government."[32]

In recent years, presidents have been placed in an uncomfortable position. They have opposed all legislative vetoes except the one in the reorganization act. Beginning in 1949, various high officials in the Justice Department developed arguments to justify this particular legislative veto while casting doubt on all others. In 1977, Attorney General Griffin Bell wrote to President Carter that the one-house veto attached to the reorganization authority is the only constitutionally valid legislative veto.[33] The checkered history of the reorganization statutes, and the evident difficulty of distinguishing those laws from others, has weakened any principled objection the president might have to the legislative veto. The position appears to be: it is acceptable when the president is advantaged, but unconstitutional when Congress is advantaged.

Time and mutual acceptance have not settled the constitutional issue involved in the reorganization acts. As recently as 1977, Congressman Jack Brooks introduced a bill calling for an affirmative vote by Congress, in the form of a joint resolution, to confirm a reorganization plan. Any other disapproval procedure, he said, would represent an unconstitutional delegation of power. When the House Government Operations Committee, chaired by Brooks, agreed to retain the one-house veto, he noted at the meeting of the full committee that the measure was "the best unconstitutional bill you could draw up."[34]

Political Rationale

While the statutory objective "economy and efficiency" has rarely been satisfied, and constitutional doubts remain, it is possible to argue that reorganization authority is worthwhile because it accomplishes important nonstatutory political objectives. The debate on specific reorganization plans is generally conducted on two levels: the formal, public debate in which symbols and values of orthodox administrative theory are invoked; and the "real politics" level where the fate of organizations, programs, and personalities are decided. It is to the latter level that Harold Seidman refers: "The knowledgeable members of Congress and the executive branch are generally quite aware what these issues are—and they seldom have anything to do with economy and effi-

[32] Ibid., p. 10571.

[33] Letter reprinted in *To Renew the Reorganization Authority*, hearings before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, pp. 11–12.

[34] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, *Extension of Reorganization Authority to the President: Report to Accompany H.R. 5045*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, H. Rept. 105, p. 43. Congressman Brooks did succeed in amending the bill to require that resolutions of disapproval be introduced in both chambers. This move was intended to virtually assure a floor vote on each reorganization plan. In practice, however, the Senate in a majority of instances did not take a floor vote on the reorganization plans submitted by President Carter.

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ciency. But the real issues are openly discussed, if at all, by indirection and in language which only insiders can understand."[35]

Herbert Kaufman, another perceptive student of the governmental process, has pointed out that the consequences of reorganization do not lie in the realm of efficiency or cost of government but are measured in terms of influence, policy, and communicating the administration's priorities.[36] The political defense of the president's reorganization authority as a useful and necessary administrative process generally rests on three related premises: The reorganization plan method diminishes the role of "politics" in administrative decision making; the president and congressional leaders are able to enact necessary, yet controversial, reforms; and the reorganization plan process enhances the president's ability to be an effective manager of the executive branch.

Diminishing the Role of Politics

The American ambivalence towards "politics" is nowhere more evident than in the continuing debate over how the government ought to be organized. Supporters of the executive reorganization process are generally uncomfortable with, or hold in disdain, partisan politics. They tend to see public policy as the product of negotiations between groups asserting selfish interests, even though they too enter the political arena to accomplish personal policy objectives. Through much of this century, political reformers seeking the triumph of the public interest over the private interests have placed their faith in the institutionalized presidency.

Reform groups have not only been sympathetic to the presidency, but generally hostile towards Congress. They tend to see Congress as part of a subgovernment consisting of interest groups, agencies, and congressional committee leaders who work to keep policymaking within the confines of their alliance. For reformers, then, the reorganization plan method is attractive because it appears to permit the president to outmaneuver this subgovernment and propose what is "right."

Any attempt to remove politics from the reorganization process, however, is bound to fail. Politics, as Harold Lasswell opined, is the process that determines who gets what, when, and how. The reorganization act neither eliminates nor diminishes politics; it merely alters the rules by which the politics is conducted, restricts the number of players, and limits the time for congressional consideration.

Congress is frequently described as an institution rendered virtually helpless by the presence of "roadblocks" in the normal legislative process and by the dispersion of power and authority. One of the traditional justifications given

[35] Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*, p. 11.

[36] Herbert Kaufman, "Reflections on Administrative Reorganization," in *Setting National Priorities: The 1978 Budget*, ed. Joseph Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 391-418.

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for the executive reorganization process has been that it permits the president and the congressional leadership to overcome these hurdles. In 1961, for instance, the Kennedy administration submitted a bill to establish a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing. The Senate and House Government Operations Committees favorably reported the bill, but the House Rules Committee (a major roadblock at the time) declined to clear the measure for floor action. Faced with this opposition, the administration decided to short-circuit the legislative process and submit a reorganization plan to create the department.

The Senate Government Operations Committee held hearings on the plan, but a motion to discharge the committee of its jurisdiction was introduced prior to the expiration of the normal period for consideration. The extraordinary haste in this effort to take the plan from the committee, coupled with political reservations on the substance of the proposal, led the Senate to reject the motion to discharge by a vote of 58 to 42. On the day following the Senate action, the House disapproved the plan, 264 to 150.[37]

Rather than deemphasize politics, this episode illustrates how the reorganization plan method can escalate politics to high intensity. Details of departmental structure were relegated to the background. The primary issue became whether the president would be politically embarrassed by Congress. Congress, in this instance, chose to embarrass the president and defeat the plan. When Congress renewed the president's reorganization authority in 1964, it reacted to what it considered a presidential "end-run" by prohibiting the president from submitting reorganization plans that would establish an executive department.[38]

While the 1962 defeat of the housing reorganization plan constitutes a dramatic example of confrontation between the executive and legislative branches, on a smaller scale the same problems arise each time a reorganization plan is submitted. Congress must divert its limited time and staff resources to the implementation of the mandatory procedures outlined in the act. So must the executive branch. Truman discovered, as did later presidents, that reorganization proposals often "faced such strong opposition that expenditures of time, energy, and political resources ordinarily make them too costly to be undertaken on a large scale. The combined opposition from executive agencies, congressional committees, and pressure groups were almost impossible to overcome, especially in the case of plans that were most desirable to the executive."[39]

The original reorganization plan procedure was largely supported on the ground that, in denying Congress (or the president) the right to amend plans once submitted, it prevented interest groups and agency leaders from blocking desirable, yet controversial, legislation. The Reorganization Act of 1977 permits the president to transmit amendments to a plan after it has been forwarded to Congress, thereby reintroducing this suspect element of politics into the

[37] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, 108, pt. 2: 2527–44, and 2680.

[38] 78 Stat. 240 (1964).

[39] Pemberton, *Bureaucratic Politics*, p. 176.

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reorganization process. Congress may now recommend amendments requested by interest groups, and the president may be obliged to submit them as a price for passage.

The amendment option itself is now one of the bargaining chips in the negotiations between Congress and the president. The amendment process reintroduces the possibility of interest-group and agency pressure upon Congress and dilutes the remaining justification for the reorganization plan authority. President Carter introduced ten reorganization plans, and in five instances he later submitted amendments. The 1977 provisions for presidential amendments to submitted reorganization plans blurs the distinction between the reorganization process and the regular legislative process.

Enacting Controversial Reforms

It is one of the ironies of the reorganization authority that it is used either for the most trivial of matters or for the most politically important and sensitive issues, such as establishing a major agency. In either instance, the review process followed by Congress is the same and is inappropriate.

It may be questioned, for example, whether President Kennedy in 1963 should have felt it necessary to use the reorganization process to transfer the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library from joint custodianship by the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of the Interior to the sole custodianship of GSA. The decision involved ten guards, one repairman, and two janitors, at a total cost of $87,000 a year.

More recently, in 1979, the president transmitted a plan to create a federal inspector for the Alaska natural gas pipeline project (Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1979), a minor, noncontroversial proposal that could have been handled as expeditiously by statute. Such proposals suggest compulsory make-work. The White House and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) staffs conclude that once reorganization authority is granted it must be used on a regular basis, even for picayune matters, for otherwise Congress may take it away. The thinking parallels the "use it or lose it" philosophy that agencies have toward federal funds.

When a major proposal is offered in the form of a reorganization plan, Congress is placed in a difficult position. In 1970 the House Government Operations Committee wanted to accommodate the president in his efforts to reconstitute the Bureau of the Budget into the Office of Management and Budget, but it objected to the use of the reorganization plan process to achieve this end. In recommending disapproval of the plan, the committee detailed several specific objections, but it lacked time to alert other members to these deficiencies.[40] The regular legislative process would have been preferable, allowing the House

[40] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, *Disapproving Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970: Report to Accompany H. Res. 960*, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1970, H. Rept. 1066.

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Government Operations Committee to retain the sound features of the plan together with other modifications important to Congress.

Occasionally the reorganization process creates more work for Congress rather than less. In 1973, for instance, three days before the president's reorganization authority was due to expire, President Nixon transmitted a reorganization plan to establish a Drug Enforcement Administration in the Department of Justice. The plan called for a number of transfers of agencies and authorities. Functions of the Bureau of Customs (Department of the Treasury) pertaining to drug investigations and intelligence were to be moved to the Justice Department. The Treasury Department would get some 900 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) inspectors.

The two unions representing INS and Customs Bureau employees opposed the plan. The House Government Operations Committee voted 23–17 against the plan. To stave off a floor defeat, OMB officials met with the labor leaders and reached a written agreement with them. Such action was unprecedented. OMB agreed to send congressional leaders a draft bill that would repeal a section of the plan that the unions found objectionable.[41] Congressman Jack Brooks argued that the agreement reached between the administration and the two labor unions constituted a threat to the integrity of the legislative process.

> I am appalled that the OMB would enter into a written agreement not to implement an act of this Congress. This is not the first time that OMB has refused to carry out a congressional directive, but it is the first time of which I am aware that they have entered into a written public agreement to follow that course. It is also the first time in my experience in over 20 years in Congress that a bill to repeal an act of Congress was pending prior to the enactment of the provision by Congress.[42]

The vote to disapprove the plan failed in the House. Since no resolution of disapproval had been introduced in the Senate, the plan became effective on 1 July 1973. One month before the effective date, however, Congressman Holifield, chairman of House Government Operations, introduced a bill to repeal the offending section. Because of delays on the Senate side, the bill was not enacted until 16 March 1974.[43]

This plan illustrates the institutional costs that may be incurred by Congress when the reorganization plan process is used. Although reorganization staffs may spend considerable time in researching an issue, the plans themselves are frequently drawn up in haste with inadequate preparation, drafting, and consultation with affected bodies. Agency heads are often given little time to comment on draft plans that will significantly impact their agencies.[44] Congress has

[41] U.S., Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 119, pt. 14: 17519–20.

[42] Ibid., p. 18466.

[43] 88 Stat. 50.

[44] William L. Cary, *Politics and the Regulatory Agencies* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 29.

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been placed in a position where it had to accept a poorly conceived proposal or embarrass the president. In the instance under discussion, Congress had to pass a bill to "amend" the drug reorganization plan to ratify a written agreement between OMB and certain interest groups. How this year-long process constituted an improvement over the normal legislative process is difficult to ascertain.

In the three decades since passage of the Reorganization Act in 1949, there has been a gradual, yet persistent, erosion in the president's reorganization authority. This erosion reflects the ambivalence of Congress regarding its delegation of power to the president and the ways presidents in recent years have used this authority.

The act was noteworthy for the broad scope of authority delegated to the president. In this respect, Congress was heeding the recommendation of the first Hoover Commission that few limitations be placed on the president's authority to submit plans and that no agencies be exempted. "Once the limiting and exempting process is begun," Hoover warned, "it will end the possibility of achieving really substantial results."[45] In recent years, however, Congress has chosen to place limits on this authority and has exempted certain agencies from coverage.

In 1964, Congress denied the president authority to submit plans proposing new executive departments. When the law was renewed in 1971, there was a provision inserted that a plan must be limited "in effect" to dealing with no more than "one logically consistent subject matter." In 1977, the president was prohibited from proposing plans that established, abolished, or consolidated departments or independent regulatory agencies. Furthermore, he could not propose the elimination of any enforcement function or statutory program of an agency. No more than three reorganization plans could be under consideration at one time.

The erosion in presidential reorganization authority is also evident in the trend toward creating governmental units outside the purview of the reorganization act. These new exemptions cannot be located by reading the reorganization act; they are included in the enabling statutes of the units in question. Two recent examples include the Legal Services Corporation and the Synthetic Fuels Corporation.[46]

Enhancing Presidential Management

The reorganization plan process is considered by many to be a useful tool for the president to use against the bureaucratic fiefdoms. He can redistribute in-

[45] U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *The Hoover Commission Report* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1949), p. xv.

[46] The Reorganization Act applies only to agencies of the federal government. The Legal Services Corporation is legally described as a "private nonmembership nonprofit corporation," not an agency of the federal government (88 Stat. 379–380, sections 1003[a] and 1005[e][1]). The Synthetic Fuels Corporation, another "nonagency" of the federal government, is further exempted from the reorga-

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fluence in a policy field by restructuring organizations. Reorganization plans may be considered, in some instances, as presidentially imposed treaties upon bureaucratic combatants.

There is another side, however, to the reorganization plan process for the institutional presidency. If a president is going to ask that the reorganization authority be renewed, he must show that it is a delegation of authority that is needed and will be used. Historically, the pattern of reorganization plan use has been uneven and opportunistic.

In 1949 and 1950, immediately following the issuance of the first Hoover Commission report, the president submitted some thirty-five plans, of which twenty-six became effective. These plans were unusual because they "embodied one consistent and thoroughgoing effort to apply the Hoover Commission's prescription for strengthening the central management of departments and agencies by transferring to their heads all and sundry statutory powers previously lodged in their components and subordinates."[47] Aside from this one burst of systematic and philosophically cohesive reorganization activity, there has been little in the way of coherence among the proposals. Each plan appears to be justified on an ad hoc basis.

Occasionally, presidents have sought to preempt or settle certain political and administrative controversies by the use of reorganization plans. In 1970, President Nixon proposed the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as an agency independent of any of the existing departments. The purpose was to symbolize to the public the commitment of his administration to the protection of the environment and also to preempt efforts by other departments and agencies to participate. Similarly, in 1970 the administration proposed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), placing it in the Department of Commerce (rather than in the Department of the Interior) as a temporary location prior to the anticipated establishment of a new Department of Natural Resources.[48]

The benefits for the president, however, should be weighed against some of the costs. Concentration on process and procedures tends to obscure substantive issues and often results in pyrrhic victories for the president. Considerable resources in the OMB and the various departments and agencies are exhausted discussing and planning for reorganizations. Even the prospect of a reorganization, irrespective of whether it comes to fruition, causes much maneuvering and preparation within agencies.

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nization authority through its enabling act which states that the Reorganization Act of 1977 "shall not apply to authorize the transfer to the Corporation of any power, function, or authority" (94 Stat. 640, sec. 119[b][2]).

[47] Harvey C. Mansfield, "Federal Executive Reorganization: Thirty Years of Experience," *Public Administration Review* 29 (July-August 1969): 339.

[48] Office of Management and Budget, *Papers Relating to the President's Departmental Reorganization Program* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 171-72. See Richard Corrigan, "Conservationists Prepare to Fight Plan Giving Commerce Lead Oceanography Role," *National Journal*, 25 July 1970, pp. 1581-84.

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There have been instances when presidents have caused themselves unnecessary political damage by using the reorganization plan option. In February 1979, President Carter announced he would forward a reorganization plan to establish a Department of Natural Resources that would absorb the Interior Department and include the Forest Service from the Agriculture Department and NOAA from the Commerce Department.[49] While the use of the reorganization plan process to establish this department was endorsed by Chairman Brooks of the House Government Operations Committee, it ran into stiff opposition from Senator Ribicoff, who chaired the Governmental Affairs Committee. Ribicoff's objection was based on his interpretation of the Reorganization Act's prohibition against using reorganization plans to create new departments. Administration officials argued that they were not proposing a "new" department. Rather, they were just moving some agencies around and changing some titles. Senator Ribicoff disagreed: "Section 905(a) of the Reorganization Act of 1977 states that no reorganization plan may provide for or 'have the effect of creating a new executive department.' It is my belief—and the belief of a number of other Senators—that this prohibition was written into law to cover just the kind of situation we are facing in this instance."[50]

Administration officials had been quite candid in their belief that the proposal for a new Department of Natural Resources could not be passed using the regular legislative process. The only chance for success, in their view, lay in a reorganization plan.[51] When the White House recognized that the Senate leadership adamantly opposed the use of a reorganization plan to establish a department, it withdrew the proposal. President Carter, however, did pay a price. In response to his request for an extension of the reorganization authority, members of Congress gave him only a year extension and served notice that they would use the time to review the authority and its procedures. The administration also had to promise that it had no plans to propose the creation of a Department of Natural Resources "or anything resembling it."[52]

[49] Hedrick Smith, "White House to Ask New Resource Department," *New York Times*, 1 March 1979.

[50] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 7 March 1979, 125: S2255 (daily edition).

[51] The political reality is that the presidential staffs often see the reorganization plan process as a means to achieve White House objectives not likely to be accepted if subjected to the regular legislative process. A White House aide in the Carter administration explained that with a reorganization plan "you don't need passionate supporters. All you need to do is avoid passionate enemies. That's the only way to get any of this through. We could never do it by legislation" (Rochelle L. Stanfield, "The Best Laid Reorganization Plans Sometimes Go Astray," *National Journal*, 20 January 1979, p. 86.

[52] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *To Extend the Reorganization Authority of the President*, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, p. 6. Statement of Harrison Wellford, Executive Associate Director for Reorganization and Management, OMB.

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Debasing the Process

We do not deny that a case can be marshalled for renewing the president's reorganization authority. The record shows that this authority has been used often and, in some instances, has achieved major results. Passage of reorganization authority can be a useful exercise in symbolic politics, sending a message to voters that both branches are committed to efficient government. Presidents may seek the authority to convince the bureaucracy that the White House is in charge, exerting control on the "subgovernments" in which agencies play a leading role. The reorganization process allows the president to skirt the political obstacles that exist in the regular legislative process. The argument will also be heard that it is unfair to deny future presidents a power that most presidents have had since the 1930s. The case for the plan method of reorganization has been succinctly argued by Harvey Mansfield.

> The particular utility of the plan method is not to displace previous methods of securing a reorganization, but to capitalize the advantages of its unique characteristics. The statute is not to be had for the asking. Each President must negotiate for it anew. What he gets, that he could not otherwise secure, is an opportunity from time to time to present the Congress, the country, and the entrenched interests with a reorganization package of his own devising, as a *fait accompli*, barring a veto; and if a protest is raised, an opportunity to appeal directly to the full membership of either house for support in a floor vote within a stipulated time on the package as he put it together, bypassing both the leadership and the legislative committee seniors if they are unsympathetic. This is an opportunity our constitutional system otherwise seldom affords.[53]

We believe these virtues, however, are more than offset by several serious shortcomings. First, to our minds there is something unseemly, and ultimately self-defeating, about lauding a method that seeks to circumvent the constitutional process. When a method is employed to reach an objective that might not have gained the backing of a majority in each House, the system of lawmaking is, to some degree, debased. "Stealthiness" appears to be a virtue that is rewarded, at least in the short run.

Second, the reorganization plan method is premised on an essentially negative view of Congress that does not comport with the facts. It assumes that members of Congress are irresponsible and will not support sensible legislative proposals submitted by the executive branch. The record suggests, however, that Congress can, and does, act with dispatch on organizational matters. Moreover, instead of cultivating an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect, the process breeds cynicism and suspicion. The plan method is grounded in a similarly hostile attitude toward the bureaucracy. Once legislators and agency officials are stereotyped as untrustworthy, the attitude is corrosive. It is difficult to look upon them favorably for other decisions.

Third, the delegation of the reorganization power to the president is un-

[53] Harvey C. Mansfield, "Federal Executive Reorganization: Thirty Years of Experience," p. 341.

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necessary and potentially counterproductive. Little of value has been accomplished by reorganization plan that could not have been done through the regular legislative process. The mere existence of the authority places pressure on presidents to use the process lest they appear frivolous for having requested the authority in the first instance. Presidential staffs engage in reorganization for the sake of reorganization. The process becomes the goal.

Given this environment and the time and resource constraints present in the institutional presidency and in Congress, it is not surprising that many plans exhibit inadequate preparation and technical knowledge. On Capitol Hill, a debate on substance is necessarily subordinated to the exigency of appearance. Members have little time to uncover inconsistencies, contradictions, or other defects that may be hidden within a reorganization plan.

Furthermore, congressional ambivalence over the delegation of reorganization authority to the president has resulted in misunderstanding, confusion, and recrimination between the two branches. On the one hand, Congress gives the president authority to skirt the regular legislative process, yet when the president invokes the power, he risks being accused of violating the established system. After each presidential "misuse," Congress responds by adding restrictions and exemptions, gradually circumscribing the power; today the reorganization act is but a shadow of the 1949 statute. The original design has been so diluted that recourse ought now to be had to the regular legislative process—a conclusion especially compelling in view of the 1977 change that allows presidents to submit amendments to their plans. Having introduced one more element of the legislative process, it is wise to take the next step and let the regular procedure prevail.

This is not to suggest that it is always inappropriate for Congress to delegate to the president certain powers to reorganize the executive branch. When the two Hoover Commissions submitted their reports, there was some justification for permitting a "fast track" legislative process. The individual plans were part of a systematic approach to reorganization. Also, during periods of national emergencies, it may be advisable to delegate to the president substantial reorganization authority, subject to a congressional veto. During normal periods, however, both branches are ill-served by the reorganization plan method. If a proposal is noncontroversial, the regular legislative process will do. If controversial, there is all the more reason to insist on full congressional review and affirmative action by both houses. Only the normal legislative process can properly address the emerging organizational issues of the 1980s.

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Book Reviews

Changing of the Guard: Power and Leadership in America *by David S. Broder. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1980. 512 pp. $14.95.*

David Broder, an excellent reporter of American politics, seeks through numerous interviews with young people professionally engaged in public affairs to reveal the implications of the torch passing to a new generation of political leadership. This book should encourage those who believe that the public interest is most likely to be maximized by broad participation in a freely functioning democratic system. It may be disquieting for those who feel this nation needs political leadership with an understanding that issues are interrelated, an overriding vision of America's future, and an ability to exercise power effectively.

The interviews are organized by interest groups, reflecting Broder's view that members of the New Guard perceive themselves as part of distinct networks. The diversity of the networks—including the New Right, Hispanics, women, ethnics, the South, suburbia and the West, business and labor—suggests that while influence remains with traditional groups, it is increasingly shared with newcomers.

Lacking universal experiences, such as the Great Depression and World War II which formed certain shared views of the world among their predecessors, the New Guard networks are small and have limited substantive agendas. Reflecting the Vietnam and Watergate experiences, a common denominator seems to be opposition to concentrated power and a related commitment to a more participatory political process. Thus, New Guard politicians generally oppose the congressional seniority system, support a proliferation of congressional subcommittees, and ask to be judged on their honesty and professional approach to problems, rather than on the results they achieve.

Although Broder finds the New Guard appealing, he is wise enough to wonder: "Will their individual political skills be directed to any goal broader than their personal ambitions and agendas? Does their arrival on the scene mean a further fragmenting and dispersal of the nation's leadership or can it . . . help in finding that elusive national consensus which seems to have been lost in the Sixties" (p. 385)? The concern is justified. Sensitive

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to the demands of the media, members of the New Guard may be tempted to oversimplify to the point of distortion. Sophisticated in using polls, successful New Guard politicians may only be the best followers rather than leaders. Their de-emphasis of results may reflect an inability to identify much that is worth accomplishing. As Broder says, "it is sobering to realize that none of the challenges of the past decade has brought forth from this immensely talented and well-educated set of women and men a speech or set of speeches which illuminated the public's understanding and helped move a nation" (p. 475).

It may be mistaken, however, to look to the New Guard as the probable source of the ideas necessary to address the nation's complex needs. That vision may be more likely to emerge from among those generally not included in the book—academics at universities and at "think tanks" and individuals engaged in private and philanthropic affairs.

The question remains whether the New Guard will be up to leading even if the direction is charted by others. The changing of the guard is fragmenting power. The Congress which now permits newcomers to participate is virtually unable to unite to enact meaningful legislation. An important issue to be resolved over time is whether the New Guard's opposition to concentrated power is largely an argument for giving the newcomers immediate influence or an attitude that will evolve into an abdication of responsibility. For as Broder says, "leadership *is* the exercise of power, and leadership is what the country will demand of this generation" (p. 474).

It will be interesting to see whether increasing political competition will produce better leaders or merely make inadequate policies more legitimate and acceptable.

MARK L. WOLF
Sullivan & Worcester

Dean Rusk *by Warren I. Cohen. Totowa, N.J., Cooper Square Publishers, 1980. 375 pp. $22.50.*

This book is important for at least two reasons. First, it reveals the once enigmatic figure of Dean Rusk as the State Department official who adapted the containment policy to Asia between 1949 and 1951 (and, according to Warren Cohen, raised even Dean Acheson's acute anticommunism to new levels of awareness on Indochinese, Chinese, and Korean issues). Rusk then appears as the secretary of state who had deep reservations about the Bay of Pigs operation, but did not insist on them; who valued the western alliance but was prepared to carry out U.S. policy in the Congo and Laos regardless of Allied criticism; who would use only the word "Peiping" in describing the Chinese capital, but flirted with an opening to Mao's government in 1963 (until as a team player he would not buck John Kennedy's adamant anti-Chinese feelings); and who then became Lyndon Johnson's point man in selling the Vietnam War even though "in the end [1969] the faithful Rusk was left as the principal apologist for a disastrous policy in which he had initially had less confidence than those who departed" (p. 222).

A second reason for the book's importance is Cohen's use of Rusk as the intelligent, dedicated, well-educated, realistic American liberal who set out to make the world safe

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for stability and ended by trying to find a nonexistent center in African and Asian revolutions. Cold war liberalism provides the framework for this account, and Cohen wants to find out through Rusk's career what went wrong. He discovers more than our short historical perspective on the 1960s might indicate. This success is due to Cohen's ability to track down and declassify important documents, and also to the willingness of Rusk and many of his associates to be interviewed. The only notable name absent in the list of interviews is George Kennan, who repeatedly fought Rusk inside the State Department during 1949–1950 and publicly condemned his policies in public during the 1960s.

But the hard edge in this account—a hard edge not usually found in earlier *American Secretaries of State* volumes—comes from Cohen's desire to find out why his own generation's liberalism went sour. He learns that the ghost of Woodrow Wilson could never be exorcised, not even by the incense of realism that permeated the years of Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. Rusk became "the consummate Wilsonian, still responding to Lenin with the precepts of American liberalism" (p. 109). Cohen also notes that Rusk seemed bored by the growing economic contradictions that finally undid U.S. hegemony in the world's markets (although after the 1968 Tet offensive, even the secretary of state advised against mobilizing reservists because of growing monetary problems). Rusk, moreover, cared little about public opinion, to judge from this account. He was an incrementalist who moved rapidly enough to carry through the directives of the presidential office he held in high honor, but slowly enough so the society could adjust to the wrenching demands of being the world's policemen. He had patience; Cohen observes that as a rural boy from Georgia, Rusk did not expect the instant gratification that was expected by some of his Ivy League associates.

In the end, presidential wisdom led to disaster, and the economy and the public suddenly created new rules for the containment game. Rusk emerges in this book as a good man who too often had his heart in the right place but his political allegiance in the wrong place, and an inability to resolve the problem by working through the contradictions in their anticommunism that Wilsonians and other liberals encountered in the 1960s. "He thus betrayed his own better instincts, the interests of his country, the principles of the UN. Much may be said in mitigation, but never enough" (p. 330). So Cohen ends this significant historical and personal exploration.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

Inequality in an Age of Decline *by Paul Blumberg. New York, Oxford University Press, 1980. 290 pp. $15.95.*

The general theme of this reasonably sprightly and well-written work is that the United States, after a long period in which it has been getting richer—with almost each generation about twice as rich as the previous one—has now reached a plateau of riches, beginning about 1970, and that it is unlikely to get much richer, at least on a per capita basis, in the future. Then the question is raised, what is the impact of this leveling off on the distribution of income and on class structure? The general conclusion is that it may severely in-

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crease class conflict and class differentiation, unless this is offset by what the author also perceives as a certain mellowing of American society as it has moved away from discrimination and towards a richer and more differentiated culture.

The general thesis is well laid out. The first chapter is devoted to theories of class in postwar America. It deals with the controversy between the "convergence" theorists, who argue that class differences are declining, and the "stability" theorists, who hold that the class structure has not changed. The author hints at, but never quite elaborates, a possible reconciliation of these two views, in terms of relative distribution of income. In the period from 1940 to 1970, for example, there was remarkably little change in the proportional distribution of income, but average real incomes came close to doubling. This means that all sections of society roughly got twice as rich. This is why, by any standards, the United States halved the amount of poverty in that period. The relative difference between the income classes did not change, but as each group in society doubled its income, the class characteristics changed. This simple view, of course, neglects the mobility within classes, which Blumberg does not treat very much and which is certainly noticeable, though not enormous, in American society. Then the question arises, if now Americans are not going to get any richer, will this perpetuate the existing class structure, perhaps diminish interclass mobility, and increase class conflict?

Chapters 2 through 5 discuss the nature of the no-growth economy of the seventies from the distributional impact of inflation and the differential unemployment and the class divergence that results. The evidence verges on the anecdotal; there are some good statistical tables and charts, but the general discussion of the distribution of income is rather neglected. Attention is also paid to the relative position of the United States in the world economy, the rise of oil imports, the decline in manufacturing exports, the weakness of the dollar, the weakening competitive position of American industry, and so on. At times, the author strikes almost a chauvinistic note deploring the fact that American capitalists are providing employment in the poor countries of the world rather than at home. The final chapter, entitled "America Transformed," introduces a slight note of optimism, acknowledging a slight "greening of America" as it develops a more tolerant, integrative, and perhaps more adaptable society. The continuation of these processes remains a hope for the future.

A work of this kind, with all its charm and cogency, suffers from the deplorable excess of specialization in the social sciences and illustrates the need for a more unified social science. Blumberg is dealing essentially with problems of the total society, yet his lack of expertise in economics, political science, and even anthropology is fairly evident. The concept of class, for instance, is extremely unsatisfactory as a taxonomy, particularly in complex societies such as the United States, whatever validity it may have had in earlier societies. What we have now is a huge variety of subcultures—occupational, regional, religious, political, ethnic, educational—that constitute, as it were, the basic social taxonomy of the society, and how one aggregates these into "classes" is a very debatable question. The population can be classified by income groups, but income groups are extremely heterogeneous in terms of culture. Some cultures straddle a number of income groups. The whole concept of a "working class" is shadowy in the extreme, though there are clusters of subcultures, particularly occupational ones, that might conform to the

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concept. The distribution of power in society is far more elusive than the distribution of income, especially when divided into power to stop and power to do, and this gain cuts across all the subcultures. It is hard not to feel, therefore, that the analytic structure that underlies Blumberg's work is quite inadequate to the task he has set himself, though it is quite common among sociologists of what might be called the "middle Left."

When it comes to the economics of the situation, there are glaring omissions, even misunderstandings. There is no clear understanding, for instance, of the difference between relative price structure and the impact this has on distribution, on the one hand, and general inflation on the other. There is virtually no discussion of the nature and possible pathologies of the financial system, which is odd in a book devoted to class. The whole question of how inflation is a result of interest rates adjusting to it and therefore demanding more of it is completely neglected. Blumberg has little appreciation of the extraordinary flexibility of the American economy, though he is quite right in pointing out that the war industry has been a serious internal drain, especially a brain drain, over these thirty years, and that the economic and technological stagnation in which Americans now find themselves can be attributed in part to this. He does not discuss the perceptions of the international situation that really created the war industry, nor the change in political climate that after 1970 permitted so drastic a decline in the taboo on budget deficits.

These defects, however, are sins of omission rather than of commission. As far as it goes, the book is a useful contribution to the discussion of an extremely important current problem. The style is a little afflicted with what we might call "left righteousness," with its assumption that it is a far better way of doing almost anything, which is so well known that it need not even be mentioned. This, however, is part of the occupational subculture of sociologists, and one should not be too much put off by it.

KENNETH E. BOULDING
University of Colorado, Boulder

Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class, and Political Response *by Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979. 393 pp. $20.00.*

The book provides a thorough, interesting, and perceptive examination of unemployment both as a personal problem and a political issue. It contains important information, primarily from telephone surveys of employed and jobless urban workers conducted in 1976, on the social and economic characteristics of the urban unemployed; the financial, emotional, and family problems that result from the loss of a job; and the ways in which jobless workers cope with the financial loss.

The extent to which joblessness and low economic status promote political behavior consistent with objective economic circumstances is the primary interest and provides the theoretical focus of the study. Employing a "model of the process of political mobilization," the authors examine relationships between unemployment, economic social class, class consciousness, general social and political beliefs, specific policy preferences, political activity, and voting behavior.

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Contrary to the inferences of the model, the data indicate:

- Neither joblessness nor economic class is related to a sense of class consciousness or policy preferences (p. 276).
- Unemployment, in most cases, does not promote increased political activity. In fact, because of the "selective recruitment of the unemployed from nonparticipant groups in the population," jobless workers are less likely to vote and engage in other political activities than those with jobs (p. 254).
- Party identification and attitudes about unemployment as an issue are more predictive of voting behavior than employment status (p. 331).

The authors point out that during the recession years of 1975–1977, despite the quiescence of the jobless, political leaders responded to the problem of unemployment by enacting legislation such as the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment bill and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). They neglect to mention that, in addition to these measures, $49 billion in unemployment compensation benefits were paid out during this period. This represented 38 percent of the total amount spent under the federal-state unemployment compensation system since its inception in 1938. Further, $9 billion went for new, temporary programs enacted in 1975 in direct response to the exceptionally high unemployment rate.

The authors conclude that there is a "significant disjunction" between objective, personal economic circumstances and political behavior. Further, the response of political leaders to the problem of unemployment, despite the inactivity and lack of involvement of the unemployed, deviates from the pluralist model and its emphasis on economic self-interest in explaining the mobilization of groups and the response of the political system. Their answer is that, in addition to—and sometimes inconsistent with—objective economic circumstances, individual citizens and political leaders act on the basis of political ideas and beliefs about what is necessary or what is the right public policy.

This informative and readable study clarifies and elaborates certain dimensions of unemployment and the relationships between joblessness, social class, and political behavior. The theoretical framework effectively structures the analysis and presentation of the data. It suggests and logically connects a range of pertinent questions and relationships, including some for further examination. For example, under what conditions would jobless workers become politically mobilized? What are the sources of, and what sustains and changes, political ideas and beliefs? Do changing conditions affect the relative importance of objective circumstances versus political beliefs in the behavior of citizens and political leaders?

Finally, is it irrational, as implied by the authors' model, for a voter (or an elected official) to act in a way that may be inconsistent with his or her immediate economic situation but is consistent with beliefs about what is good for the nation?

M. KENNETH BOWLER
Subcommittee on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation,
U.S. House of Representatives

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What Should Be Taxed: Income or Expenditure? *edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980. 332 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $5.95.*

This volume, and the Brookings conference out of which it grew, evidences enhanced interest in the possible adoption of an expenditure tax in the United States and other countries. The concept of a graduated tax based on expenditures—basically individual income less current net saving—had been, until quite recently, not much more than a footnote in the literature on public finance. A Treasury Department proposal for an expenditure tax during World War II was not seriously considered by the Congress. Nicholas Kaldor, whose book on the topic appeared in the mid-1950s, was instrumental in the only actual use of such a tax, for brief periods in India and Sri Lanka. More recently, special study commissions in the United Kingdom and Sweden have considered the expenditure tax. The Meade committee in the United Kingdom supported such a tax. During the last year of the Ford administration, the Treasury Department sympathetically investigated an expenditure tax in *Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform.*

Readers of *What Should be Taxed?* should turn first to the paper by David Bradford who makes a positive case for a progressive tax on consumption as an alternative to an income tax. Bradford, who was responsible for the publication of *Blueprints*, points to the well-known shortcomings of the income tax—varied taxation of the yield from different investments, inconsistent taxation of the yield from owner-occupied housing and other consumer durables, and distortions of the measurement of income caused by inflation—and argues that a personal consumption tax deals more satisfactorily with these problems. He makes a formal argument for the optimality of a consumption-base tax as a means of maximizing household welfare through a preferable allocation of life-time consumption.

The reader should turn next to Richard Gode's classic defense of the income tax as a superior measure of ability to pay. The welfare gains from a consumption tax may be illusory as the tax base inevitably erodes through the political process. Because even a broad-based consumption tax requires higher rates to yield revenue equivalent to that from an income tax, the distortion of household choices between marketed goods and nonmarketed household production and nontaxable fringe benefits would be exacerbated.

William Andrews presents the case for a personal expenditure tax as a supplement to an income tax. Michael Graetz discusses practical problems associated with the design of an expenditure tax, concluding that these problems would be substantial but not absolutely prohibitive.

These four papers are commented upon by various tax experts, and Henry Aaron provides a summary of the conference discussion. Among the issues discussed are the international aspects of the choice between an income or an expenditure tax; the treatment of housing, gifts, and bequests; administration and compliance; and problems of a transition from income- to expenditure-based taxation. Issues not addressed include the treatment of spending for education and the impact on intergovernmental fiscal relations.

This volume also includes, inexplicably as the first paper, E. Philip Howrey and Saul Hyman's econometric study of the impact of after-tax rates of return on saving. This

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counters Michael Boskin's findings that the elasticity of savings with respect to after-tax rates of return is significantly positive. Howrey and Hymans, unable to replicate those findings, conclude that there is no strong evidence that household saving can be manipulated by policies working through after-tax rates of return. Boskin, in his commentary, does not agree. That debate continues, but its relevance for the choice between an income or expenditure tax is not crucial. That choice, if ever confronted in the political arena, will hinge primarily on perceptions of equity. If increasing the savings rate were thought to be overwhelmingly important, there are many other policy options open.

BRUCE F. DAVIE
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. Congress

The Defense Industry *by Jacques S. Gansler. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1980. 346 pp. $19.95.*

This book's appearance is timely; it comes as the Reagan administration contemplates major increases in defense procurement. Its title is promising; no book in recent memory has tried to cover everything about the defense industry. Its delivery, alas, is disappointing; although the author provides a useful description of the defense industry and some of its problems, his strong warning that the defense industry "is becoming both economically inefficient . . . and strategically unresponsive" is not supported convincingly (p. 4).

Everywhere he looks, the author finds problems and trends that support this conclusion. The large prime contractors are growing less efficient. At the level of the subcontractors and parts suppliers, the exit of many small firms in some cases has left one firm in a position to raise prices in peacetime, but unable to meet surge demands in time of crisis. And the small innovative research and development (R&D) firms are being replaced by the large prime contractors that combine R&D with production, but which are for that reason more conservative and less creative.

Because defense firms sell to and are regulated by the government, most of these problems result from government policies, and the book overflows with examples of specific policy failures. But the real problem, in the author's view, is a policy *process* that is informed by no coherent or even adequate view of what the nation's defense industrial base does or should look like. General policy tends to be made in response to specific problems as they emerge; unfortunately, "the cumulative impact of these actions is rarely considered, nor is their interaction" (p. 72).

On this last point the author is probably right, though this is hardly a problem unique to defense policy. Moreover, he has performed a service both in capturing the enormous variety of the industry—the differences between "primes" and "subs," the special problems associated with producing different kinds of systems, and the different procurement patterns employed by each military service—and in listing the special characteristics of the military services as buyers: the excessive specifications, the tendency to overmanage, the preference for performance (with less emphasis on cost), and so forth.

But whether the picture is so bleak remains a moot point, partly because the author has

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tried, unsuccessfully, to photograph a moving target. The long decline in defense demand that followed the end of the Vietnam War, and the increase in defense spending that began in 1977, made the 1970s a decade of substantial adjustment and change in the defense sector, especially among the subcontractors. Having drawn supporting data from studies conducted *throughout* that decade, the author is in no position to argue that his is a portrait of the defense industry in "the post-Vietnam era." Indeed, whether some of the facts and trends he cites still obtain remains open to debate.

If the author's facts are occasionally questionable, his value judgments are incompletely supported. He is especially critical, for example, of the Defense Department's penchant for buying very sophisticated and expensive equipment. He clearly favors the purchase of large numbers of cheaper, simpler systems, a move that would increase efficiency by allowing easy transfer between defense and civilian production. Whether such a policy would increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces, however, is a very tough question that the author never faces. Without doing so, his complaints about inefficiency are poorly grounded.

The book thus ultimately is unconvincing. It may go further than any other in outlining the scope of the issue and in raising important questions about this sector of the nation's economy. Whether the answers it provides to those questions are correct, however, is a matter for further research.

THOMAS L. MCNAUGHER
The Rand Corporation

Machine Politics in Transition: Party and Community in Chicago *by Thomas M. Guterbock. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1980. 324 pp. $20.00.*

Machine politics in Thomas Guterbock's ward in Chicago is a combination of the expected and the unexpected. One expects patronage employment, a ward office whose staff performs services by mediating between citizens and downtown bureaucracies, and the ward office as an outpost of a centralized city-wide party. All of that is there. One also expects the provision of services to generate ties of affection, loyalty, and obligation, reinforced by ethnic solidarity, resulting in votes for the machine. These are not present. Instead, Guterbock argues that citizens view services as rights, not as favors. Thus, performance of services does not generate votes. Party support is not a function of services performed but an expression of Democratic partisanship generated by the national party. Those who use party services are not the down-and-out who are willing to trade votes for favors, but those most attached to the local community, who demand that government keep things running smoothly.

This is a more sensible account of Democratic party strength in Chicago than has been offered in quite some time. The underpinnings of the argument, however, are largely inaccessible. Guterbock tells his readers that he lived in the ward for three years. Knowing that, I expected the author to explore the texture and sentiment of life in the ward and to present intuitive and perhaps theoretically suggestive sketches of the relationships be-

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tween the people of the ward and its politicians. Instead Guterbock's account is stark and uncommunicative. The reader learns that there were 609 requests for service from the ward office in one year. Who was asking? What were they asking for? The reader is also told that the alderman spent a great deal of time at "task-oriented meetings" of "community groups" (pp. 198–206). Who is in those groups? What did they want? These questions are not answered. Guterbock's argument is based not on those requests or meetings but on the results of a short telephone survey conducted with a small number of people. This makes the central chapters difficult to read for anyone and probably incomprehensible to undergraduates.

Guterbock is a bit more forthcoming about the texture of relationships within the party. He tells us quite a bit about what makes party workers tick. For one thing, although service activities do not really generate votes, they do a great deal to keep the party organization together (in part because party workers believe these activities generate votes). Here, however, one has the sense of an innocent—or a young reformer—abroad. Guterbock's commentary is organized around his insistence that the party is "essentially venal" (p. 76), acting against the public interest (p. 206), and only creating an appearance of acting for the community (p. 213). When the ward committeeman's assistant says office activities are for public service, not to trade for votes, Guterbock doubts not his sincerity but his perception. Yet Guterbock's own account of things suggests a different approach. In a city in which a single party has been in power for forty years the distinction between the party and the government is much clearer in principle than in fact. Party workers and citizens alike have dualistic attitudes about the party that reflect its dualistic reality. As government the party provides a "city that works." Even if *specific* services do not generate votes, the overall level of services does. Insisting on the venality of the party is bound to produce a distorted picture in which services are merely a symbolic cover or mystification of the "truth" about the party, when in fact the services are also part of the truth.

Liberal domocracy, after all, is designed to force selfish men to pursue the common good once in office. It is hardly perfect, and it is certainly short of perfect in Chicago. Anyone who thinks that because Chicago's Democrats are organized in a patronage party they have special freedom to pursue their own ends rather than the public interest (p. 237), however, should take a close look at those bastions of reform and inequality—the cities of the Sunbelt.

AMY BRIDGES
Harvard University

Who Votes? *by Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1980. 158 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $3.95.*

Population subgroups, it has long been recognized, differ considerably in their voting behavior. One attempt to explain differences in voter turnout focuses on costs and benefits of voting for the citizen: instrumental (tangible) or expressive (intangible) benefits are weighed against, among others, the costs of time, lost opportunities, and lost income. Wolfinger and Rosenstone note the broad acceptance of this voting model and

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the consensus on which political resources help citizens bear the costs of voting: time, money, social status, information, and experience with politics. This study, however, is designed to go beyond existing research by suggesting "why certain resources matter . . . and how much a given resource affects the turnout rates of different sorts of people" (p. 9).

The authors' own theory of voting emphasizes the overwhelming influence of education on turnout. Additional years of schooling enhance cognitive skills and the capacity to comprehend political abstractions. Education also produces a heightened sense of civic duty and provides experience in overcoming bureaucratic procedures that pose hurdles to voting. Alternatively, comparable skills may develop in specific occupations (farmers, clerks, salespersons) or accumulate through exposure to life and politics, that is, as one ages.

These conclusions are drawn after a thorough examination of how voting is affected by variations in resources (operationalized by demographic characteristics) and contextual variables, especially registration laws. The authors use probit analysis (discussed extensively in the appendices) to estimate the differential impact that a single variable will have on the probability of a subpopulation voting. Some of their findings challenge traditional interpretations: free time does not increase the probability of voting, and additional income only does so until citizens achieve a "modestly comfortable standard of living" (p. 34); aging, far from causing less participation, "by itself, produces not a decline but an increase in turnout" (p. 47); gender differences in turnout are virtually nonexistent until age forty—thereafter women become progressively less likely to vote as age increases.

Analysis of how state registration requirements affect turnout reinforces the emphasis on education. If all fifty states had eliminated the closing date for registration, opened enrollment offices during the entire workweek as well as weekends, and permitted absentee registration, the authors estimate that turnout in the 1972 presidential election would have risen 9.1 percent. The largest increases would have come among voters with less education, for whom registration requirements constitute major hurdles. Nonetheless, the authors argue that passage of liberalized registration laws would only slightly alter demographic, partisan, and ideological characteristics of the voting population. Thus, conclude Wolfinger and Rosenstone, the impact of registration reforms would be limited, since there are only minimal political consequences resulting from current underrepresentation of some groups among voters. These conclusions are likely to elicit criticism from both advocates and opponents of reform proposals.

Who Votes? is a noteworthy contribution to the literature on voting behavior. Use of 1972 and 1974 Census Bureau data provides the authors with a significantly larger sample than is ordinarily available for voting studies. Arguments and findings are clearly and precisely stated, and the authors note appropriately the limits imposed by the data which do not include information on political interest, issue attitudes, or political disaffection. What is lacking, however, is a more extensive discussion of how the findings of this study relate to issues of democratic theory and more broadly conceptualized studies of participation. Although the authors raise a number of provocative questions and present findings likely to generate new research, there is a curious silence on several larger issues.

JOSEPH A. PIKA
State University of New York at Buffalo

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One Nation Divisible: Class, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States Since 1938 *by Richard Polenberg. New York, Viking Press, 1980. 363 pp. $12.95.*

This book provides a narrative social and political history covering forty years of recent experience. The account is divided into six episodes: the United States on the eve of World War II; the nation in wartime; the immediate postwar era (focusing on "The Cold War"); the Eisenhower era (a chapter entitled "The Suburban Nation"); the early sixties (called "The Age of Reform"); and the late sixties and early seventies, this centering on Vietnam. The work goes beyond description to trace the effects of the events of each period on "class, race, and ethnicity."

Most of the work is devoted to accounts of the pressures for change within each of the episodes along with descriptions of the various political responses. These accounts of protest and reform efforts and of the legislative, administrative, and judicial responses constitute the book's most successful achievement. Questions may, of course, be raised about the inclusion or omission of one or another event, and, similarly, readers will differ over emphases and interpretations of some details. But, as an overview, as a basic account of social movements and political responses in those four decades, the book will serve a useful purpose. Its value, however, will be greatest for those who were either not present or not fully attentive during those years. Readers who followed the events closely will have memories refreshed but otherwise will gain only an occasional new fact or observation.

Serious problems arise in connection with Polenberg's larger claims, those dealing with impacts on class, race, and ethnicity. The terms of the analysis are very loosely defined. Class, initially, refers to "distinctions in styles of life arising from differences in wealth, occupation, and education." A few lines later, Polenberg finds it "difficult to improve on" the definition that "class is a matter of how you carry yourself." Ethnicity is used "to encompass country of origin, language, or religion as the context seems to require" (p. 8). The relationships between class, race, and ethnicity are said to be "subtle and complex," a point with which all may agree, but no serious attempt is made to deal with that complexity. The author is convinced that these factors have been of "central importance in the lives of the American people" (p. 7), that they have "shaped the most important aspects of the way people lived" (p. 15). Those assumptions are simply taken for granted; the problems involved in measuring that "central importance" are bypassed.

People working on the issues of class, race, and ethnicity, must, of necessity, focus on just these questions. One general conclusion coming out of their work involves the complexity of these relationships, a principal finding being that class may have considerable importance in relation to some things but not to others. One of the main tasks for those studying social stratification has been to explain why the observed "class differences" in many areas of attitudes and behavior have been so modest.

Polenberg's analysis of ethnicity focuses on the deprivations experienced by some ethnic groups. But that focus assimilates the discussion of ethnicity to that of class. Again the "subtle" questions are omitted: what, if any, independent contribution to attitudes and behavior results from the ethnic factor? Polenberg makes no reference to the most recent important contributions in this area, those of Andrew Greeley. Had he done so,

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much of his discussion of ethnicity would have required reconsideration since some of the "traditional" patterns have reversed.

Following his account of the events in each era, Polenberg offers some brief conclusions about class, racial, and ethnic differences, these suggesting some kind of measurement. The Kennedy and early Johnson years, for example, had seen a partially successful attempt to "bridge the distance," but the era of the Vietnam War would "see the distance widen once again" (p. 207). Given the lack of definition, of specification, and of any serious effort at measurement, those conclusions obviously can be no more than plausible hypotheses.

Another problem arises with Polenberg's use of sources. Some sociologists will be surprised by the reappearance, after some decades of eclipse, of W. Lloyd Warner's theories of social stratification in the book's opening chapter. Most specialists will remember that Warner's position, after a period of considerable popularity, received much criticism and, apart from mention made in reviews of pertinent literature, has disappeared from current work and discussion. No reference to these critiques appears in Polenberg's text or footnotes. They are first discussed in a bibliographic essay where he indicates that there were "scathing criticisms" of Warner's work. One author had "denounced" it, another had "attacked" it, and still another had "condemned" it. Those statements avoid the substance of the criticisms. Most sociologists, I suspect, have found them to be fully justified.

A number of works appear in the bibliographic essay that could or should be discussed in the text. He devotes several pages to "Archie Bunker" variety portrayals of blue-collar workers. In his "Essay on Sources," however, he cites various works, mine among them, as providing "effective critiques" of that stereotype. One wonders then why his text should dwell on the stereotype.

Abba Schwartz's book is not mentioned in the discussion of immigration law reform. It too makes its appearance only in the bibliographic essay where it is accompanied by a denigrating comment, one that I do not think justified. Michael Rogin's book on Joseph McCarthy appears in the essay, not in the text or notes, also with a deprecating comment—it "harshly" criticized Daniel Bell's "pluralist" explanation of McCarthyism. Rogin's criticism may well be harsh, but the book is well researched, and, pending new work on the subject, his criticisms also are fully justified.

The political history, in short, may be read with some profit. Some caution, however, is recommended with respect to the book's treatment of the social history.

RICHARD HAMILTON
McGill University

Presidential Secrecy and Deception: Beyond the Power to Persuade *by John M. Orman. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980. 239 pp. $22.95.*

This is a confusing book to read. The title suggests that the focus will be on presidential power and that the author will seek to explain why Neustadt's characterization of presidential power as the "power to persuade" was fundamentally flawed. Consistent with

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this approach, it is asserted in the first chapter that political scientists have neglected the study of presidential use of secrecy and deception, and because this use is not only important "but one of the prime characteristics of the modern presidency," this neglect has led to an inaccurate description of presidential power (p. 4). With this introduction, the reader might well assume that the rest of the book would be aimed at proving these assertions. Although four chapters of the book discuss specific covert actions undertaken by presidents, the author, however, does not then address what implications these actions might have for perceptions of presidential power. The cases presented moreover do not support the argument that presidents act unilaterally. For example, the influence of bureaucratic politics on such presidential choices as Kennedy's attempts to eliminate the Castro regime (p. 90) suggests a contrary conclusion. Furthermore, nowhere does the author demonstrate that covert activity allowed presidents success in their broad aims. Kennedy was even less successful in his attempt to eliminate Castro than were the instances of presidential commands labeled as failures by Neustadt. At any rate the reader is left to decide the implications of the data, since the later discussion is shifted toward two other questions. Why do presidents resort to secrecy and deception to effect their objectives? Is such action justified constitutionally, legally, or pragmatically? These two themes are also not consistently pursued. The question of justification is examined in three separate chapters, and one of these appears in a different place in the text from the others.

The absence of a central focus is not the book's only weakness. The author has attempted too much in too little space, and the result is that much of the material is treated very superficially. For example, *United States* v. *Nixon* merits only two paragraphs. The effect of condensing and distilling a large amount of historical material is to weaken greatly the author's ability to persuade the reader to accept his conclusions as to why presidents acted as they did.

There are a number of other problems with this book. In many places, instead of analysis, the reader is presented with lists. These lists are not only tedious to read, but also convey a misleading appearance of parity among the various items. For example, the author lists together "political advice and counsel" and "paramilitary operations designed to overthrow or support a regime" as possible covert actions (p. 71). Other important distinctions are glossed over as well. Covert action, secrecy, and manipulation are treated as if they were identical. The loyalty-security program and executive privilege are presented as if they equally reflected presidential attempts to control information. Another problem is that the author repeatedly substitutes quotes from other writers for evidence. Readers do not learn much from statements by several authors that secrecy and freedom conflict (pp. 38–39). The point, of course, is that secrecy hinders accountability.

While the issues addressed in *Presidential Secrecy and Deception* are interesting, there is a real question whether this book adds much. The accounts of covert actions are based on the research of others, and little new substantive data are presented. The legal and constitutional analyses are more extensively treated elsewhere. The theme of how presidential power should be assessed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate was promising, but was not consistently pursued.

CAREN DUBNOFF
College of the Holy Cross

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Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception *edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1980. 256 pp. $25.00.*

Potter's collection of essays represents a unique academic endeavor—a revelation by front-line scientific intelligence analysts and their informed observers of a moment's worth of the vast subterranean activity whose work, together with that of the inventors of weapons themselves, drives the politics of cold war confrontation. The issues they address are both old and new. British analysts estimating the accuracy of Germany's strategic rockets measured the radius of a circle within which 50 percent of the V-2's detonated on their way to a common London aimpoint (about 11 kilometers). Today's analysts examine telemetry, radar traces, and high-resolution photography to draw their 50 percent circle, but the measurement is still the artilleryman's time-honored CEP (circular error probable).

The SALT and Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaties provide a new and more abstract framework for today's intelligence analysts, who must know not only the number, accuracy, yield, and reliability of modern weapons, but also whether they are being deceived, or perhaps worse, deceiving themselves about these estimates. These analysts hope to avoid having the opportunity to pace off the few hundred meters from intended aimpoint to radioactive cauldron produced by current weapons.

So much of this work is secret, and so much is clouded by the polemics that are inevitable by-products of partial knowledge and probabilistic intelligence estimates, that one cannot criticize Potter for gathering a collection of papers that sometimes skirt secrecy by being vague ("Verifying SALT Agreements" by Bruce G. Blair and Garry D. Brewer) or shout their fear of a deceptive, conniving adversary ("Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification" by Gordon J. Humphrey). These are accurate reflections of the process this book reveals.

Indeed, this is precisely the value of the book. The tenor and substance of the real world is in it. And the people who live in it and write about it on the other side of the secrecy wall address the issues they confront every day. Stuart Cohen provides a valuable reference piece on Soviet SALT verification views. One wishes for more of this, for American intelligence analysts must know what the Soviet scientists' estimate of American weapon systems is in order to define the boundary of stability. Paul K. Davis captures the hardheaded style of the Pentagon's weapons planners who must specify concrete capabilities in response to highly contingent threats. Herbert Scoville, whose vast experience with intelligence analysis and SALT is only hinted at in his brief article, offers some sage judgments about the likelihood of the United States's ability to derive the estimates of Soviet forces that is required for SALT negotiations to be successful. Amrom Katz writes with wit and insight on a depressing thesis—the United States will never know what the Soviets have successfully concealed from us. He shows why this is not exactly a truism. Dan Caldwell wraps the book up with a valuable, if too brief, bibliographic essay. He has put his finger on a good many of the leaks and revelations that drive security officers of the government's vast intelligence bureaucracy to strong drink.

I hope Potter does not stop his work in this field with this book. The country needs a solid, reasonable framework from which to address the issues of strategic policy and programs. The United States needs intelligence officers and analysts who, as students, have

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read the bibliographies each of Potter's authors provides. Indeed, the United States may need graduate-level courses in which the technology of weapons development is combined with the techniques of modern intelligence analysis to assist these sorely pressed insiders in their difficult, often critical work.

VERNARD A. LANPHIER
Booz, Allen & Hamilton

Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy *by J.B. Kelly. New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1980. 530 pp. $25.00.*

J.B. Kelly is a recognized historian of the British Empire who has spent his career studying British interests, policy, and diplomacy in that part of the world that has come to be known as "east of Suez." His writings reflect a wealth of knowledge, a touch of brilliance, and a beautiful command of the subject. He is also highly opinionated and hopelessly colonialist.

These qualities of scholarship, meticulous reliance on the record, and aggressive defense of the former British Empire are readily apparent in the book under discussion. Unlike his earlier works, such as *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880*, this book offers a curious melange of history, political ideology, an almost pathological dislike for the House of Saud, a yearning for the golden days of the empire, and a call for action by the industrial states to protect Western civilization from the onslaught of the new wealthy "barbarians" to the east. Since it would be difficult to deny Kelly's contribution to the study of British history, one could wish that he had stuck to that. His delving into the politics of oil has revealed at best a naive concept that the West has a God-given right to Arab oil and at worst an ingrained racism that glorifies anything that is British and abhors anything that is not. Kelly's wistful longing for the days of the British Raj seems to have colored his otherwise excellent grasp of that historical period. It seems he has become absorbed in instant historical analysis, unfortunately at the expense of scholarship. No love is lost between Kelly and the forces of change in Arabia, be it Aden or the Hijaz; a fact that tarnishes his present book.

Setting the author's biases aside, it is possible to reflect rationally on his analysis of the energy crisis and of Soviet designs in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region. There is no doubt that the major oil-consuming countries, meaning the industrial world, are in dire need of a concerted energy policy that would enhance the interest, and ultimately the security, of both producing and consuming countries. Such a policy must be based on the twin principles of conservation and mutual understanding with the producers. A policy of confrontation, which the author seems to advocate, will eventually prove counterproductive. I believe that many producing countries are genuinely interested in maintaining a stable international economy and in pursuing a rational oil production policy to serve that goal. The author often forgets that the oil countries, including Saudi Arabia and its neighbors, have maintained warm relations with the Western world, including Britain.

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British withdrawal from "east of Suez" does not seem to have harmed British or Western interests in that part of the world.

The author seems more convincing discussing the Soviet specter. Few people would disagree with the author's position on Soviet adventurism and designs in the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 has been pivotal in convincing the Arab/Islamic world that the Soviet danger is no longer an academic question. As one Gulf official told me recently: "the Soviets are only a few hundred miles away, and that makes us nervous." The author fails, however, to address what Gulf leaders refer to as the other occupation to the West—the Israeli occupation of Arab lands. He conveniently mixes Israel and Israeli occupation into one entity and does not seem to recognize the emerging view among Arab Gulf leaders that a rational distinction should be established between Israel as a state and Israel as an agent of occupation.

In conclusion, the nine chapters that constitute Kelly's *Arabia, the Gulf and the West*, yield a wealth of information, an intense political analysis bordering on the polemical, and a call to arms for the "free world" to aid the United States in its mission to stop Soviet advances in the Middle East. The role of local states, excluding Oman, in maintaining regional security is inadequately treated. Unfortunately, only with serious reservations can I recommend this book to students of the contemporary Middle East.

EMILE A. NAKHLEH
Mount Saint Mary's College

Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran *by Barry Rubin. New York, Oxford University Press, 1980. 426 pp. $17.50.*

Despite bitter recriminations on all sides, few Americans or Iranians have made systematic attempts to examine relations between the two countries. And as the Iranian Revolution continues to unfold, this neglect is further exacerbated by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, and questions about the organization and size of America's Rapid Deployment Force. Thus, Barry Rubin's book is particularly welcome as it tries to fill an important gap at an auspicious juncture in American and Iranian history.

A fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, Rubin has benefited from his Washington locale and has researched a fascinating and persuasive study of American-Iranian relations. His examination of U.S. foreign policy in the 1977–1979 period is particularly thorough as he contrasts differing intelligence analyses by the National Security Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, various segments of the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Responding to popular misconceptions of the intelligence community as a monolith of incompetence, Rubin recognizes the prescience of some analysts and the incompetence of others. He succeeds in unraveling the complex skein of mishaps, confusion, and ignorance that characterized frequently conflicting American policy throughout this period. Because most of Rubin's information is in the public record he provides few surprises, yet he

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skillfully synthesizes the available facts into a readable portrait of one of the United States's most devastating foreign-policy failures.

Rubin's analysis is not without flaws, however, and at times he is overly cautious. For example, in his discussion of the Nixon Doctrine he nowhere mentions Henry Kissinger's alleged role in linking the price of Iranian oil to the Shah's shopping spree for American arms. James Akins, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, has publicly charged Kissinger with initiating this arrangement; his accusation is too important to ignore.

Another weakness of the volume lies in the author's excessive dependence on the press. In chapter 4 the *New York Times* seems to be cited on every other page. This is ironic in light of Rubin's subsequent observation that a comparison of "American stories on Iran to the detailed expositions of *Le Monde*'s Eric Rouleau is a sobering exercise" (p. 350).

The final criticism of the volume is that it ultimately fails in its analysis of Iranian politics. Rubin's lack of familiarity with Iran is clear from the outset. He consistently transforms the name "Ali Akbar" to "Ali Akhbar" so that Rafsanjani, Mo'infar, and Tabataba'i are unlikely to recognize themselves in print. More seriously, however, Rubin overlooks crucial turning points in the revolution such as the huge processions of *Tasuah* and *Ashura* (the day that marks the death of the Iman Hussein, and is characterized by mass outbursts of intense religious passion), provides inadequate insight into the coalescence of widely differing social groupings into revolutionary activity, and is generally insensitive to the intricacies of Islam as well as to such politically salient groups as the bazaar, the urban middle class, and the *ulema* (religious leaders). There are numerous social-science writings on and techniques for the study of revolution, political development, and the relationship between religion and socio-political change. Unfortunately, Rubin ignores them, and his emphasis on description at the expense of explanation undermines an otherwise interesting book. For *Paved with Good Intentions* is a serious attempt to grapple with important questions central to the practice of American foreign policy, both past and future. It is in this light that it should be read rather than as a study of the Iranian Revolution, which it is not.

JERROLD D. GREEN
University of Michigan

Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy *by Stephen D. Krasner. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 404 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $5.95.*

Stephen Krasner's important book provides a comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy since World War I concerning raw materials and commodities.

Part one of the book compares four models for predicting foreign economic policy: interest group pluralism, traditional (instrumental) Marxism, revisionist (structural) Marxism, and realpolitik (statism). Krasner concentrates on constructing a statist approach that assumes the state has an autonomous set of resources and purposes (the national interest) shaping its foreign policy; foreign policy cannot be reduced to the sum of the aspirations of particular interests in society (either in the sense of the pluralist or the in-

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strumental Marxist). Like the statist, however, a structural Marxist argues that the state can defy particular capitalist interests in order to protect the coherence and vitality of a capitalist society, a Marxist vision of the national interest.

The effort to operationalize the meaning of the national interest by inductive reasoning from the case study is ingenious, although Krasner fails to convince me that it is theoretically necessary, or empirically correct, to argue that the rank order of goals must persist over long periods of time for the national interest to be a meaningful concept. Similarly, I question Krasner's claim that sophisticated pluralists deny that state institutions have limited autonomy (p. 28).

Krasner's most important contribution is methodological. When examining the often-debated cases presented in part two, he repeatedly combines subtlety and crisp logic to formulate "critical" tests that will distinguish the relative power of the competing theories. His principal conclusions are twofold. First, although the White House is strongest in the realm of foreign policy, the executive branch has often been constrained in executing its foreign economic policies because, compared to other governments, the American state is relatively weak. Yet the independence of the presidency in foreign policy is so important to understanding the cases that only models that account for the state's autonomy (that is, structural Marxist and statist) qualify as potential general explanations of foreign policy.

Second, Krasner argues for the ultimate superiority of the statist logic because it explains how ideology can cause states to act in ways that violate their self-interests. Krasner cites the Vietnam War as a case of the United States sacrificing its best material interests and weakening the strength of capitalist society in order to advance its anti-Communist ideology. Structural Marxism can only treat such incidents as bewildering anomalies.

In part three Krasner concludes by suggesting how a synthesis of statist theory with one based on the balance of power can account for episodes such as Vietnam. For truly hegemonic states the dilemmas of the stag hunt have largely disappeared; they are free from worries about security. Thus a hegemonic state has the constant temptation to pursue its ideological whims by attempting to reshape the world order to its liking, as was the case of the United States in Vietnam.

Krasner's conclusions remain open to challenge. The structural Marxist could argue either that irrational bouts of behavior are predictable in a state under the constant stress of an irrational society or that the Vietnam War was fought in order to relieve the strain on capitalist *society*. The latter case would point to social disorder, not economic necessity, as the reason for Vietnam; the social revolution of newly mobilized groups prodded the political leadership to invoke the American dream in an expansionist, ultimately imperialist, nationalism reminiscent of the French Revolution or Bismark's Germany. That the tactic failed is not a refutation of structural logic; even Marxist leaderships can make major mistakes over policy.

Aside from these rebuttals, analysts may question the linkages between ideology and the balance of power. When using hegemony as an independent variable to explain detailed micro behavior, one wants to know how much hegemony explains? If the American state were "strong" and hegemonic (imagine France as ascendant in world power), would its behavior be more or less ideological?

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Despite the questions I have raised, Krasner has produced a skillful and impressive contribution to the analysis of American foreign policy.

PETER F. COWHEY
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The United States in the 1980's *edited by Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution, 1980. 868 pp. $20.00.*

If a visitor from Mars wanted to know what American conservatives believed in and what foreign policies they favored I would not hesitate to recommend this compendium. But I would advise an American who already knew something about the subject to save his time and money. Other than Edward Teller's sensible suggestion that no document remain classified for more than two years, the 440 pages of the volume devoted to foreign affairs break no new ground. They reiterate the generally well-known views of a number of conservative commentators. In several instances, the chapters actually represent shortened versions of books or articles already in print. The only thing that makes the volume noteworthy is the fact that it has been widely touted as a guide to the thinking of the new Reagan administration. Some of its contributors will no doubt be influential personages within that administration.

From a policy perspective the most striking characteristic of the volume is the extent to which the foreign-policy recommendations differ more in nuance than in substance from the policies of the Carter administration. Ray Cline, in his discussion of the CIA, makes a pitch for improving the quality of analysis within the agency and for incorporating in a more systematic manner National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) judgments in the policy process. He argues the need for covert operations conducted "sparingly and wisely" and under "close internal governmental accountability." His major thesis is that the president, the National Security Council (NSC), and Congress should recognize the importance of a professional and well-coordinated intelligence system. Admiral Turner would certainly concur. Similarly, the policy recommendations with regard to energy, foreign aid, and international trade would not ruffle too many Carter feathers. Hendrik Houthakker, for example, proposes a community-wide tariff on imported oil on the part of industrial consumers as a possible means of transferring some of the profit back to the importers. P. T. Bauer reaches the theoretical conclusion that foreign aid should be terminated, but he recognizes the continuing need for such aid in the foreseeable future. He suggests several reforms, the most radical of which is that aid increasingly be given in the form of untied cash grants. G. M. Meier, in a cogent contribution on American foreign economic policies, stresses the ways in which the U.S. economy has become interdependent with those of Europe, Japan, and the newly industrializing countries. In such an environment, he argues, multinational policymaking is essential because only supranational decision-making units can reduce the tensions and conflict that interdependence generates. He warns that traditional liberal reliance on free-market forces and unilateral action could lead to a dangerous return to "defensive economic nationalism."

There is even a nod in the direction of human rights. Richard Staar, in his article on the

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Soviet Union, acknowledges that a broad campaign in support of human rights can be an effective weapon in the battle for the support of world public opinion. Together with our revolutionary political traditions and agricultural surpluses, a human-rights campaign constitutes, according to Staar, one of our strongest assets in the realm of national security. The chapters that concern regional problems also differ more in tone than in substance from the policies of the previous administration. The authors would put less pressure on allies to conform to our human-rights standards, attach fewer strings to the sale of weapons and more to the export of technology. They also tend to see the Soviet threat in somewhat more military terms than would Cyrus Vance and Edmund Muskie, although not more than Zbigniew Brzezinski. The general similarity between these recommendations and the policies of the Carter administration is probably the result of two developments: the first, a growing realization on the part of the intellectual Right that many of the old shibboleths can no longer be advocated as serious responses to the complex problems of interdependence; the second, the fact that the Carter administration, despite its much publicized ideological commitment to a new world order, retreated toward more traditional policies in every sphere during the course of its four years in office. This convergence can be seen as commendable or disheartening, depending upon one's political perspective.

The strongest dissent from the liberal line is to be found in those chapters dealing with national defense. Fred Iklé, in a piece entitled "Arms Control and National Defense," never mentions arms control but repeatedly demands that the United States regain military superiority. His chapter can be dismissed as just another bit of self-promotion by a former moderate out to ingratiate himself to the Reagan camp in the hope of a job. "The Soviet Approach to Global Nuclear Conflict," by Amoretta Hoeber and Joseph Douglass, Jr., is equally polemical and is based on the most tenuous assumptions, assumptions that the authors present as incontrovertible fact. Among them are these assertions: the Soviets, motivated by their ideology, are out to communize the world even if they have to fight a nuclear war to do it; they are constrained from doing so only by U.S. military might and are accordingly striving to attain strategic superiority, which is something they will achieve in the near future and use successfully to "Finlandize" Western Europe and cow the United States. The Reagan campaign was no doubt served well by such rhetoric; it made it appear that his opponent had woefully neglected national defense. One hopes that the Reagan people, now that they are in power, will separate out strategic fact from political fancy and pursue a more cautious and sophisticated policy in the area of arms control and nuclear weaponry.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
The National War College

Presidents and Prime Ministers *edited by Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. 347 pp. $8.25.*

This is a useful and intelligent book that fills an important gap in the literature on com-

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parative political leadership. The stated purpose of the book is modest: to examine other government institutions in an attempt to "illuminate" our own. Its primary audience, therefore, is American and its base of reference is the American presidency. Seven scholars look at contemporary roles of political leaders in Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and West Germany. Together they attempt to explain variations in institutions and processes across national boundaries and the consequences of these on political systems. In a final essay, Richard Rose addresses what he sees as the outstanding difference between these systems and the American system, namely, the common reliance on collective authority in Western Europe and Canada.

The selection of cases is economical and it works. The eight systems are sufficiently similar to offer a useful basis for comparison. The essential similarity, as Rose sees it, is their relative openness to politics and the scope they provide individuals and groups to press demands on government (p. 298). Even in Franco's Spain, Rose argues, interest groups were active in pressing their demands on ministries (p. 299). The American system is distinctive in that it "maximizes" this kind of politics (p. 289). The eight systems are sufficiently different, however, to include a wide range of institutional experiences from which to generalize. Two presidencies, five cabinet systems, and a dictatorship provide a rich field. The essential differences among the sytems, Rose argues, is that cabinet systems have a "single collective authority to reconcile disparate political demands" and the American presidential system does not (p. 292).

Despite the book's modest purpose, this collection of essays provides a unique opportunity to generalize on the nature of leadership in modern, western, pluralist systems. Here the book is somewhat disappointing. Only Johan Olsen's essay on Norway explicitly relates individual findings to generalized propositions on leadership. Nevertheless, patterns do emerge. Leadership is conceived in these essays, according to Rose, as "the management of politicians" (p. 48). This involves brokering, mediating, and coordinating diverse groups who are pressing demands on the system. This is as characteristic of presidential leadership as prime ministerial. The essential difference between the American and other systems is twofold. Prime ministers, although possessing limited formal powers, act in the context of a hierarchical system of communications and authority that focuses demands and the ability to act on those demands on the cabinet. This structure is reinforced by centralized disciplined parties at least when they provide majorities. The American system, of course, offers neither resource and is, therefore, less capable of sustained coherent leadership. This argument seems to suggest that leadership is based in large measure on two resources, authority and access to information, and that studies of comparative leadership may be done by comparing both prerogatives and "contact patterns" as Olsen calls them (p. 210). It is too bad these essays do not address more systematically these kinds of general questions. It is an opportunity missed.

For its stated purpose, however, this book works exceedingly well. The seven essays on Europe and Canada are rich in insight and information. In the eighth essay, Rose skillfully ties together the experiences of the others in order to comment on recent developments in the American system. His analysis draws heavily on the literature of subsystem politics and is sensible and balanced. His suggestions for reform are at once practical and provocative. I only wish there were more opportunity for Rose to comment on the output side of the political process. If his central proposition is that the centralization of com-

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munications and authority in cabinet systems facilitates coherent response to demands, how does he explain the system's failure to solve such questions as economic growth, inflation, unemployment, and the integration of ethnic minorities in Canada and much of Western Europe? In many cases, the European record is no better than the American. Perhaps that is another book. All in all, this is an important collection of essays that whets the appetite. It underscores Richard Neustadt's opening comment in the Foreword: "Comparing governmental institutions from one country to another can be fun. . . ." It is also, in this case, illuminating.

DON A. MELE
Columbia University

Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government *by Michael J. Malbin. New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1980. 279 pp. $15.95.*

This is a useful and provocative book. It is useful because it presents extensive description of the work that congressional staff members have done in a variety of specific contexts. It is provocative in the evaluation that it offers concerning the implications of staff activities for representative democracy.

As befits an author trained as a political scientist who has worked as a Washington journalist, the book's analysis is based on historical illustration rather than systematic theory-oriented research. Malbin charts the growth since 1947 of staff for individual members, for committees on support agencies like the Congressional Budget Office, and staff serving the leadership and in formal groups. He stresses the emergence of young, issue-oriented (liberal and conservative) professionals. He provides detailed examples from the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Congresses (1975–1978) of staff developing legislative agendas, working for enactment of bills, and carrying on intricate private negotiations. He analyzes the quantity and quality of information provided by staff during the same years in the House Energy and Power Subcommittee, the House Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the House Budget Committee, as well as in congressional debates on natural gas deregulation.

Malbin's conclusions about the impact of congressional staff are mixed. He says that staff serve well in representing their members' interests, helping manage the legislative workload, exercising the power of Congress in national policymaking, performing oversight of administration, and giving access to poorly organized interests. However, the author thinks that staff also get in the way of members' needs for accurate information, the time to evaluate it, and discussions *among themselves* of its implications. Malbin also contends that staff have tended to build ever more coalitions supporting ever more programs of ever-increasing complexity, whose operation requires Washingtonians who have specialized expertise—such as the congressional staff who helped to devise them. As remedies, Malbin recommends limiting the legislative agenda and increasing direct deliberation among elected members.

Malbin's findings and conclusions raise fascinating issues. To conserve space, they are

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posed here as questions. What is the appropriate size of Congress's staff? In proportion to what should it be measured—the number of members, committees, other legislative groups? the number of executive employees or programs? some percentage of the GNP? the staff of foreign legislative institutions?

What is the relative importance of the quantity and quality of staff? How is quality to be measured? by whom?

What has been the overall distribution of staff power? Has it varied by member, committee, staff person, partisan or nonpartisan status, policy area, time period, other factors? To what extent has staff power changed? How representative are Malbin's findings over time, and how predictive of the Ninety-seventh and future Congresses? How do they square with data in Fox and Hammond's *Congressional Staff*?

What are the appropriate functions of staff? Should they provide background information only, lists of options, professional assessments, value-explicit policy recommendations? How much authority should staff exercise in negotiating for members? Should different kinds of staff play different roles? Should staffs be partisan, nonpartisan, or some combination? Should staff represent a "General Will" of Congress or a sum of particular wills?

How, if at all, can staff influence be controlled? By legislation, rule, ad hoc arrangements?

If, as Malbin urges, staff influence in policymaking is circumscribed, will members fill the gap? Do they have time? motivation?

What is the appropriate role of policy analysis in legislative decision making? An aid to informed choices? A "fig leaf" for value judgments (p. 204)? Are sophisticated models superfluous (p. 207)?

Finally, what is the appropriate role of Congress—and its staff—in national policymaking?

JUDITH H. PARRIS
Congressional Research Service

The Implementation Perspective: A Guide for Managing Social Service Delivery Programs *by Walter Williams. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980. 136 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $3.95.*

The objective of this book is to make the "central focus of policy the point of service delivery" (p. iv). Its most important audience is the policymaker who has some degree of control over others involved in implementation. The implicit rationale is that the more attention that practitioners pay to implementation problems, by taking an implementation perspective, the greater will be the government's capacity to deliver on social programs.

The book deals with the management problems raised by the implementation of social programs. The most basic of management obligations, such as coordinating activities to deliver desired services, becomes incredibly demanding in Williams's analysis. Historical development, for example, has divided responsibility for managing social programs between national and subnational units of government (chap. 3). The capacity to shape im-

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plementation outcomes is scattered among many participants, each with its own resources and many with divergent goals (chap. 4). The capacity of federal managers to deal with such situations is limited by multiple goals of elected officials, the transiency of high executives, resistance from their own subordinates, and constraints on their control over outsiders.

The implementation perspective that emerges from this book has two parts, First, the perspective involves a sensitivity to what can go wrong, where, and why. Prospects for failure increase as control is diffused among many actors. Implementation, in this view, is like a long, easily broken chain. Second, the perspective also prescribes that managers ought to make effective implementation their prime goal. To achieve it, managers are advised to increase the commitment of their agencies to program performance by the internal development of organizational capacity and to develop strategies that bring outside actors into line. Such remedial strategies, Williams admits, cannot bear the full weight of delivering on unrealistic goals, using uncertain technologies, in a system of shared power.

The strength of this book is its attention to detail: fitting together a disparate academic literature, the use of program examples from the author's own experience, the informed discussion of what goes on inside an organization as well as how relations among organizations are shaped, and a capacity to put broad national initiatives into the context of an ongoing federal system.

Despite its many strengths, I have a few reservations about the book's message. First it is not clear that policymakers would benefit from being fully aware of the things that could go wrong. Such advice, if followed too closely, could easily lead them to become overloaded with information about contingencies, and this in itself is a serious pitfall. After all, not everything that can go wrong usually does go wrong. Second, awareness of implementation problems does not guarantee improvements in performance. Most behavior that frustrates or aids implementation is instrumental. The problem of perverse incentives is further complicated, in social programs, by an uncertainty about which behaviors are worth encouraging. Third, taking the manager's perspective and identifying the sources of resistance to higher authorities may overstate the difficulties involved in implementation. A multiplicity of participants, under some circumstances, may provide several alternative paths to implementation rather than merely clog a single path.

ROBERT T. NAKAMURA
Dartmouth College

America's Housing: Prospects and Problems *by George Sternlieb et al. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research, 1980. 562 pp. $20.00.*

Sternlieb and his coauthors are among the most prominent proponents of the point of view that Americans are in a "post-shelter society." The need for shelter is by and large assuaged, says Sternlieb; people want more housing today primarily as an investment, not because what they have is really inadequate. A housing crisis is talked about only because this is "how a bureaucracy can hope to perpetuate itself." Public programs are needed only

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because our "aspiration/expectation levels" rise as quickly as the steadily improving reality. "Housing for the poor," the authors continue, "has become a form of symbolic action. Its major justification is viewed not in terms of a shelter utility function, but rather to indicate concern. The triumph of this art form is the efforts to breathe new housing life into the South Bronx, an area whose basic isolation and social trauma defy adequate description" (p. 548). The studies in this volume thus do not have too much to offer on the "art form" of housing the poor. One chapter, which gives a generally interesting if not particularly imaginative compilation of adaptive reuses of older or unwanted buildings and neighborhoods, contains suggestions for areas of "rampant decline" limited to transportation improvements (to get people out, presumably), land banking, and vegetable gardens.

Fortunately, the book has more to offer when addressing the housing of the middle class. It presents, clearly and analytically, a mass of data on current housing trends, demographic changes, and regional shifts, and projects their market implications. Its basic findings are not surprising: population movements, and thus future growth in housing demand, will take place increasingly in nonmetropolitan areas; the Sunbelt is growing, Frostbelt declining; households are getting smaller, female-headed households (the census term, on its way out) are increasing; the quality of individual housing units is improving in the sense that there are fewer "substandard" units. Some findings are not as well known: the return to the central city is a trickle, not a flood, three higher-income households leaving for every one that moves in; black suburbanization is not noticeably changing the degree of overall residential segregation; blacks in the suburbs are measurably worse off than whites of equivalent income.

The data are substantial and well presented, and some of the analyses and formulations contribute significantly to thinking about their implications—the implications for the market, at least. Costs are properly singled out as a continuing problem. The impact of rising costs on the preference for homeownership is strikingly phrased by pointing out that the increase in resale value can be seen as an offset to the increase in operating costs for the owner-occupant—a blessing indeed more likely to be appreciated by the seller than the buyer. Buyers may see themselves as sellers some day too, but as long as they have to find a new place to live after the old has been sold, the full advantage of the rise in value will not be realized. Of course, at some point we all vacate our housing one last time, presumably for a trip to a land where costs are not a problem; but then the benefit of rising values here on earth will accrue to our heirs rather than to us. But as long as many home seekers believe in the Sternlieb argument, it is itself a force on the housing scene, and its consequences will need to be reckoned with.

Substantive questions can be raised about other issues in the book. It has a clear bias against rent control; a whole section is devoted to showing how local property taxes in Fort Lee, N.J., are increased for homeowners if rent controls limit increases in value of rental housing, without any discussion either of the equity of that result or of the broader community consequences that limiting of real estate speculation and stabilizing rents may have. Demographic trends are taken as given, even when national policy issues are discussed; the fact that national policy influences, and may even bring about, population movements by favoring certain regions or by encouraging disinvestment and reinvestment

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in new plants and facilities is not even mentioned. The political and social implications of the "post-shelter" argument—that, since there has been "an over-allocation of the nation's resources to housing in order to achieve the shelter success of the 1970s" (p. 96), there should now be a reduction in the commitment to housing—are never spelled out and certainly are never viewed from the standpoint of those to whom it will come as a surprise that the housing policies of the 1970s were a success story.

There are other, more minor weaknesses in the book. While the introduction mightily strives to give it coherence as a whole, it remains a collection of separate pieces, written on various occasions over the last two or three years by Sternlieb himself, James Hughes, Robert W. Burchell, Stephen C. Casey, Robert W. Lake, and David Listokin. Tables are repeated in toto in different chapters; footnote numbering from some prior publication is kept in the text but changed at the end of the chapter; a discussion gives an increase at 81.4 percent but the summary gives it as 84.1 percent; 1978 appears where 1976 belongs. Some contributors write better than others. A little more time spent on editing might have delayed publication slightly yet been worthwhile: the statement that "excessive optimism is premature" (p. 437), for instance, has no doubt unintended implications that normal copyediting might have caught.

But, all in all, this is a useful, stimulating, and meaty book. Taken with a few grains of salt, it is well worth digesting for those concerned with housing problems and policy from the point of view of middle America and those supplying it with housing.

PETER MARCUSE
Columbia University

Managing Community Development in the New Federalism *by Donald F. Kettl. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1980. 156 pp. $18.95.*

Can cities be trusted with broad discretion over the expenditure of federal funds? This is a question that has shaped the policy debate over federal aid to cities for much of the past thirty years. One resolution of the debate was the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which was begun in 1974 as part of President Nixon's "New Federalism" to provide states and localities "with more money and less interface." Donald F. Kettl studies how four Connecticut cities managed their CDBG programs from 1974 to 1977. In each of the cities—New Haven, New London, Bridgeport, and Norwich—two projects were singled out for in-depth analysis, the city's "best case," a planning and implementation success, and a "worse case," where the city experienced serious design and execution problems. Through this methodology, Kettl is able to tell a remarkably clear story about the politics of federal program implementation and the dilemmas involved in extending local authority over federal grant programs.

The $2.5 billion CDBG program was established by Congress in 1974 to consolidate seven earlier HUD grant programs into a single program that guaranteed eligible communities (cities with populations over 50,000 and urban counties with populations over 200,000) an annual entitlement based on a "need" formula and that allowed recipient

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communities broad discretion about how to spend the money. Funds were provided for three general goals: the elimination of slums and blight; the needs of low and moderate income families; and urgent community development needs; that is, the development of "viable urban communities." Money could be spent for a wide range of "brick and mortar" projects to upgrade housing and neighborhoods and for projects designed to improve the community's public services and facilities including a variety of social and community development programs. The CDBG program was designed to simplify the grant process, to reduce red tape, and to strengthen the linkage between local officials and their constituents. By changing the previous grant programs from categorical to block grants, it also changed HUD's role in intergovernmental relations from a predominantly "redistributive" role to a "regulative" one, with HUD shifting from controlling who received funds for what purpose to a more passive role of monitoring local performance through strong postcontrols.

How well did this new approach work? According to Kettl, the answer depends on what criteria one uses to evaluate performance. Some obvious changes occurred. Power over community development policy was shifted to the cities and control over program authority strengthened city halls. As the program intended, the cities spent most of their money for urban renewal, housing rehabilitation, neighborhood parks and facilities, and social service projects. However, local politics and bargaining tended to produce projects that were scattered, short term, and neighborhood-based. Some cities used CDBG funds to provide tax relief. In general, Kettl concludes that "the cities spent their money on projects that were important at least to those elected officials making the decisions," and in doing so, "matched the projects to the demands of their citizens" (p. 105). But the tendency of elected officials to meet the short-term political demands of their constituents led to the failure of the cities to design programs that linked projects to long-term economic and community development plans. Furthermore, the tremendous infusion of federal funds created several administrative problems resulting from an overload on the administrative capacity of the city governments.

Managing Community Development in the New Federalism is a well-crafted policy evaluation of grants management at the local level. The book's greatest strength, however, is also its greatest weakness. At each stage in his analysis, Kettl stays close to the case studies and neatly folds his analysis into the standard subcategories of policy analysis—formulation, execution, and outcomes. Yet, at the end readers are left with little new theoretical insight for the study of public policy, intergovernmental relations, federalism, or organization theory. Left largely unanswered are the two central questions that framed the study: First, how can we balance our pursuit of national goals, our reverence for local self-determination, and our concerns about democracy in American cities? Second, once we set this political balance, how can we administer it? While Kettl shows how answers to these questions were worked out over time in the case of the CDBG program, he provides only broad and vague guidance for national policy formulation: "The obvious strategy is a mixed set of categorical grant programs to meet long-term redistributive problems and block grants to meet small but important problems that might otherwise fall between the cracks" (p. 142). This may be an economically sound guideline, but as Kettl readily acknowledges, policymaking along these lines will require

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substantial readjustments in the political and administrative behavior of both the federal and local partners of the urban grants system.

CHARLES H. LEVINE
University of Maryland

The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing and Removing Regulatory Forms *by Barry M. Mitnick. New York, Columbia University Press, 1980. 506 pp. $20.00.*

This book is ambitious in its objectives. It seeks through systems analysis to integrate and extend our knowledge about regulation and to build a theory that will facilitate the design of regulatory institutions. Mitnick writes that his subject is about the "political economy" or regulation because it is concerned with efficient or optimal choices largely made by agents in political settings and with the processes of choice.

The author begins by assessing the concept of "regulation." He defines the term broadly as "the international restriction of a subject's choice of activity by an entity not directly party to or involved in that activity" (p. 20), but also develops more restrictive meanings. His view of regulation is that of a dynamic process, and he identifies its basic functional problems: establishment, change, administration, and enforcement. Turning next to the evolution of regulation, Mitnick concludes, on the basis of his survey, that the recurring pattern of regulatory development (response to crisis, specialization, delegation) has its roots in the early days of the Republic. The author also considers in some detail the "life cycle" conception of regulation, discusses in this context the evolution of public utilities, and reviews the works of Bernstein and Downs.

Perhaps the central part of Mitnick's work is his assessment of the various theories of regulation. He evaluates existing theories in relation to the stages of the policymaking process—"access, decision, implementation, administration, effects"—and concludes that most approaches are inadequate because they are limited to only parts of that process. Following a critique of "public interest" and "private interest" theories, Mitnick examines "four simple interest theories of regulatory origin." He argues that regulatory behavior cannot be understood without an appreciation of bureaucratic factors such as incentives and "environmental control capabilities." In support of his view, and in an attempt to develop a partial theory of regulatory capture, Mitnick applies his observations to a case study of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation.

In what he describes as the "designing" part of his book, the author writes that he considers the rationale for regulation as an effort to restrain intentional activity (for instance, natural monopoly) and to control unintentional by-products (for example, externalities). In his comparative analysis of regulatory means, Mitnick assesses the merits of directive and incentive means in the context of environmental protection regulation. Finally, the process of "deregulation" is considered. Mitnick identifies strategies of industries and agencies and concludes that the deregulation of incentive means should be more difficult than deregulation of directive means.

The scope of this undertaking is so wide that it is difficult in this short space to address

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all of its facets. At the outset, it should be stated that Mitnick's exhaustive review of the interdisciplinary literature of political science and economics is a solid contribution for which readers are the richer. His discussion of various theories is most interesting. His recognition of the influence of bureaucratic factors on regulatory outcomes is very sound. But perhaps it is because Mitnick's aspirations are so all-encompassing that the reader feels that the book does not address in sufficient detail its various themes, that it tries to do too much. The work does not present much fresh empirical data; that is not its purpose. But in drawing upon the literature, it might have been desirable if Mitnick posed more sharply the tensions between and differences in approach of political science and economics. His myriad of typologies sometime obscure more than explain. None of this, I should emphasize, is meant to detract from Mitnick's effort. I am sure that students of regulation will want to turn to this fine work of scholarship.

ROBERT A. KATZMANN
Concord, New Hampshire

The Duping of the American Voter: Dishonesty and Deception in Presidential Television Advertising *by Robert Spero. New York, Lippincott and Crowell, Publishers, 1980. 232 pp. $12.95.*

The main point of this clearly written diatribe against television advertising is that presidential politicians actually lie, deceive, and mislead viewers concerning their public policy views and their opponent's views. They also manipulate symbols in an effort to gain votes. What a surprise! The author, a vice-president of a leading international advertising agency, acknowledges that these things have always been true. But he is alarmed because presidential candidates now depend so heavily on television advertising that, in his view, greatly increases the impact of deceptive practices in presidential election campaigns.

The reasons for this increased deception are manifold: most television spots are too short in length; extensive editing can cover up the candidate's true character; most people depend on television for knowledge of the candidates; situations portrayed in the spots are contrived; and, most important, no one can challenge the candidate's statements through an impersonal medium. Spero prefers the good old days when citizens supposedly could talk back to candidates on the steps of the local store and expose distortions.

Of course, whether nineteenth- and early twentieth-century presidential politics was, in fact, less riddled with distortions than media-age presidential politics or whether the lies of yesteryear had less impact than those of today is never seriously addressed. Nor are there references to the growing academic literature on the impact of television advertisements on today's presidential elections.

Nevertheless what really irritates Spero the most is that the content of political advertising on television is almost totally unregulated compared with commercial product advertising on the same medium which is rigidly controlled for good taste and honesty by both the networks and a host of government agencies. In an early chapter, Spero lists eighteen typical violations of NBC's "Broadcast Standards for Television" which are discovered in

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product commercials so frequently that nearly half must be redone. In subsequent chapters he applies these standards to a series of television spots from the campaigns of Eisenhower and Stevenson through Ford and Carter to demonstrate just how uncontrolled deceptive practices are in the political field.

The television spots analyzed include such gems as Lyndon Johnson's "The Little Girl and the Daisy" featuring an atomic explosion and Carter's "My Own Campaign" in which he says he owes nothing to special-interest groups. Although Spero notes that many of the deceptions can be traced to misleading reports in the print media, one looks in vain for any analysis of what presidential election politics would be like if only television spots were eliminated. Moreover, as Michael Novak has pointed out, a large part of presidential politics is necessarily the clash of cultural, philosophical, and socioeconomic symbols. Spero seems uncomfortable with these facts of political life regardless of whether they are limited to television.

In any case, Spero's solution to the problems of television advertising is a wholesale restructuring of the presidential system. While recognizing that a ban on television commercials for candidates would be unconstitutional, he advocates, among other things, a deregulation of television (to reduce timidity among reporters and station owners); installation of one six-year presidential term (to eliminate incumbency advantages in advertising); termination of the electoral college (to stop the incentive for commercials targeted to specific groups); shortening of electoral campaigns (commercials work on the repetition principle); establishment of minimum lengths for political advertisements (to ban "simplistic" thirty-second spots); adoption of required advertisement formats (to prevent bad taste in ads); and the provision of free television time (to reduce incentives for political commercials). Any Ph.D. candidate worth his or her salt could shoot holes easily in such a vast system of structural change designed for such limited purposes and based on such naive assumptions. But for those who are unconcerned about the "unintended consequences" of political change or enjoy political fantasies, Spero's work will make fun reading.

PAUL HALPERN
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Subliminal Politics: Myths & Mythmakers in America *by Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980. 256 pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $4.95.*

Nimmo and Combs join the few writers who have dealt insightfully with the theme of myth in politics. Their wide-ranging effort, in addition to dealing with the nature of political myths, examines the mythology of America's past and present, looks at political "flackery," the news media, politics and popular culture, the general myths of American politics, and even the mythology of political science. The result is a worthy addition to the literature of American Studies as well as of American politics.

Nevertheless, there are flaws. Prentice-Hall should be embarrassed by the pages that separate from the binding and the numerous editing errors. Within a few pages there are

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"involes" for "involves" (p. 99), "Evil Knievel" (p. 100), "quite" for "quit" (p. 102), and "tp" for "to" (p. 109). Errors elsewhere include "Carter" for "Cater" (p. 188) and "1930" instead of "1903" as the founding date for the American Political Science Association (p. 195).

With regard to matters of substance, the authors define "myth" carefully and emphasize that they "avoid the all-too-easily-voiced view that myths by their very nature are false ideas. For us, myth is a nonpejorative term. A myth may be true, false, or both." Myth is "a dramatic representation of past, present, or future events that people *believe*" (p. xii).

Throughout the work, however, there are strong implications, at least, that myth may be, after all, something else, including simply error. Myth may be a view of the presidential office that is either too positive or too negative (p. 69). It may be political gossip, haunting presidential figures (p. 72). Myth may even be explanation: "The original White House myth about the Watergate break-in—that is, that it was petty third-rate burglary—became less and less plausible" (p. 87). It becomes error, when "it should give us pause to consider that much of what we believe now to be real and true and important about politics is mythical" (p. 90). Implying that a political opponent is irresponsible may be myth making, regardless of how the opponent has acted (pp. 109–10), as is an attempt to convince others that "some particular policy is good or true" (p. 119). "How do we know," the authors ask, "that the current version of the politically true, beautiful, or good is not simply another myth" (p. 122)? How indeed, but why worry unless "myth" is error?

No doubt the authors intended to adhere to the definition that they present in the preface, but their treatment is not sufficiently precise to maintain clarity. They appear to attempt to explain too much. Any explanation that explains everything ends up by explaining nothing. They have anticipated that the reader may ask if everything is myth, and they explain that it need not be if we are willing to substitute possibilities for certainties. This is fine, but it deserves more than a mention in a conclusion to an epilogue (p. 245).

Let no reader be put off, however, this is a valuable book. The treatment of politics and popular culture is among the best ever written, and the examination of the myths of political science should be mandatory reading for all students of politics. Even before the 1980 elections they warn us about the polls, and any work in social science that speaks of the dangers of the passive voice in writing (even if it does accept Ephron's *The News Twisters* as a valid source) should always be welcome!

MAX J. SKIDMORE
Southwest Missouri State University

Unions, Wages, and Inflation *by Daniel J. B. Mitchell. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980. 290 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $6.50.*

The accelerating inflation of recent years has fostered a good deal of research into its causes and cures. In this book, Daniel J. B. Mitchell analyzes the contribution of unions

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and the collective-bargaining process. Mitchell's conclusion can be stated briefly: Unions were not responsible for initiating the inflation of recent years, but the collective-bargaining process does tend to perpetuate inflation after prices start to rise for other reasons.

In Mitchell's view, the United States's recent inflationary problems began with excess demand in the 1960s (due to our attempt to fight simultaneously the war in Vietnam and the war on poverty, without raising taxes for them). The inflation of the 1960s was then exacerbated in the early 1970s by oil and food supply shocks.

Current wage-setting behavior in both union and nonunion sectors, however, tends to assure that ongoing inflation will go on and accelerating inflation will accelerate: "Monetary and fiscal restraints can be applied to slow the process, but wage determination as a whole is not very sensitive to economic slack and in the major-union sector is even less sensitive" (p. 219). Hence, Mitchell believes that monetary and fiscal restraints will probably increase unemployment to politically unacceptable levels before they have any significant effect on inflation. Direct controls are an alternative by which the unemployment consequences of monetary and fiscal restraints can be reduced, but only if the controls are credible so that public expectations of continued inflation are altered. "If applied, direct intervention [controls] should be used correctly—that is, briefly and with the specific aim of checking the wage-price spiral during periods of moderate or slackening demand" (p. 223). To use them, as the Nixon administration did in 1971, to keep a lid on prices while pumping up the economy will fail in the short term; worse, it will make controls less credible in the future even if used correctly.

Mitchell's analysis makes it difficult to conclude that unions were a major factor in starting inflation. Their size in relationship to the labor force and their premiums in wage gains in the 1950s and 1960s were too small. Unionized workers, however, have been notably better able to maintain their real wages in the 1970s than nonunion workers, forcing the nonunion sector to absorb the brunt of the decline in real income in the United States caused by OPEC oil price increases (see Table 2-5 on p. 44) The unions either do not believe or do not care that higher labor costs threaten jobs in their industry. Excessive growth in labor costs is part of the problem in American automobile and steel industries today. If current union and industry lobbying efforts to obtain greater import protection are successful, then unions may ultimately be successful in insulating themselves from current adverse economic circumstances. This could lead to a reversal of the decline, evident since the 1950s, in the proportion of the U.S. workforce that is unionized.

Mitchell's book is a valuable addition to the literature on the labor market. As a part of his careful analysis of how unions contribute to inflation, he finds that neither wage imitation nor pattern setting is sufficiently pervasive in the U.S. economy to enable the government to control wages by focusing on only a few "key" contracts. He also includes, in chapter 3, a very nice discussion of the various biases that are likely to occur in attempts to estimate the effect unions have on relative union-nonunion wages. Anyone engaged in research on the effect of unions in the labor market will find this book a useful reference.

SANDRA CHRISTENSEN
Congressional Budget Office

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Black Americans in the Roosevelt Era: Liberalism and Race *by John B. Kirby. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1980. 254 pp. $14.50.*

The author is associate professor of history at Dennison University, and his volume was a doctoral dissertation submitted presumably at the University of Illinois. The book is concerned with the relationship between the social thought and the public policy of the liberal white administrators and their black advisers who held office in the New Deal before the United States entered World War II. The social thought of the leaders of the pertinent pressure groups is also included. Considered are Ickes, Foreman, Alexander, Bethune, Weaver, Hastie, Randolph, Granger, White, Davis, DuBois, and Bunche. Eleanor Roosevelt and Lillian Smith are also treated.

I knew most of those who are considered in the book, for I founded the New Negro Alliance, which the author calls the "most effective" of the boycott organizations (p. 188), held a small position in the New Deal in 1934–1935, taught political science at Howard University under Ralph Bunche, and after 1943, headed one of the four divisions that comprised FDR's Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). For the most part, the author has "got it right"—no small thing for a participant to say.

The book represents a fine piece of traditional historical research, but has some problems with its time frame and appears to have been written without benefit of interviews. None are noted. Interviews may have improved some of the judgments. Johnathan Daniels was a tough opponent of racism regardless of his public reticence or statements (p. 49). No Negro adviser in the early New Deal undertook any campaign or program against segregation except with regard to government cafeterias in Washington, D. C. (see p. 110).

Interviews would certainly have prevented the author from making the simple statement that Robert C. Weaver left office in 1943 because he no longer felt that he could be effective as a racial adviser. The circumstances were, in fact, historically significant. Minority training and employment, which Weaver headed in a series of jobs, came after 1943 to be controlled by FEPC through agreements with the operating agencies (the War Manpower Commission [WMC] in this case). FEPC, an agency created by Negro wartime leverage, hired Negroes in line, not advisory, positions. It was bent upon establishing fair employment as a right through the complaint and public hearing process while other government agencies were merely interested in the full utilization of all marginal labor during a time of war. FEPC established civil rights as a viable movement in America and pioneered line authority for Negroes in the federal government. When Weaver came back to government in 1960, it was as head of the Housing and Home Finance Agency and as the first secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

The author's interest in social thought has led him in a few instances to impute erroneously public policy actions or influence to those whose thought is intriguing to him. There is little to indicate that during the period under consideration Abram L. Harris, E. Franklin Frazier, Ralph J. Bunche, or Lillian Smith affected public policy or "acted" in an important public way. Bunche's considerable public action and constructive influence came later. Kirby rightly concludes that during this time Bunche was a confusing critic of social action who was dissatisfied with all liberal approaches and urged neo-Marxism and labor-movement solidarity as the solutions for racial problems in America (pp. 204–14),

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positions chracterized by grandiose sentimentality rather than realism. Bunche's thought and his writings before the war were influenced by his fear of the rise of Nazism and by his considerable training, experience, and personal contacts in the field of African affairs.

The turmoil, violence, struggle as well as legal and political strategies of the time are missing or muted in this volume. The last chapter is not a good summary of what was accomplished and what was set in motion for the future. The book's main value is its thorough examination from the written record of the ideas of the reformers, both white and black, from 1933 to 1941.

JOHN A. DAVIS
City College, City University of New York

The Old Revolutionaries: Political Lives in the Age of Samuel Adams *by Pauline Maier. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. 309 pp. $15.00.*

It was only time before the scholarly fashion of generational studies would yield a work that distinguished two groups of leaders, of different ages and hence of different generational experiences, that led the American Revolution. This book, by one of the most thoughtful and penetrating historians of the revolutionary era, principally concerns five members of the older generation, those whose influence as vanguards of the Revolution ebbed soon after 1776—Samuel Adams, Isaac Sears, Thomas Young, Richard Henry Lee, and the second Charles Carroll—and the links between their lives, their communities, and their politics. (A curious interlude, passages from the letters of Josiah and Mary Bartlett, introduces two other figures.) Maier seeks to relate "not just why Americans made the Revolution, but what the Revolution did to them" (p. xix).

In this regard, she succeeds splendidly. Less what she calls a "collective biography" than marvelously gentle and sympathetic essays on an astutely chosen small sample of men—of five states, many pursuits, various religious faiths, and motives of public good and private gain—her work is an account of the Revolution from the inside out. Her determination to discover the personal dynamics that contributed to the decision for independence—an interest, she points out, virtually inadmissable to eighteenth-century politics and discourse—makes it possible to locate an event as vast as a revolution in the contours of individual lives. If her standard as essayist is Richard Hofstadter, her guide as interpreter is Bernard Bailyn, who similarly attempted to find the wellsprings of loyalism in the experiences of a single life: Thomas Hutchinson's.

By implication, Maier's insistence upon the complexity of individual motives and impulses makes it difficult, if not impossible, to interpret the Revolution as a collective movement. At least, by her account, it was chiefly a commitment to the ideal of a republic that linked her subjects. But, if so, the ideological content of the Revolution, to whose interpretation she has earlier contributed, becomes denatured rather than active. For how are we to read the progress of complex lives if the political goal of each was so clear?

Maier seems to believe that she has found the answer in the experiences of a generation. But surely not the least strength of a historical argument is its ability to withstand con-

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trary evidence. What we need now are studies of members of the generation of the "Old Revolutionaries" who either were not republicans or who remained neutral throughout the revolutionary war.

Maier's sympathies lie, as they always have, with the revolutionaries of a particular sort, of whom Samuel Adams, to whose earlier biographies she devotes the only historiographical review in the book, is characteristic. Yet in rescuing Adams from the errors and clearly misplaced views of previous students, she makes of this emblem of radicalism a moderate—and, hence, of the course to independence a gradual, judicious, rational response to external provocation. Readers are thus left again with a revolution modest in its origins and radical principally in its political consequences. The next step for historians of the era must be a thorough examination of the effects upon all aspects of American society of the revolution and its war.

At the close of this book, which suggests the difficulty of generalizing at all, Maier claims to find in the experience of a generation the key to the decision for independence. She may be correct, but the evidence she presents earlier will not carry the burden of the interpretation. Moreover, by emphasizing the individuality of the course to revolution, she is left with the predicament of not being able to offer a convincing general explanation of the origins of the Revolution. But, despite these difficulties, the book is a signal achievement. It deepens our understanding of the Revolution, even if it fails to explain it.

JAMES M. BANNER, JR.
American Association for the Advancement of the Humanities

The Churchill Coalition, 1940–1945 *by J. M. Lee. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1980. 192 pp. $20.00.*

This is a book that is useful, at times quite interesting, but that ultimately leaves the lingering sense that the work could have been far more stimulating and insightful. The study in brief fashion discusses the functioning of the special party political coalition that managed Britain during World War II from 1940 to 1945. The book does not follow chronological order. Rather, in an effort to provide effective analysis, the study is divided along functional lines. Chapters deal in turn with war management in general, the cabinet and Parliament, strategy and mobilization, economy and production, reconstruction and social reform, and diplomacy. The author, J. M. Lee, is reader in politics at the University of London and a specialist in government organization. The author notes that the book is part of a series, but the goals and components of that series are not clearly spelled out.

To begin with the positive aspects, the book obviously is helpful in at least two respects. First, there is a great deal of specific factual information concerning modes of government organization, production schedules, strategic plans, and political problems and understandings both at home and regarding the Americans. In effect, this is a secondary source that contains considerable data that should prove useful to both the researcher and the seminar teacher. The study should prove particularly interesting to students

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of organization, though with the cautionary note that the style and approach are much more congenial to those of public administration than to those of public policy or bureaucratic politics. There is even a reproduction of a rather complicated chart done by one of Churchill's private secretaries, at the request of the Americans, to outline central executive organization.

Second, there is some effort to place the war effort in a broader domestic political context. The emphasis placed on the Beveridge Report recommending extensive social reform, and the substantial resonance generated among politicians and large parts of the general public, is well done and understandable. There is also considerable attention to Churchill's frequent abrasiveness in dealing with colleagues, his penchant for personal control at the expense of sensible delegation of authority, and his lack of foresight concerning emerging forces of change in the domestic polity and in the British Empire. Lee notes at one point, "On strategic questions Churchill frequently acted without consulting his senior Cabinet colleagues; on reconstruction questions they for their part acted without involving the Prime Minister" (p. 112).

Yet the book suffers fundamentally from never coming to grips with the larger picture or asking the most interesting questions. World War II for Britain, like the Civil War for the United States, was a time of momentous military strain and political challenge. The threat represented by Hitler galvanized the population and provided a dimension not present in World War I. As a result, Britain's national experience has provided a continuing source of material for biographers and dramatists, as well as for historians and political scientists. *The Churchill Coalition* provides neither fresh or comprehensive insights into the events of those years nor what these events reveal about the strengths and weaknesses of the British political system. There is no shrewd evaluation of Churchill's complex, contradictory personality. This man, who could be so narrow and rigid in some ways, was also capable clearly of great foresight. He was right about Hitler when others were very wrong, and Harold Macmillan, among others, has remarked on Churchill's striking capacity to look beyond the present. The study does not help us reconcile this paradox or others. Perhaps this reflects an unconscious tendency to make great events trivial, a tendency that is discernable at the very start of the book where the author states, incredibly: "In writing the following chapters, I have often felt like celebrating 'the generation in between'—too young for war service and too old to be convincing radicals in the 1960s" (p. 7).

ARTHUR CYR
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Lake Forest College

Britain's Economic Performance *edited by Richard E. Caves and Lawrence B. Krause. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980. 388 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $7.95.*

A commodity of which there is at present no shortage is material about Britain's relatively poor economic performance. From academic research to the inside pages of provincial American newspapers one can find articles claiming that the origins of economic decline

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lie in the power of trade unions, deficient investment, penal taxation levels, or a bloated public sector. Few scholars ever believe in simple answers, and from that point of view one of the nicest features of this volume is that it eschews rhetoric and conducts a detached examination of the evidence. The diagnosis that emerges—a poor record of productivity growth deriving largely from deeply rooted features of the social structure—does so primarily as the only account of the many considered that turns out to be consistent with important pieces of evidence.

The book is devoted to analyzing the causes of Britain's poor economic performance, measured by comparatively slow economic growth and high rates of both price inflation and unemployment. To this end, six main chapters are provided, dealing with exchange rates and the balance of payments, unions and industrial relations, productivity differences, taxation, financial markets, and the management of North Sea oil. The chapters vary both in depth and in their contribution to the central theme. In particular, the last three chapters, while good structural introductions to their subjects, have relatively little to say either about economic growth or about some leading policy dilemmas. For instance, the chapter on financial markets finds the weight of evidence against theories of deficient investment, concluding that Britain's financial institutions "enable any clearly profitable project to be readily financed" (p. 316). The question more usually disputed is of the availability of venture capital for those projects not so "clearly" profitable. The remaining chapters, however, contain important discussions of such topics as the role of floating exchange rates in the importation of inflation, industrial disputes, and the growth of unions and the role of the three "S's"—strikes, skills, and scale—in productivity gains and losses.

The book contains about a hundred figures and tables, from which one can get a great deal of basic information that is not readily available elsewhere. Moreover, the level of discussion in the book is nontechnical and clearly aimed to include a substantial lay audience. Statistical work—some of which is disappointingly cursory—is by and large confined to appendices. Particularly useful are the sketches of possible economic motivations for policy choices facing the authorities and alternative developments contingent on these choices. And as lay guide to economic policy the book is very strong.

The weaknesses are more of omission than commission. There is very little political about the analysis, perhaps reflecting the editors' conviction that specific policy choices in the period had little to do with economic performance. While some decisions are labeled mistakes—the delay in devaluation of sterling up to 1967, indexing wage and salary agreements in 1973–1974—there is no coherent discussion of individual decisions or the various political pressures or constraints on policy choices, and indeed no narrative at all of developments in fiscal, monetary, and incomes policies. Moreover, the choice of subjects suggests two glaring omissions: no discussion of the growth of the public sector, sometimes (though perhaps erroneously) argued to be at the root of Britain's economic troubles, or of the impact on Britain's economy of membership in the Common Market. It is true that the stress on macro performance rather than domestic structure may make Britain's membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) a less relevant question, and that the impact of such membership cannot be estimated without some heroic assumptions about Britain's growth possibilities outside the EEC. Nevertheless, the absence of a chap-

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ter on one of the two biggest new features in Britain's economy in the 1970s (North Sea oil is the other) is disappointing. In spite of these shortcomings, the book remains useful as a source of information and leads for further analysis and discussion.

JAMES E. ALT
Washington University, St. Louis

The Question of Separatism: Quebec and the Struggle over Sovereignty *by Jane Jacobs. New York, Random House, 1980. 134 pp. $8.95.*

Some analysis is profound though not erudite, wise though not pretentious. Such is the character of this book. It would be a pity if academics failed to take the book seriously because of its lack of formal footnoting or research style. The book is thoughtful, original, refreshing, and, in my view, wrong in its essential thesis. For perhaps all of these reasons it deserves reading.

In brief, Jacobs examines the claim of sovereignty-association as articulated by Premier Levesque by considering the analogy of the secession of Norway from Sweden. She is very good at describing the emotions of nationalism and in explaining how a dialogue that has shaken Canada to its structural roots has nonetheless remained so civilized in typical Canadian fashion. She is emotionally attached to an independent Quebec because she sees greater autonomy as a way of creating a new awakening inside Quebec and the rest of Canada both in cultural and in economic terms. "Making little ones out of big ones," according to Jacobs, "whether amoebas, Standard Oil companies or even new nations like Norway—may mean not disintegration but birth, with the chance for new strength which birth implies" (p. 67).

This is not to say that she is totally happy with the formula of sovereignty-association. That formula is flawed in her view because independence for Quebec and a shared currency with Canada are not compatible, and because a "supergovernment" to handle various overlapping jurisdictions would simply "saddle us with additional, complex and expensive layers of bureaucracy and a new layer of centralized control" (p. 121). But she sees these problems as remediable and in no sense a justification for inaction.

Her essential thesis, familiar elsewhere in the 1970s, is that small is beautiful. This may be true where economics of scale do not exist as in various areas of public bureaucracy. Jacobs is also correct that small private firms tend to be more dynamic in technical terms and aggressive regarding risk than are larger firms. Small independent oil companies in Canada have been responsible for the natural gas finds in Alberta. But size cannot so easily be dismissed in either the private or the public sectors.

As the cost of energy exploration offshore climbs, only the largest firms are able to withstand the risks and then only through joint ventures. Research and development costs are such that many projects can only be financed by governments and then only by some of the countries with the largest GNPs. Indeed, contrary to what Jacobs implies Sweden joined the European Community because it needed access to a much larger export market; Norway may follow.

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In the Canadian context, moreover, the issue of market size is not irrelevant. Industrial operations have a much larger probability of success of becoming world-scale if a firm can count on a large domestic market. Furthermore, there is a very good inverse correlation between dependence on foreign trade and the size of GNP.

The outcome of the Quebec referendum reflected some of this economic awareness by the average Quebec voter. On cultural grounds the average voter certainly sympathized with the aims of Premier Levesque. But that voter also shrewdly observed that sovereignty might not be followed by association. Getting out of federation might be much easier than getting back into a common market. Economic isolation would be costly to Quebec in income terms and might indeed lead to foreign dependencies far greater than those already experienced.

In short, the outcome of the referendum lends further weight to doubts about the Jacobs thesis. Nonetheless, the insights the author has about Canada, about urban society, and about culture make this book well worth the time spent on it.

CHARLES F. DORAN
The Johns Hopkins University

Soviet Economic Thought and Political Power in the USSR *by Aron Katsenelinboigen. Elmsford, N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1980. 213 pp. $25.00.*

Aron Katsenelinboigen has written about Soviet economic thought and political power treating each at two different levels. It is first and foremost an account of the life, times, and works of scientific research workers in the Soviet Union and only secondarily about the subject matter of their work, mathematical economics. The political power is predominantly the power relations within and between competing bureaucracies of research institutes, universities, academies of science, and the editorial boards of major journals. These are linked only very loosely, at the end of the book, to the macropolitics of the Central Committee.

Katsenelinboigen portrays a complex picture of the scientific community and its members. Readers gain insight into a number of figures whose names are familiar (Aganbegian, Fedorenko, Kantorovich, Khachaturov, Kronrod, Lurie, Nemchinov, Novozhilov, Ostrovitianov, Turetskii, Vainshtein) and some clarity on the major institutes, especially TSEMI, the Central Economic Mathematical Institute, where the author worked for many years. The main themes are the interplay between creativity, ambition, and integrity, and the jealousy and the pettiness of the disappointed. In this context the author makes clear one way in which anti-Semitism is manifested in the scientific community, namely, by attacking Jews and firing them when a scapegoat is needed. The author appreciates the complex nature of human beings, but the sheer number of persons in his account—over 300—is overwhelming.

The focal point through which power and economic thought are viewed, at the micro level within the institutes and at the macro level, is the struggle over the role of mathematical economics in a socialist country. Mathematical economics is resisted on four levels: by those who are intimidated by mathematics; by those who have difficulty

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understanding the function of mathematical modeling; by those who perceive a threat to the legitimacy of the regime contained in the optimal planning approach; and by those who fear the micro-level shifts in power if it were to be applied. The first resistance is self-evident and probably diminishing. The remaining three are crucial and interrelated. The author has some very lucid thoughts about the function of mathematical modeling: "The main concern in the economic theory of optimization was not the composition of the optimal plan. The basic goals of this theory were to enrich the intuition of practical workers" (p. 140). The key idea that mathematical modeling poses and that is resisted in the USSR is the notion of opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of doing A is not the amount of socially necessary labor time it requires as measured by good current practice, but the minimum amount of B you have to sacrifice to get it. Rational choice consists of comparing bundle A to bundle B and deciding between them. The ideas of conscious choice among alternative outputs and the search for the least costly technique of production, in terms of alternatives foregone, are profoundly at odds with the Soviet practice of planning. Soviet practice takes the final bill of goods as given and uses present methods of production as the starting point for estimating costs and for allocating materials. Full intuitive acceptance of the notions of optimal planning would jeopardize some Soviet sacred cows.

Despite resistance, mathematical economics has flourished, and diverse and competing research institutes have been deliberately fostered. What is interesting is why the ideas of optimal planning are both fiercely resisted and strongly supported within the USSR. Katsenelinboigen spells out some of the connections between economic thought and macro-level political power in the final chapter, but his account is not as enlightening in this respect as it might be.

In summary, Katsenelinboigen's book will be enjoyable to people who know the research institutes and scholars in the USSR well enough to enjoy a professional gossip account by a sensitive observer. Its main strength for the general reader is its portrayal of real bureaucratic structures. It fleshes out a picture not dominated by a single hierarchy or by a competition of multiple interest groups, but one of multiple competing hierarchies with their collection of ambitious, principled, creative, dogmatic, proud, and petty real people who run the business of the scientific and technical apparatus in the USSR.

DEBORAH DUFF MILENKOVITCH
Barnard College, Columbia University

The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy *by Philip G. Cerny. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1980. 319 pp. $29.50.*

Charles de Gaulle continues to provoke interest because he was one of the few postwar statesmen with a coherent and well-articulated political vision that guided his actions in the foreign-policy arena. It is particularly understandable that Gaullism should claim widespread attention now, at a time when mediocre and floundering leadership based on pragmatism or banal formulas passing for idealism infect and debilitate the West. This is true outside of France, and especially in the United States, where many must feel that the

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Gaullist critique of American leadership has been substantiated by the calamitous developments of the 1970s.

Philip Cerny's book focuses on the concept of "grandeur," in an attempt to explain how this notion enhanced the stability and legitimacy of the Fifth Republic during de Gaulle's tenure in office. He furnishes an extensive discussion of the personal and national roots of a philosophy of grandeur and surveys the principal developments in Atlantic politics during the 1960s. Despite a well-intentioned attempt to understand the origins, goals, and significance of de Gaulle's international policy, Cerny has unfortunately muddled the affair with almost relentless thoroughness. Even the most ardent Gaullist might wonder if grandeur qualifies as an ideology in the proper sense of the term. Indeed, this concept (among many others) is strained, strangled, and mutilated to the readers' despair as they finally learn that it was simply a reorganization of long-standing cultural symbols and ideals synonymous with traditional French nationalism.

Although it is not the author's intention, Gaullist foreign policy is underestimated, even demeaned, by reducing most goals and actions to a mere symbolic role capable of eliciting popular support in France but unable to accomplish much of concrete significance in the world or for the French themselves. Given the many contradictory statements and assessments in this book, the reader is led to wonder if the author has properly understood the complex and shifting aims of long-standing French or Gaullist policies or the nature of the international system itself. Discussions of the 1958 memorandum, the 1966 withdrawal from NATO, the nuclear force, and French European policy leave the impression that the issues have not been carefully thought through. For example, given French public opinion at the time, it seems odd to argue that during the 1960s "France's inability to possess a nuclear striking force without seriously affecting the bipolar strategic balance enhanced not so much French prestige abroad, but Gaullist prestige at home" (p. 125). It is also idiosyncratic to insist that 1968 did not mark a turning point for Gaullist foreign policy because de Gaulle's basic aims had been satisfied by the end of 1966 (pp. 148–49). (In my view, the 1966–1968 period marked a temporary retreat into semi-isolation that was never a primary aim of de Gaulle; it was a temporary expedient abandoned by the autumn of 1968.) And, finally, it is doubtful that Cerny has understood the Fourth Republic's record of conflict and dissidence within the Atlantic Alliance, when he writes that in this period "as far as French foreign policy is concerned, the broad framework of the Atlantic Alliance was accepted and its limitations respected" (p. 159).

A reader irritated by flawed or contradictory judgments might also wonder why, in a book whose principal thesis concerns the domestic effects of foreign policy, the bulk of the material is devoted to rather standard and unenlightening external policy analysis. One slim chapter dips into the specific effects on domestic politics, but it is an unsatisfactory discussion of some very tenuous public-opinion data. Given the author's contention (a correct one, I think) that Gaullist foreign-policy principles helped establish the legitimacy of the Fifth Republic, it is unfortunate that he dogmatically refuses to extend his analysis beyond de Gaulle's fall in 1969, into the 1970s when the foreign-policy legacy was indeed enshrined—on the left and right—as a pillar of the regime. This was not really the case by the late 1960s, when the defense policy was often challenged and, in any event, domestic issues had a more significant effect on the stability of the Gaullist state.

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In addition to conceptual deficiencies, the book suffers from a number of annoying defects, in style and execution. It relies heavily on a limited number of outdated or mediocre secondary sources. They are quoted often, and at great length, in a text that tends to summarize the ideas of others without really synthesizing them. A review of the much discussed 1960s should bring new evidence or a fresh approach to bear on the period, but this is not the case here. Cerny's views too often reflect the contradictions, misconceptions, and uncertainties of the period rather than transcending them to achieve a new and useful perspective. At one point in his discussion, the author honestly promises a "nebulous," possibly even incoherent, account of an important problem (p. 246). I fear he has delivered the goods in an entire book that is a disappointment and an injustice to its noble theme.

MICHAEL M. HARRISON
Johns Hopkins University

The Other Western Europe: A Political Analysis of the Smaller Democracies *by Earl H. Fry et al. Santa Barbara, Calif., American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, 1980. 251 pp. $24.75.*

The two major authors of this text on the smaller democracies of Western Europe have two laudable purposes: to fill a gap in students' knowledge of the political structure and processes in European states other than the "Big Three" (Britain, West Germany, and France); and to do so by employing a comparative analysis. They have had only limited success. The authors sought to compare two Iberian countries, two Alpine countries, the three Benelux countries, and three Scandinavian countries by examining the historical setting; political culture and socialization; internal cleavages, political competition, and citizen participation; governmental institutions and the policymaking process; and policy problems and prospects. Much interesting information is provided under these headings, but the descriptions are for the most part superficial, and the material included in the categories is not strictly comparable from one country to another. Although the book starts out bravely with a discussion of methodological problems in comparative analysis, there is no clear context for any comparisons. For example, what distinguishes these small and middle powers from the great powers other than their size? Do they have anything else in common with each other?

The concluding chapter, supposedly an overall comparison, ends up by stating that it is imperative for Western Europe to search for more solidarity and unity by a relentless forward push. Such a plea follows a quick examination of some regional European international organizations. To include these organizations in "the other Western Europe" was an interesting idea, but it was poorly integrated into the rest of the book except for the final chapter. Perhaps it was also useful to include NATO, although this is really a North Atlantic organization, which from the beginning eschewed a purely European approach.

There is a fairly sophisticated section on Switzerland and Austria, oddly associated under the rubric "Alpine" and written by David Bohn (who is otherwise unidentified even in the preface). Elsewhere the approach is wooden, reading somewhat like a handbook

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put out by the governments involved. This is particularly true for the section on Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, whose author, James Waite, could have tapped a wealth of interesting political analyses.

Careful editing would have greatly improved the literary qualities of the book, which leans towards the journalistic style, includes a number of slang expressions, and some quite grotesque terms. The infelicitous style detracts from the value of the book for educating students. Their interest might have been aroused also if those sections praising the stability of some of the small democracies contained some reference to youth-group revolts against what they regard as the suffocating conservatism of these polities. The authors did, however, call to the students' attention certain political characteristics associated especially with the particular groupings of states: corporatism, consociation, diversity accommodated by federalism, and experiments in social democracy.

ANNETTE BAKER FOX
Columbia University

Multinationals in Latin America: The Politics of Nationalization *by Paul Sigmund. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1980. 426 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $6.50.*

"Sovereignty at Bay" and "Storm over the Multinationals" were some of the leading titles in the heated academic debate about transnational enterprises in the early and mid-seventies. Although, as often happens with such matters, the differences between critics and defenders of transnational corporations (TNC) were never resolved, the issue seems to have faded away. Questions related to international debt, for example, are likely to receive far more scholarly and journalistic attention in the early 1980s than exchanges on the impact of TNCs on home and host country economies. In this useful book Paul Sigmund analyzes some of the reasons for this lower priority as far as the Latin American political agenda is concerned. Focusing on the question of nationalization of foreign enterprises in the Latin American experience, Sigmund, after a legal-historical introduction to the issue, provides the reader with five case studies, arguably the most significant from a comparative perspective—Mexico, Cuba, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. Two final chapters develop the author's conclusions on what he considers to be the mixed blessings of nationalization for developing countries as well as his recommendations for U.S. foreign policy on this controversial subject, one that has fueled so much discord and recriminations in U.S.-Latin American relations in the last four decades.

Sigmund's thesis is straightforward. Foreign control over some of Latin America's key extractive industries is mostly a matter of the past. Successive nationalizations, most of which ended up involving the U.S. government in one way or another, have brought basic natural resources under national control. In the process, Latin American governments have come to realize that nationalization is not a panacea for the country's problems, and TNCs have increasingly turned to investment in manufacturing and to technical and managerial services, moving away from equity ownership in the primary sector of the Latin American economies. As a result, the relationship between the "new sovereigns"

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and the Latin American governments has become pragmatic and business-like rather than ideological and confrontational.

Few critics will find fault with this assessment, which has been set forth by a number of authors. A particularly important corollary of the nationalization experiences is that the U.S. position asking for "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation has been rendered obsolete by international practice; in Sigmund's judgment, the sooner it is replaced by the more modest request for "fair and equitable" compensation, the better.

There is no doubt that the author has provided readers with a well-designed and carefully researched study that addresses an important issue in the political economy of Latin America and inter-American relations. Country specialists may raise questions about one or another aspect of each of the cases; I, for example, consider that the historical evidence available simply does not support Sigmund's quite positive evaluation of Frei's "Chileanization" of the copper industry or his highly negative assessment of Allende's nationalization of the *Gran Mineria*. The main point, however, is that the book would have benefited considerably from a narrower and more systematic and structured approach to the case studies. By extending the discussion of each of the nationalization experiences into the broader "developmental model issues" raised by each country study, the chapters become somewhat unfocused; an in-depth analysis of the issue at hand would have considerably strengthened them. By the same token, a more systematic effort at identifying key variables in each of the cases would have allowed the author to develop his line of argument with greater empirical support.

JORGE HEINE
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 *by Michael Brecher, with Benjamin Geist. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980. 479 pp. $24.95.*

This in-depth study is the first in a projected series on the behavior of individual states in times of crisis. Using a "model of crisis behavior," Brecher examines the influence of stress (an independent variable composed of perceptions of threat, time, and war probability) mediated through "coping mechanisms" on the patterns of choices of Israel's decision makers in the crises of 1967 and 1973. The bulk of the book is devoted to an extensive examination of the phases prior to, during, and following both crises and relies on published primary and secondary sources and on extensive field research and interviews.

Israel is an excellent choice for the first in this series. It is one of the most open and accessible societies in the world. Both the quality and quantity of the data available in a highly sensitive area are almost unprecedented. Added to this is the fact that Brecher brings to this study an outstanding set of credentials. Over the years he has produced a remarkably comprehensive and detailed record of Israeli foreign-policy decision making. In this particular instance he has produced a rigorous, methodical, and heuristically interesting study that presents its conclusions in falsifiable form and thus provides a useful framework for further research. The final section on the influence of increasing and declining stress on choice is likely to prove especially valuable to other scholars in

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generating additional hypotheses on the impact of stress on decision making. Overall, his attempt to investigate the specific consequences of stress in times of crisis and his use of a comparative approach to do so are important contributions to the theoretical literature.

Aside from its theoretical importance, the book is also a significant addition to the literature on Israel. It clearly identifies the decisions made in each crisis, the groups and individuals participating in them, and the dynamics of the crisis syndrome itself.

There are, however, some substantive and methodological problems with the study which those engaging in future projects might wish to contemplate. Some attempt needs to be made to include variables on the "dimensions of crisis" and the "attributes of the actor" in the model. The author asserts that the magnitude or intensity of stress is a function of these variables but does not attempt to operationalize their influence. Another problem concerns the available data and what these data are supposed to be measuring. Stress is a feeling, after all, and the application of the model depends on being able to measure its intensity at any point in time. Some variables (for example, structure, realm of options) are easily quantified. Others such as "psychological environment" or "belief system" are much more elusive. Reliance on memoirs or self-reporting is often a problematical approach especially when the quality of the data is so variable. (Meir's autobiography is not as reliable or comprehensive as those of Dayan or Eban, for example.) Using inference data, on the other hand, runs the risk of circular reasoning: There were more meetings because there was increased stress; we know there was increased stress because there were more meetings.

The model might also be enriched by an attempt to include the influence of personality. Although this is also an elusive concept, it was certainly a factor. One thinks of Rabin's reported breakdown in 1967 or Dayan's pessimism in 1973 as compared with Meir's crucial strength in the early days of the 1973 war, for example.

Methodologically, there could have been better integration of the comparative and historical chapters. Brecher needs more analysis of the significance of some of his findings. Since the history chapters presented little that is new, they might well have been shortened and the comparative chapters expanded. The text, moreover, is often encumbered by data without sufficient discussion. The procedures for coding, for example, need to be more clearly explained, especially as so many of the findings are aggregated through that process. Finally, there is need for an integrating chapter at the end pulling the book together.

Despite these criticisms, this is an important book that will have to be consulted by anyone doing research on crisis decision making.

Lewis Brownstein
State University of New York at New Paltz

Humanity in Warfare *by Geoffrey Best. New York, Columbia University Press, 1980. 400 pp. $25.00.*

A good general history of the efforts to impose humanitarian restraints on warfare in the modern period has not existed prior to this book. Indeed, Best's treatment of this fun-

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damentally important theme is not merely good; it is at once a work of international law, military history, and general history, woven skillfully together within a perspective that continually raises to view the moral questions that the effort to restrain war has attempted to answer. Approaches from each of the disciplines mentioned have their own merits, but the merit of Best's book is that it integrates them all. Moreover, in none of the disciplinary approaches has there been much regard for moral questions, and while Best is by no means a moral philosopher, it is his overall sensitivity to the need to maintain certain basic standards of humanity even in warfare that animates his investigation and brings his various foci into convergence.

The plan of this book is as follows: Beginning with the publicists and what Best terms their "later Enlightenment consensus" on the limits of war, he traces the demise of that consensus in revolutionary, national, and popular warfare of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; he then steps sideways to examine the legislative foundations of modern international law on war in the period 1815–1914, following with a chapter on the stresses imposed by the total warfare of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945; finally, he analyzes developments and trends in the humanitarian law of war from 1945 to the present. Best is obviously indebted to Vattel, whom he frequently mentions; Vattel's conception of the limits of war is taken as the reference point from which the death of the Enlightenment consensus is judged to have occurred. At the other end of his time scale, Best stresses the importance of the Geneva Conventions, "Geneva" or "humanitarian" law as opposed to "Hague" law. Best's perspective requires that he be particularly interested in certain recurrent problems: the definition of "enemy," that is, whether all the citizens of a nation with which one is at war are enemies; the definition and protection of noncombatants, particularly civilians and neutrals in the way of war; the bombardment and other indiscriminate means of warfare; the behavior of occupying forces; the definition and limitation of reprisals; and the clarification of the concept of military necessity. The chief theme in all this is protection of the civilian noncombatant, the peculiar victim of modern warfare. An entire book waits to be written about the protection of noncombatants in wartime, and until it is done, Best's discussion goes far in that direction.

The principal limitation of Best's study is that his sources are overwhelmingly European ones. Thus he is at his best in discussing European phenomena, such as the attitudes toward war of leading figures in the French Revolution or the strategic bombing of German cities by the Allies in World War II. Indeed, these two examples are superb sections of the book—in particular, Best's treatment of the strategic bombing, suggesting its roots might lie in earlier British naval policies toward bombardment. On the other hand, for example, when the subject is the American Civil War, the ground underfoot is considerably narrower, and Best pays hardly any attention to Far Eastern or Third World warfare.

Yet when all is said, this should be an enormously helpful book to persons interested in the development of ideas on restraint in warfare. It is broad and general enough for the beginner, particular and detailed enough for the specialist, wholistic and integrative enough for both, and unfailingly readable throughout.

JAMES T. JOHNSON
Rutgers University

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Reference Books and Source Materials Received

Basic Documents on Human Rights, 2d. ed. *edited by Ian Brownlie. New York, Oxford University Press, 1981. 505 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $34.95.*

Encyclopedia of Black America *edited by W. A. Low and Virgil A. Clift. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981. 921 pp. $49.50.*

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Policy Studies Review Annual, vol. 4 *edited by Bertram H. Raven. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, Inc., 1980. 768 pp. $35.00.*

Public Administration in American Society: A Guide to Information Services *edited by John E. Rouse, Jr. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Company, 1980. 553 pp. $32.00.*

Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968–1979 *prepared by Edward F. Mickolus. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980. 967 pp. $75.00.*

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

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

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